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Mav the studing of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and mav their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

**Mishna**

If one stores away (*seeds – even a very small amount*) for planting, (*or a different substance to be used*) for a sample, or for a medicine, and he then carries it out on *Shabbos*, he is liable - whatever its size (*for since he demonstrated that the substance, even in that small amount, was significant for him*). Other people, however, are not liable unless (*it is carried*) in accordance with its standard. And if he (*himself*) carries it back again (*for he decided not to plant it, etc., after all, and takes it back into the private domain*), he is liable only in accordance with its standard (*for by changing his mind, he removes the significance with which he first attached to it, and it is the same as any other of its kind*). (90b)

**Standard for Carrying**

The *Gemora* asks: Why must the *Mishna* state that ‘he stored it away’ (*first, before he carried it out*); let it state (*simply*): ‘If one carries out for (*the purpose of*) planting, for a sample, or for a medicine, he is liable -whatever its size (*for a definite standard is required only when one carries it out without any specified purpose, but if he states his purpose, he attaches significance to it*)?’

Abaye said: The *Mishna* is discussing a case where one stored it away and then forgot why he stored it away, and now he carries it out without any specific purpose. One might have said that his intention has been nullified (*and therefore, he will be exempt from a chatas*); therefore we

are informed that whenever one does anything, he does it with his original purpose.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: Rabbi Meir maintained that one is liable even if he carries out a single kernel of wheat for planting.

The *Gemora* asks: But that is obvious, for we learned in the *Mishna*: whatever its size?

The *Gemora* answers: You might thought that whatever its size is to exclude the standard of the quantity of a dried fig, yet in truth, one is not liable unless there is as much as an olive; therefore, we are informed that this is not so.

Rav Yitzchak the son of Rav Yehudah asked: If so (*that liability depends on one’s intentions*), if one declares his intention of carrying out his entire house (*at one time*), is he really not liable unless he carries out his entire house?

The *Gemora* answers: There his intention is negated vis a vis that of (*the intentions of*) all men.

The *Mishna* had stated: Other people, however, are not liable unless (*it is carried*) in accordance with its standard.

The *Gemora* notes that the *Mishna* does not agree with Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar, for it was taught in a *braisa*: Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar said a general rule: Whatever is not fit for storage (*i.e. something forbidden from benefit*) or it is not a proper amount that is fit for storage (*i.e. a tiny amount of something*), and even so, it was fit for someone

and he did store it away, and somebody else carried it out to a public domain on *Shabbos*, the second person is liable due to the thoughts of the first person.

Rava said in the name of Rav Nachman: If one carries out as much as a dried fig for the purpose of eating it there, and then decides to use it for planting, or (*the reverse*) if he carried it out for the purpose of planting it there, and then decides to use it for eating, he is liable.

The *Gemora* asks: But that is obvious: consider it from this time (*when he lifted the item*), there is the standard (*needed to be liable*), and consider it from this time (*when he placed the item down*), there is the standard? [*The standard for 'eating' is the size of a dried fig, and the standard for 'planting' is even the smallest amount.*]

The *Gemora* answers: One might have thought that both the removal and depositing (*of the item*) must be done with the same intention (*in order to be liable*), which is lacking here; therefore, he informs us that this is not so.

Rava inquired: What if one carries out half the size of a dried fig for planting, but it swells (*to the volume of a dried fig*) and he (*changes his mind and he*) decides to use it for the purpose of eating it? Can you argue that only there (*in the preceding case*) is he liable, because consider it from this point of time and there is the standard, and consider it from that point of time and there is the standard; whereas here, since it did not contain the standard of food when he carried it out (*for then it was less than the volume of a dried fig*), he is not liable. Or perhaps, since he would be liable for his intention of planting if he were silent and did not (*change his mind and*) intend it for another purpose, he is still liable now?

Rava continues: Now, should you decide to rule that since he would be liable for his intention of planting if he were silent and did not intend it for another purpose, he is still liable now; what (*would be the halachah*) if one carries out as much as a dried fig for the purpose of eating it and it

shrivels up and he (*changes his mind and he*) decides to use it for planting? Here it is certain that if he remained silent (*and not have changed his mind*), he would not be liable on account of his original intention (*for it was less than the standard, and therefore he should be exempt from liability*); or perhaps we regard the present (*intention only*), and therefore, he is liable?

Rava continues: And should you rule that we regard the present, and therefore he is liable; what (*would be the halachah*) if one carries out as much as a dried fig for the purpose of eating it, and it shrivels up and then swells up again (*to the size of a fig, and then he places it down*)? Does (*the principle of*) disqualification operate with respect to *Shabbos* or not? [*The principle of disqualification (lit., 'negation') is that once a thing or a person has been disqualified in respect to a certain matter, it or he remains so, even if circumstances change. Thus here, when it shrivels, it becomes unfit to cause liability, being less than the standard: does it remain so or not?*] The *Gemora* leaves this question unresolved.

Rava inquired of Rav Nachman: What is the *halachah* if one throws *terumah* of the size of an olive into a *tamei* house?

