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Mav the studing of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and mav their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Mishna

If one intends to carry out (*an object*) in front of him (*such as money wrapped in a cloth, which he tied in a bundle to his cloak in front of him*), but it came behind him (*as he was carrying the object out, it slipped and moved to the back of him*), he is not liable; behind him, but it came in front of him, he is liable.

In truth, they said: A woman, who wraps herself with an underskirt (*worn for modesty reasons*), whether the object is carried in front or behind her, is liable, because it is normal for it to reverse itself (*and she knew that from the outset; her intention, therefore, was to carry it in any way*).

Rabbi Yehudah said: Also letter carriers (*are liable when that which they are carrying moves to the front or back of them*). (92b)

Different Ways of Carrying

The *Gemora* asks: What is the difference (*why is it that*) if one intends to carry out (*an object*) in front of him, but it came behind him that he is not liable? Presumably it is because his intention was not fulfilled! But then in the case where he intended to carry it behind him, but it came in front of him, (*he should also not be liable*), his intention was also not fulfilled!?

Rabbi Elozar said: There is indeed a contradiction! He who taught the one (*case*) did not teach the other.

Rava said: But what is the difficulty: Perhaps where he intended to carry out (*an object*) in front of him, but it came behind him, the reason that he is not liable is because he intended a strong guarding, whereas he succeeded (*in transporting it only with*) a weak guarding; but if he intended to carry it behind him, and it

came in front of him, the reason that he is liable is because he intended only a weak guarding, whereas he succeeded (*in transporting it with*) a strong guarding (*and since he is pleased with the result, it may be said that his intentions were fulfilled*).

The *Gemora* asks: But then, what is Rabbi Elozar’s difficulty?

The *Gemora* answers: The inferences drawn from the *Mishna* are difficult, for the first part of the *Mishna* states: if one intends to carry out (*an object*) in front of him, but it came behind him, he is not liable. We may infer from here that if he would have intended to carry it behind him and it remained behind him, he is liable. Then consider the second clause: he intended to carry it behind him, but it came in front of him, only then is he liable: We may infer from here that if he intended to carry it behind him and it remained behind him, he is not liable? Rabbi Elozar therefore answered: There is indeed a contradiction! He who taught the one (*case*) did not teach the other.

Rav Ashi said: But what is the difficulty: Perhaps the *Mishna* is written in a “it is unnecessary to state” format, as follows: It is unnecessary to state that if he intended to carry it behind him and it remained behind him that he is liable, since his intention was fulfilled; rather, even if he intended to carry it behind him, but it came in front of him, it must be stated (*that he is liable*), for you might have thought that since his intention was not fulfilled, he is not liable; therefore the *Mishna* informs us that since he intended (*only*) a weak guarding, whereas he succeeded (*in transporting it with*) a strong guarding, so that he is liable.

The *Gemora* suggests that the case where he intended to carry it behind him and it remained behind him, there is a dispute amongst the *Tannaim*, for it was taught in a *braisa*: If one carries out coins in his money belt with its opening above, he is liable, if its opening was below (*in a way that the coins can fall out*), Rabbi



Yehudah rules that he is liable, but the Sages hold that he is exempt. Rabbi Yehudah said to them: Do you not admit that if one intended to carry out an object behind him and it remained behind him that he is liable? [*Accordingly, it should be the same when he carried it behind him.*] And they said to him: Do you not admit that if one carries out an object with the back of his hand or with his foot, he is not liable (*so too, it should be where he carried the coins with the opening facing downward*)? Rabbi Yehudah concluded: I stated one thing (*to prove my point*), and they stated one point. I found no answer to their argument, and they found no answer to mine.

Now, since he said to them: Do you not admit (*where the object remained behind him*), does it not surely follow that the Rabbis hold that he is not liable?

The *Gemora* disagrees: Then according to your reasoning, when they said to him: Do you not admit (*where it was carried with the back of hand or foot*), does it follow that Rabbi Yehudah holds him to be liable! But surely it was taught in a *braisa*: With the back of his hand or his foot, all agree that he is not liable!

Rather, the *Gemora* concludes as follows: if one intends to carry out an object behind him and it remains behind him, all agree that he is liable (*for some people carry it that way, and it is therefore regarded as a usual manner*); with the back of his hand or foot, all agree that he is not liable (*for people do not carry objects in such a manner*). They disagree when he carries it out coins in his money belt with its opening below: one master likens it to a case where he intended to carry it out behind him and it remained behind him (*and he would be liable*), while the other master likens it to carrying with the back of one's hand or foot (*and he would be exempt*).

The *Mishna* had stated: In truth, they said: A woman etc.

