



Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler, Kollel Boker Beachwood

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Mav the studing of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and mav their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

***Carrying food in a utensil***

The Gemora cites a braisa which says that if one carried food in a utensil, he is liable for carrying the food, but not the utensil. If he needed the utensil also, he is also liable for the utensil.

The Gemora asks whether we can infer from the second case that if one ate two measures of forbidden fat in one mistake, he is liable for two sacrifices, as he is liable for both the food and utensil when he took both out simultaneously.

Rav Sheshes deflects this by saying that the braisa is a case where he was mistaken about the food, but knew that he may not take out the utensil, and the braisa is stating that he is liable to be killed for carrying the utensil.

Rav Ashi challenges this, as the braisa says that he is *also* liable for the utensil, implying that he is liable for the food as well.

Rav Ashi instead answers that he was mistaken about carrying both, but realized his errors separately, once for the food and once for the utensil.

The Gemora says that the two different answers depend on the dispute of Rabbi Yochanan and Raish Lakish about whether each realization of an act of transgression obligates its own sacrifice, as Rav Ashi’s answer assumes that it does.

***Carrying someone live***

The Mishna says that if one carried a live person out on a bed, he isn’t liable at all.

The Gemora suggests that Rabbi Nasan is the author of the Mishna.

The Gemora cites a braisa about carrying animals and birds. The Sages say that one is liable whether they are live or slaughtered, while Rabbi Nasan says that one isn’t liable if they are live, as a live creature carries itself.

Rava deflects this, saying that the dispute is only about animals and birds, which try to get away from someone who is carrying, but they agree that a live person carries himself.

Rav Ada bar Ahava challenges Rava, as Rabbi Yochanan says that Rabbi Nasan’s position is identical to ben Besaira, who allows one to sell a horse to a non-Jew, since it doesn’t do any work in carrying its passenger. If all agree that a person carries himself, ben Besaira’s position should be consistent with the Sages as well, as horses carry people.

The Gemora deflects this by saying that Rabbi Yochanan said this, since ben Besaira was also referring to horses that carries birds, like those used by hunters.

Rabbi Yochanan says that Rabbi Nasan agrees that one is liable if the animal is tied down, since it doesn’t carry itself.

Rav Ada bar Masna asked Abaye how this is consistent with Rabbi Yochanan’s statement that ben Besaira follows Rabbi Nasan, as horses also carry Persians, who don’t walk, but ride all wrapped up, which is like being tied up. He answered that they can help the horse move, but they ride this way only out of haughtiness, citing the story of the Persian official who ran away on his feet for 3 paras, when running away from the king who got angry at him.

***Carrying a corpse***

The Mishna says that if one carries a corpse in a bed, he is liable, but Rabbi Shimon says he is exempt, as it is an act of work whose main result isn’t necessary.

Rabba bar bar Chana cites Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yosef cites Raish Lakish saying that Rabbi Shimon exempts one even if he carried out the corpse for burial.

Rava says that Rabbi Shimon agrees that one is liable if he carries out a spade to dig with or a Torah scroll to read from.

The Gemora says that this seems obvious, but explains that we may have thought that Rabbi Shimon says that one is only liable if he carried something for both his and its use, like a spade for digging and to repair it, or a Torah scroll to read from it and correct it.

There was a corpse in the city of Drokra, and Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak permitted to take it out to a karmelis – semi-public domain.

Rabbi Yochanan, Mar berai deRavina's brother, challenged him, as even Rabbi Shimon only says that carrying a corpse out is not liable from the Torah, but is still prohibited Rabbinically.

He answered by swearing that Rabbi Yochanan should be the one to carry it, as he only permitted carrying it to a Rabbinic domain of a karmelis, as Rabbinic prohibitions are suspended in the face of human dignity, such as a corpse decomposing.

The Gemora cites a Mishna which states that if one uproots the signs of tzara'as impurity from skin or makes a tzara'as area pure by destroying the healthy region inside it, he has transgressed the commandment to guard the rules of tzara'as.

The Gemora says that if one pulled out one of two white hairs in tzara'as, he is liable for transgressing the prohibition, as he is now pure.

If one pulled out one of three, Rav Nachman says he is liable, as this can make it pure if one of the remaining two hairs falls out, while Rav Sheshes says he is not, as he is now still impure.

Rav Sheshes supports his position with the Mishna, which says that one is liable for carrying a kazayis of a corpse or carcass out of a house, implying that he isn't liable for carrying less than a kazayis, while a braisa says that one is liable for carrying out half a kazayis.

Rav Sheshes says the way to resolve the seeming contradiction is to say that the braisa is a case of taking half a kazayis off of one kazayis, making the house pure, and therefore considered a full act of carrying, while the Mishna is a case of taking it out of a house that has 1½ kazayis, which is therefore still impure. This proves that removing part of a measure, leaving a full measure behind, isn't considered significant.

