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Eiruv Daf 30

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Mav the studing of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and mav their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

The *Gemora* asks: But could Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar have given such a ruling (*that the glutton’s eiruv, though he consumes much, is nevertheless determined based on the consumption of an average person*)? Was it not in fact taught in a *braisa*: Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar ruled: A door for (*the corpse of a giant like*) Og the King of Bashan, must be (*if the other doors and openings in the house in which the corpse lies are to remain tahor*) as big as his full size (*so that his body might be carried through it without having to enlarge it*). [*In that case, only that door is tamei, while all other doors through which the corpse would not be carried remain tahor. Where the door, however, is not wide enough for the passage of the corpse, so that it is uncertain which of the doors of the house would be enlarged and used for such passage, all doors and openings become tamei. R’ Shimon ben Elozar, who, by thus declaring all doors and openings tamei on account of the inadequacy of the door for the passage of the large corpse, though it is adequate enough for the passage of one of average size, obviously adopts the restrictive view. How then could it be said that in respect of an eiruv, he adopts the lenient one?*]

Abaye would answer: What could one do there? Should the body be dismembered and carried out that way? [*This is obviously absurd. Therefore, the ruling is that unless one door was wide enough for the passage of the corpse, all doors become tamei.*]

They inquired: Do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar, or not?

Come and hear, for Rabbah bar bar Chanah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: A door for (*the corpse of a giant like*) Og the King of Bashan, is to be four *tefachim* (*by four tefachim*) wide. [*Evidently, they do in fact argue.*]

The *Gemora* notes that this, however, is not conclusive proof, since there it may be a case where there were many small doors and only one of them was four *tefachim* wide, so that it is certain that when widening would take place, it would be in that door.

Rav Chiya bar Rav Ashi said in the name of Rav: An *eiruv* may be made from raw meat. Rav Shimi bar Chiya said: An *eiruv* may be made from raw eggs. And with how many? [*How many are needed to be sufficient for two meals?*] Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak replied: One (*is sufficient*). Sinai (*Rav Yosef*) said: Two (*are required*). (30a)

The *Mishna* had stated: If a man vows to abstain from sustenance, he is allowed to partake of water and salt.

The *Gemora* notes: Apparently, water and salt alone are not called sustenance, but all other foods are called sustenance?

The *Gemora* asks: May we not say that this then is a refutation of Rav and Shmuel, for they say that the blessing *Borei minei mezonos* – ‘the One Who creates various kinds of sustenance’ is recited only over the five species of grain.?



The *Gemora* counters: Didn't we already refute their teaching (*once before*)?

The *Gemora* answers: Let us say that it will be a refutation from here as well.

Rav Huna solved the problem by saying that the *Mishna* refers to one who says, "Anything which sustains is prohibited to me," (*for all foods except for water and salt do provide some sustenance; it is the five grains which provide the primary sustenance for man*).

The *Gemora* asks: [*But is it only water and salt that do not provide sustenance, and all other foods do?*] Didn't Rabbah bar bar Chanah say: When we went after Rabbi Yochanan to eat the fruit of Genosar - when there were a hundred of us we would each take for him ten fruits, and when we were ten, we would each take for him a hundred (*so either way, it would total a thousand*), and (*due to their large size*) a hundred of them would go into a basket holding three *se'ah* (*totaling 432 eggs*), and he used to eat them all and swear that he had not tasted food (*for one can always eat more sweet food*).

The *Gemora* answers: Rather, he meant that he had not eaten anything which provides sustenance. (30a)

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: If a man said, "I swear that I will not eat this bread," an *eiruv* may nevertheless be prepared for him from it (*since this oath was limited to eating; an eiruv - provided somebody is able to eat it, is valid, even if the person for whom it was prepared is unable to eat it*), but if he said, "This bread shall be forbidden to me" (*which implies that all benefit is forbidden for him*), no *eiruv* may be prepared for him from it.

An objection was raised from a *braisa*: If a man vowed to abstain from bread, an *eiruv* may nevertheless be prepared for him from it. Does this not refer to a case where he said, "*(This bread shall be forbidden) to me*" (*and nevertheless, it may be used as an eiruv*)?

The *Gemora* answers: No, it is where he said, "This" (*where he declared that he will not eat this bread; other benefits, however, are permitted to him*).

The *Gemora* notes: This explanation stands to reason, for in the end clause (*of that braisa*) it was stated: When does this apply (*that the eiruv is valid*)? It is only when he said, "I swear that I will not taste it" (*but other benefits are permitted*); however, if he said, "*(This bread shall be forbidden) to me*," what is the law? An *eiruv* may not be made for him from it.