The *Gemora* asks in its attempt to clarify the inquiry: In respect of what is the inquiry? If it is in respect of *Shabbos* (*where he threw it from one domain to another*), we require the size of a dried fig (*and an olive's volume is less than the standard*)? If it is in respect of *tumah* (*regarding its ability to transmit tumah to other items*), we require foodstuff to be as much as an egg's volume (*and an olive's volume is less than the standard*)?

The *Gemora* answers: After all, it is in respect of *Shabbos*, and the circumstances of the case is where there is food (*in the house*) less than an egg's volume and this (*terumah, by landing next to the other food*) makes it up to an egg in quantity. What is the *halachah*? Since it combines in respect of *tumah*, he will also be liable in respect to



*Shabbos*; or perhaps in all matters relating to *Shabbos*, we require the size of a dried fig?

Rav Nachman said to him: We have learned it in a *braisa*: Abba Shaul said: As for the two loaves of bread (*which accompany the shelamim sacrifices on Shavuos*) and the showbread (*referring to the twelve loaves placed on the Shulchan – the Table, every week in the Temple*), their standard is the size of a dried fig. But why is this so? Let us say that since in respect of its going out (*beyond the walls of the Courtyard; if they are taken beyond that, they become disqualified for food, and the Kohen who eats them, violates a negative prohibition*), the standard is the size of an olive, in respect of *Shabbos* as well, it is the size of an olive? [And since we do not reason like that, we see that there is no connection between the standard of liability for carrying out on *Shabbos* and that required for other purposes.]

The *Gemora* disagrees: How can the two cases be compared? There, immediately, when one took it out of the walls of the Courtyard it becomes disqualified as that which has gone out, whereas there is no culpability for the violation of *Shabbos* until he carries it into public domain; but here *Shabbos* and *tumah* come simultaneously. [As it comes to rest the action of throwing is completed, and simultaneously, the standard for *tumah* has been reached.]

The *Mishna* had stated: And if he (*himself*) carries it back again (*for he decided not to plant it, etc., after all, and takes it back into the private domain*), he is liable only in accordance with its standard (*for by changing his mind, he removes the significance with which he first attached to it, and it is the same as any other of its kind*).

The *Gemora* asks: But is that not obvious? [*Is he not now like any other person?*]

Abaye said: What is the case we are discussing here? It is where (*he did not explicitly state that he is changing his mind, but rather*) he threw it back into the storehouse, but

its place is clearly recognizable. One might have thought that since its place is recognizable (*amongst the other seeds*), it stands in its original condition (*as something that was designated*); the *Tanna* therefore teaches us that by throwing it back into the storehouse, he indeed nullifies it (*i.e., his initial intention*). (90b – 91b)

## INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

### *Original Intent*

In many areas of the Torah, we find that a person's thoughts and intentions are taken into account. One of the most well-known examples is the *machlokes* if *mitzvos* require intent. The accepted halacha is that *mitzvos* do require intent. Thus if one goes through the motions of a *mitzvah*, without intending to fulfill Hashem's commandment, he has not fulfilled his obligation. The question however remains whether intent is required during the entire performance of the *mitzvah*, or it is sufficient for one to begin the *mitzvah* with intent, and then let his mind drift off to other matters.

Our sugya introduces a general principle that is quite crucial to this matter; "Whenever a person performs an action, he does so based on his original intent." This principle is applied to a wide variety of cases. For example, in regard to the service of the Kohanim in the Beis HaMikdash, certain intentions can render a *korban* invalid. The *Gemara* rules that any intent the Kohen harbored at the beginning of his service, influences his entire service (*Zevachim* 41b).

In our own sugya, the *Gemara* applies this principle to *melech hotza'ah* – carrying on *Shabbos*. The *Gemara* tells us that in order for a person to be liable for transgressing *melech hotza'ah*, the object he carries must be of a certain minimum size. If it is smaller than this size, he is not obligated to offer a *korban* in atonement. Nevertheless, the minimum sizes mentioned in the *Mishna* and *Gemara* are true only as a general indicator of how



much is considered significant. If an object is so small that it is insignificant to the general public, but a certain person considers it to be significant, then he alone is liable for carrying it, whereas all others are exempt. Thus, for example, a single gardening seed is insignificant to the general public. However, if someone stores it for later use, he has shown that he values it, and he would therefore be liable for carrying it, whereas all others would be exempt. The Gemara further states that if he later forgot why he had stored it, and then carried it outside, he is still liable. His original intention will continue to determine the halachic significance of his actions, even though he no longer consciously harbors this intent. Only a conscious decision to the contrary will negate his original intention.

**Today's thought for tomorrow:** The Pri Megadim questions whether a conscious decision made today has halachic significance for tomorrow as well. Specifically, the Pri Megadim discusses spinning wool for tzitzis, which requires conscious intent for the sake of the *mitzvah* of tzitzis. Is it sufficient to express one's intent on the first day of his work, and then mindlessly continue his work on days to come? The Pri Megadim rules that it is sufficient. The general rule that, "whenever a person performs an action, he does so based on his original intent," applies even on subsequent days. The Mishna Berura (Shaar HaTzion 11, s.k. 3) cites a proof for this from our sugya. Presumably, the gardening seed was stored away before Shabbos. Nevertheless, the intention from before Shabbos renders him liable for carrying it on Shabbos.