Rav Nachman deflects this by saying that the Mishna is a case where one took half a kazayis from a full corpse, which isn't significant, since so much is still left. However, if only a kazayis were left, he would be liable, as the half taken out is significant.

#### **Torah or Rabbinic violations?**

The Mishna lists acts which Rabbi Eliezer considers Torah violations of Shabbos, making one liable, but the Sages consider only Rabbinic violations:

1. Cutting one's nails with each other or with his teeth
2. Cutting one's hair, mustache, or beard with his hands
3. Braiding one's hair
4. Applying eye makeup

#### 5. Grooming hair by combing

##### **Cutting nails**

Rabbi Elazar says that the Sages dispute Rabbi Eliezer only when one cuts his nails by hand, but they agree that cutting them with a utensil is a Torah violation. The Gemora says this is obvious, as the Mishna only lists the case of nails as cutting them "with each other."

The Gemora explains that we may have thought that the Sages even consider cutting with a utensil to be only Rabbinic, but the Mishna only taught the case of cutting them by hand to show the extent of Rabbi Eliezer's position.

Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Eliezer dispute the Sages only when he is cutting his own nails, but agrees that one is exempt if he cuts someone else's nails.

The Gemora says this is obvious, as the Mishna only lists the case of cutting his own nails.

The Gemora explains that we may have thought that Rabbi Eliezer even considers one cutting someone else's nails to be a Torah violation, but the Mishna only taught the case of cutting one's own nails to show the extent of the Sages' position.

##### **Cutting hair**

The Gemora cites a braisa which says that one is liable if he cut enough hair to fit inside a scissor, and Rav Yehuda explains this is 2 hairs.

The Gemora challenges this from a braisa which concludes that the measure of the prohibition of karcha – uprooting hair as a sign of mourning is 2 hairs, but answers that the braisa means that 2 hairs is *also* the measure for karcha.

The Gemora cites a supporting braisa, which explicitly defines the measure as 2 hairs, also citing Rabbi Eliezer who says that the measure is one hair.

The braisa continues to say that the Sages agree that one is liable if he removed one white hair among black ones, and this is actually always prohibited as an instance of a man adorning himself like a woman.

The Gemora cites a braisa in which Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that if one has a nail or cuticle which is mostly detached, he may cut it by hand, but is liable for a chatas if he cuts it with a utensil.

The Gemora asks how something that is a Torah violation when done by utensil is permitted by hand, and therefore modifies the braisa to say that if they are mostly detached, one may cut them by hand, but is prohibited (Rabbinically) to cut them with a



utensil, but if they are not mostly detached, one may not cut them by hand, and is liable if he cut them with a utensil.

Rav Yehuda says we rule like Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. Rabba bar bar Chana says that it is only permitted if they were detached upwards and are paining him.

#### ***Cosmetics and hair care***

The Gemora asks what violations are involved in braiding, applying eye makeup, and grooming hair.

Rabbi Avin quotes Rabbi Yossi beRabbi Chanina saying that braiding is a form of weaving, applying eye makeup is a form of writing, and grooming hair is a form of spinning.

When the Sages said this in front of Rabbi Avahu, he challenged this, as these are all abnormal forms of the specified act.

Instead, Rabbi Avahu said that he heard from Rabbi Yossi beRabbi Chanina that eye makeup is a form of dying, and braiding and hair grooming are forms of building.

The Gemora challenges this, asking whether this is a normal form of building, and answers that it is, as Rabbi Shimon ben Menasia says that the verse which says that Hashem built Adam's side into a woman means that Hashem braided her hair and brought her to Adam, as in the sea islands they call braiding "building."

The Gemora cites a braisa in which Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that a woman who grooms or braids her own hair or applies her own eye makeup is exempt, but if she does this to someone else, she is liable. In addition, he cites Rabbi Eliezer saying that a woman should not put rouge on her face, as this is tantamount to dying.

#### **INSIGHTS TO THE DAF**

##### ***Carrying food in a utensil***

The Gemora discusses a braisa which discusses one's liability for a utensil used to carry food, saying that one is only liable for the utensil if he needed it independent of the food.

Rav Sheshes explains the braisa to refer to a case where intentionally violated Shabbos regarding the utensil, but was unintentional about the food.

Rashi explains that Rav Sheshes is explaining that the case of the braisa where he is liable for the utensil means that he is liable to be *executed* for carrying the utensil, as he did it intentionally. Since his carrying of the food is unintentional, he is only liable for execution if he needed the utensil itself.

Tosfos (93b sheshagag) cites the Rashbam who challenges Rashi's reading, as a braisa which refers to liability generally

refers to liability for a chatas on an unintentional violation, not to execution for an intentional one.