It was taught in a *braisa*: Every (*statement of*) 'in truth,' (*it means that*) that is the *halachah*.

The *Mishna* had stated: Rabbi Yehudah said: Also letter carriers (*are liable when that which they are carrying moves to the front or back of them*).

It was taught in a *braisa*: Because royal scribes would do like that. (92b)

Mishna

If one carries out a loaf (*of bread*) into the public domain, he is liable. If two people carry it out, they are not liable. If (*each*) one (*of them*) could not carry it out (*by himself*) and two carry it out, they are liable; but Rabbi Shimon exempts them. (92b)

Two performing Together

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav, and others state, Abaye said, and others state that it was taught in a *braisa*: If each (*of them*) alone is able (*and they both do it together*), Rabbi Meir holds that they are liable, while Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon hold that they are not liable. If each alone is unable, Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Meir hold that they are liable, while Rabbi Shimon exempts them. If one is able but the other is not, all agree that he is liable.

It was taught likewise in a *braisa*: If one carries out a loaf (*of bread*) into the public domain, he is liable. If two carry it out, Rabbi Meir holds that they are liable. Rabbi Yehudah rules: If one could not carry it out and both carry it out, they are liable, otherwise, they are not liable; while Rabbi Shimon exempts them.

The *Gemora* asks: From where do we know these things?

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: *From among the people of the land, by committing it*. Only he who performs the entire forbidden action (*is liable to a chatas*), but not he who performs a portion of it. How so? If two are holding a pitchfork and piling produce (*which is in violation of the melachah of "gathering"*), or (*they were holding*) the shuttle and arranging the warp threads, or (*they were holding*) a quill and writing with it; or a reed and carrying it out into the public domain, I might think that they are liable; therefore it is stated: *by committing it*. Only he who performs the entire forbidden action (*is liable to a chatas*), but not he who performs a portion of it. If they were holding (*something heavier, such as*) a round cake of pressed figs and they carry it out into the public domain, or a beam and they carry it out into the public domain, Rabbi Yehudah said: If one cannot carry it out and both carry it out, they are liable; if not, they are not liable.



Rabbi Shimon said: Even if one cannot carry it out and both carry it out, they are not liable, for it is for this that it is stated: *by committing it* - to teach us that if a single person does it, he is liable; whereas if two do it, they are exempt.

The *Gemora* asks: What is the point of issue between them?

The *Gemora* answers: They argue as to how to interpret this verse: *If one soul (an individual) from among the people of the land shall sin unintentionally, by committing it.*

Rabbi Shimon holds: Three exclusionary terms are written: *'a soul' shall sin; 'one' shall sin; 'by committing it' he shall sin.* One excludes the case where one person lifts an object from one domain and another person sets it down in the other domain; a second is to exclude the case of each being able separately to perform the action (*and they nevertheless did it together*); and the third is to exclude a case where neither is able alone (*to perform the action himself, and they both do it together*).

Rabbi Yehudah holds: One excludes the case where one person lifts an object from one domain and another person sets it down in the other domain; a second is to exclude the case of each being able separately to perform the action (*and they nevertheless did it together*); and the third is to exclude the case of an individual who acts on the ruling of *Beis Din* (*and based on their ruling, he went ahead and transgressed a Biblical violation; he is exempt from liability*).

The *Gemora* notes that Rabbi Shimon is consistent with his view, for he maintains: An individual who acts on the ruling of *Beis Din* is liable.

Rabbi Meir holds: Is it then written: *'a soul' shall sin; 'one' shall sin; 'by committing it' he shall sin?* Only two exclusionary terms are written: One excludes the case where one person lifts an object from one domain and another person sets it down in the other domain; and the second excludes the case of an individual who acts on the ruling of *Beis Din*. [*Since there is no third term, R' Meir holds that two people who carry something together, are liable to a chatas.*]

The master said: If one is able but the other is not, all agree that he is liable.

The *Gemora* asks: Which one is liable?

Rav Chisda: He who is able is liable, for if the one who is unable, what did he do then (*he is not able*)?

Rav Hamnuna said to him: Surely he is helping him?

Rav Chisda replied: Helping someone is not significant.

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: We learned likewise in a *Mishna*: If he (*a zav*) is sitting on a bed and four shawls are under the feet of the bed, they are *tamei*, because it cannot stand on three; but Rabbi Shimon declares it *tahor*. [*This is consistent with his opinion here that where neither can do the work alone, each is regarded merely as a help.*] If he is riding on an animal and four shawls are under its feet, they are *tahor*, because it can stand on three. The *Gemora* asks: But why so? Surely each helps the other? It must be because we maintain that helping is not considered significant.