The Mishna Berura (Biur Halacha *ibid*, s.v. *sheyomar*) adds that when one begins spinning wool for tzitzis, he need not be in mind that all the wool he will later spin will be for the sake of tzitzis. It is enough that he begins with this intent, and the general rule cited above automatically extends the effect of his intent.

**Walking to shul to hear the shofar blown:** Original intent need not be expressed during the actual performance of the *mitzvah*. Even if a person expresses his intent before

he begins the *mitzvah*, and then performs the *mitzvah* mindlessly, he still fulfills his obligation. Based on this, the Radvaz (cited in Magen Avraham 584:4) rules that if a person walks to shul with intent to fulfill the *mitzvah* of hearing shofar, but when he actually heard the shofar he had no such intent, he still fulfills the *mitzvah*.

However, it is quite possible that the Radvaz referred specifically to mitzvos such as hearing shofar, in which one need not perform any action. When performing mitzvos such as spinning tzitzis or baking matzos, one must verbally declare his intent. In such cases, perhaps one must declare his intent as he begins the *mitzvah*, and not beforehand.

DAILY MASHAL

**Hashem spoke to Moshe, saying: 'Lift up the heads (count) the sons of Gershon... from ages thirty to fifty, to include all that join the legion to work in the tent of meeting... This is the service of the family of Gershon; to work and to carry... the curtains of the Tabernacle and the Tent of Meeting... their utensils...'**

**(On the day the Tabernacle was fully consecrated) the Israelite princes (one from each tribe) brought their offerings to Hashem; six covered wagons and twelve oxen – a wagon from each of two princes and an ox from each – and they brought them before the Tabernacle. Hashem said to Moshe: 'You may take them... they shall be for the service of the Tent of Meeting. You shall give them to the Levites, each according to the needs of his work'. Moshe took the wagons... he presented two of them together with four oxen to the sons of Gershon... and four wagons and eight of the oxen he gave to the sons of Merari, in accordance with their work... (7:3-8)**

The name of the parasha – naso – is translated as 'count' or 'take a census'. Naso es rosh may also be translated as 'lift up the head' – which is its literal translation. Indeed, the Ramban (to 1:2) writes that 'lift up the head' has two

implications; one positive and the other negative. It could mean that the people would spiritually be lifted up to an exalted level, or that literally, their heads would be removed. – as Yosef used the term to mean both, when he predicted that the chief butler would be restored to his former glory and that the chief baker would be executed (Gen. 40:13,19). Likewise, explains the Ramban, this term communicated to the people that would be spiritually uplifted if they were worthy; but they would suffer greatly if they would not.

The task allocated to the Gershon (and Merari) sub-tribes of Levi were both heavy and less prestigious compared to the middle sub-tribe Kehas – whose house include Moshe and Aaron. The sub-tribe of Kehas were given sole responsibility for the holiest of Tabernacle artefacts – the Holy Ark containing the Tablets of Stone, the menorah, the golden table, the two altars (4:1-20). In contrast, the Gershon and Kehas only got the heavier, and socio-religiously less-prestigious external structures: the boards, the curtains, the courtyard fittings.

Which they accepted without murmur of complaint. Even though Gershon – not Kehas – was the firstborn of Levi. Unlike Korach, who in similar position complained about the precedence of Eltzafan ben Uziel (3:30, see also Rashi to 16:1), Gershon accepted his portion willingly.

In doing so, Hashem made it easier. A rich donation of wheeled transport came unexpectedly from the princes of the other tribes. That would save Gershon (and Merari) nearly all the hard work. Instead of having to schlep the heavy boards and posts over expanses of hot, desert territory, the ox-powered wagons would do the whole job for them.

That would deprive Gershon and Merari of the mitzvah of transporting their part of the Tabernacle. Surely that would deprive them of their spiritual portion?

Hashem effectively said 'No!'

For the subtribes of Gershon and Merari accepted the less

glamorous roles – Gershon even though his branch was the firstborn of Levi. Their very commitment was enough. That was expressed by their taking those lesser positions willingly and without protest.

Having fully accepted, their fulfillment was not being reduced by having the oxen and wagons doing nearly all the work for them. For – as the Rabbis put it – when a person intends to carry out a good deed, but cannot do so for circumstances beyond their control, Hashem treats the good intention as though he actually did the deed. Machashava Ke-Ma-aseh – the thought is worthy as the deed.

That may well be what Hashem was teaching Moshe. He told Moshe to accept the gift and assign it to the Levite sub-tribes. Yes – that prince-donated consignment of transport would ease the burdens on Gershon and Kehas. But it would not detract for the good deed of willingly accepting the less-prestigious tasks without protest. For Machashava Ke-Ma-aseh – the thought is worthy as the deed.

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