The Rashbam therefore amends the text of Rav Sheshes's answer to be that the braisa is a case where he intentionally carried the food, but unintentionally carried the utensil, but was not warned by witnesses. Since he wasn't warned, he is not executed, but is still liable for a chatas on the utensil, since he needed it.

The Ri challenges this explanation, as someone who intentionally violated Shabbos may not bring a chatas on an unintentional violation, as a chatas is only for someone who would have desisted had he known it was prohibited.

The Ri therefore says that the whole braisa is referring to liability for execution. If he only needed the food, the braisa is teaching that he is only liable for execution if witnesses warned him about the food, but not if they only warned him about the utensil. However, if he needed the utensil, he is liable even if they only warned him about the utensil, and he was therefore unintentional about the food.

#### ***Work not for its sake***

The Mishna cites a dispute about carrying a corpse outside on Shabbos. The first opinion says that one is liable, while Rabbi Shimon says he is not.

The Gemora explains that this is a case of melacha she'aina tzricha l'gufa – work which is not needed for its sake.

Rashi explains that this means work which is done for a situation which arose, but which one would have otherwise been happy to avoid. For example, if the corpse were not in the house, the person would have been fine, and would have no need to carry. This is in contrast to a case where one wants to carry an object outside to use it (e.g., a sefer Torah to read from), where one is actively interested in the act of work.

Tosfos (94a Rabbi Shimon) cites the Ri, who explains that it means work not done for the purpose for the normally defined purpose, i.e., the one for which it was done in the mishkan. Even if it is done for a constructive purpose, if that is not why they did it in the mishkan, it falls under this category.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Kesuvos 6a) assumes that this is the same classification as a *pesik raisha delo niche lai* – a sure result of an act which one is not interested in.

The Mishna cites a dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer about whether cutting one's nails is a Torah violation of Shabbos, with all agreeing that it is prohibited. Rabbi Elazar

clarifies that if one cuts them with a utensil, all agree that he is liable.

Tosfos (94b aval) says that this is only according to Rabbi Yehuda, as this is a case of work not for its sake. The normal purpose of shearing is for the wool cut off, but when one cuts nails, he isn't interested in the nail itself.

The Rishonim differ on how to rule on the dispute of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. Most Rishonim follow Rabbi Shimon, but the Rambam follows Rabbi Yehuda.

The Shulchan Aruch (OH 316:8) rules like Rabbi Shimon, yet rules (340:1) that one who cuts his nails with a utensil is liable for a chatas, as it is a Torah prohibition.

The Gra says that from the later ruling we see that the Shulchan Aruch actually rules like Rambam, but the Biur Halacha resolves the contradiction by citing many other Rishonim who dispute Tosfos's position. They say that cutting nails is liable even according to Rabbi Shimon, as not all shearing in the mishkan was done for the wool, since sometimes they cut hair to get smooth hides.

The authorities discuss what to do if a woman who needs to immerse Friday night forgot to trim her nails before Shabbos.

The Taz (YD 198:21) says that one may not ask a non-Jew to cut the nails, as the woman will aid her by putting out her hands and feet. Since technically all that is needed is cleaning the nails, we do not allow one to ask the non-Jew, and aid her in the process.

The Shach (Nekudos Hakesef) and Magen Avraham (start of OH 340) rule that it is preferable to have a non-Jew cut the nails, as we rule like Rabbi Shimon, and therefore cutting the nails is only Rabbinically prohibited.

Rav Ovadia Yosef (Livyat Chen 117) discusses why this is true, even according to the Rishonim who differ with Tosfos's position.

The Gemora rules that one may cut by hand a nail or cuticle which is mostly detached, but only if it is detached upwards, and is causing pain.

The Rif assumes that causing pain is determined by the fact that it is detached upwards, while the Rambam assumes these are two separate conditions.

The Rishonim dispute what upwards means. Rashi says it means towards the fingertips, while Rabbenu Tam says it means towards the body. Since we have to account for both possibilities, there is no practical application of this leniency.

#### ***Dying hair***

The Gemora cites a braisa in which the Sages say that removing one white hair among black ones is a full measure of the work of cutting hair, and is in fact prohibited for a man to do at any time, as it is a form of adorning oneself like a woman.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 182:6) applies this to dying hair as well. Rav Vosner (Shevet Levi 3:111) writes that even though this is commonly done by men, it is still prohibited, as the goal is to look younger, which is a more common concern among women. The Poskim discuss if one who has a patch of prematurely white hair may dye it. The Maharam Shik (YD 173) prohibits it, while the Shoel umaishiv (1:1:210) says that one has what to rely on to be lenient. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach says that the general custom seems to be to be lenient.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (YD 1:82) rules that this prohibition also includes one who ingests something to change his hair color, as the prohibition of looking like a woman is on the result, not a specific act.