Rav Yehudah of Diskarta asked: Perhaps I may tell you that helping is significant, but here it is different because it (*the animal*) lifts it (*the foot*) entirely (*off the ground*).

The *Gemora* disagrees: But since it alternatively lifts one foot and then another, let it be as a *zav* who turns about (*while he is sleeping*). Did we not learn that if a *zav* is lying on five benches or five money belts, the *halachah* is as follows: if he was lying along their length, they are *tamei*, but if he is lying along their width, they are *tahor*.

The *Mishna* continues: If he is sleeping, and there is a doubt that he may have turned around upon them, they are *tamei*. [*Yet, in the case of the shawls, they are all tahor, even though one of the shawls may have been stepped upon by the animal?*] Evidently, it must surely be because we say that helping is not significant.

Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: We too learnt like this in a *Mishna*: Rabbi Yosi said: A horse conveys *tumah* (*when carrying a zav*) through its forelegs, a donkey through its hind legs, because a horse rests its weight upon its forelegs, while a donkey rests its upon its hind legs. But why should this be so, seeing that they help each other to bear the animal's weight? Evidently, it must surely be because we say that helping is not significant.



(92b – 93b)

Rav Ashi said: We have learned this in a *braisa*: Rabbi Eliezer said: If one foot (*of a Kohen performing the Temple service*) is on a utensil and the other is on the floor, or one foot is on a stone and the other is on the floor, we consider, as follows: if the utensil or the stone would be removed, he can stand on the other foot, his service is valid; if not, his service is invalid. Yet why is it so (*that it is valid if he can stand using the one foot which is on the floor*), seeing that his other foot (*on the utensil or stone*) is helping support him? Is it not because we say that helping is not significant?!

Ravina said: We too have learned this in a *braisa*: If he (*the Kohen*) catches the blood with his right hand, while his left hand helps him, his service is valid. But why so, seeing that the left hand is helping the other? Is it not because we say that helping is not significant?! This indeed proves it.

The master said: If each (*of them*) alone is able (*and they both do it together*), Rabbi Meir holds that they are liable.

The scholars inquired: Is the standard quantity required for each, or perhaps one standard is sufficient for all?

Rav Chisda and Rav Hamnuna differ regarding this: One maintains that the standard is required for each; while the other rules that one standard is sufficient for all.

Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: We too learned this in a *Mishna*: If he (*a zav*) is sitting on a bed and four shawls are under the feet of the bed, they are *tamei*, because it cannot stand on three. But why is this so; let the full standard of a *zav's* weight be necessary for each? Is it not because we say that one standard suffices for all?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: We too have learned this in a *Mishna*: If a deer enters a house and one person closed the door before it, he is liable; if two closed it, they are exempt. If one could not close it, and both closed it, they are liable. But why is this so? Let the standard of trapping be necessary for each? Is it not because we say that one standard suffices for all?

Ravina said: We too have learned this in a *braisa*: If partners steal an ox or a sheep and slaughter it, they are liable (*to pay the*

fourfold or fivefold penalty). But why is this so; let the standard of slaughtering be necessary for each? Is it not because we say that one standard suffices for all?

And Rav Ashi said: We too learned this in a *braisa*: If two people carry out a weaver's reed, they are liable. But why is this so; let the standard of carrying out be necessary for each? Is it not because we say that one standard suffices for all?

Rav Acha the son of Rava said to Rav Ashi: Perhaps that is where it contains sufficient wood to boil a light egg for each?

The *Gemora* answers: If so, the *Tanna* should have informed us about a reed in general; why particularly mention a weaver's reed?

The *Gemora* disagrees, for perhaps it is large enough for each to weave a towel with; therefore, nothing can be inferred from this.

The *Gemora* relates: A *Tanna* recited before Rav Nachman (*the following braisa*): If two people carry out a weaver's reed, they are not liable; but Rabbi Shimon declares them liable.

The *Gemora* asks: Which way does this tend (*for R' Shimon is the one who exempts them*)?

Rather, the *Gemora* says, the *braisa* states as follows: They are liable, while Rabbi Shimon exempts them.

If one carries out less than the standard quantity of food in a utensil, he is not liable even in respect of the utensil, because the utensil is secondary (*to the food*). Similarly, if one carries out a living person in a bed, he is not liable even in respect of the bed, because the bed is secondary to him.

If one carries a corpse in a bed, he is liable. And similarly, if one carries out the size of an olive of a corpse, the size of an olive of a *neveilah*, or the size of a lentil of a *sheretz*, he is liable, but Rabbi Shimon declares him exempt.