The *Gemora* asks: But, if so, instead of stating (*at the end of that braisa*): If he said, "This bread shall be consecrated (*to the Temple Treasury*)," no *eiruv* may be made for him from it, because no *eiruv* may be made from consecrated food, let a distinction be pointed out (*in the braisa*) in this very case, as follows: This (*that the bread may be used for an eiruv*) applies only where he said, "This" (*where he declared that he will not eat this bread; other benefits, however, are permitted to him*); but if he said, "*(This bread shall be forbidden) to me*," no *eiruv* may be made for him from it?

The *Gemora* counters: Rav Huna can say to you: What then would you suggest? That whenever a man said, "*(This bread shall be forbidden) to me*," an *eiruv* may be made for him from it (*because it would be contended that this expression implies only the prohibition of eating*); wouldn't then a difficulty arise from the beginning of the *braisa* (*which stated that this (that the eiruv is valid) applies only when he said, "I swear that I will not taste it" (but other benefits are permitted); however, it is inferred that if he said, "(This bread shall be forbidden) to me," the law is that an eiruv may not be made for him from it*)?

The *Gemora* answers: It is as if a clause is missing, and this is the correct reading: If a man vowed to abstain from bread, an *eiruv* may nevertheless be prepared for him from it. And even where he said, "*(This bread shall be*

forbidden) to me,” it is the same as if he had said, “I swear that I will not taste it” (but other benefits are permitted; the *eiruv* is then valid). In any event, the difficulty against Rav Huna remains (for the *braisa* should have made a distinction between the two cases of vows).

[The *Gemora* provides support for the ruling of Rav Huna] Rav Huna upholds the same view as Rabbi Eliezer, for it was taught in a *braisa*: Rabbi Eliezer said: If a man said, “I swear that I will not eat this bread,” an *eiruv* may nevertheless be prepared for him from it (since this oath was limited to eating; an *eiruv* - provided somebody is able to eat it, is valid, even if the person for whom it was prepared is unable to eat it), but if he said, “This bread shall be forbidden to me” (which implies that all benefit is forbidden for him), no *eiruv* may be prepared for him from it.

The *Gemora* asks: But could Rabbi Eliezer have given such a ruling? Was it not in fact taught in a *braisa*: This is the general rule: If a man imposed upon himself the prohibition (through a vow) of a certain food, an *eiruv* may be made for him from it, but if a certain food was forbidden to a man (implying all benefit), no *eiruv* may be made for him from it. Rabbi Eliezer said: [If the man said] “This bread shall be forbidden to me” (which implies that all benefit is forbidden for him), an *eiruv* may nevertheless be prepared for him from it, but if he said, “This bread shall be consecrated (to the Temple Treasury),” no *eiruv* may be made for him from it, because no *eiruv* may be made from consecrated food.

The *Gemora* answers: The two rulings represent the views of two *Tannaim* who differ as to what was the view of Rabbi Eliezer. (30a)

The *Mishna* had stated: An *eiruv* may be made for a *nazir*<sup>1</sup> with wine (for others can drink it).

The *Gemora* notes: Our *Mishna* does not represent the view of Beis Shammai, for it was taught in a *braisa*: Beis Shammai said: An *eiruv* may not be made for a *nazir* with wine (for he cannot drink it), or for a *Yisroel* with *terumah*,<sup>2</sup> and Beis Hillel said: An *eiruv* may be prepared for a *nazir* with wine or for a *Yisroel* with *terumah*. Beis Hillel said to Beis Shammai: Do you not admit that an *eiruv* may be prepared for an adult in connection with *Yom Kippur* (even though he is forbidden from eating it; the reason being that children may eat it)? Beis Shammai replied: Indeed it’s true. Beis Hillel said to them: an *eiruv* may be prepared for an adult in connection with *Yom Kippur*, so may an *eiruv* be prepared for a *nazir* with wine or for a *Yisroel* with *terumah*.

The *Gemora* explains Beis Shammai’s opinion: There (by *Yom Kippur*), a meal is available that is fit for consumption (for that person) while it is yet day (at the beginning of twilight, before *Yom Kippur* actually begins), but here (by a *nazir* and *terumah*), no meal is available that is fit for consumption while it is yet day.

The *Gemora* notes that the above *braisa* is not in agreement with Chananya, for it was taught in a *braisa*: Chananya stated: Beis Shammai did not admit to the very principle of *eiruv* unless the man will take out his bed and all the objects he uses (to the place of the *eiruv*).

Whose view is followed by the *braisa* in which it was taught: If a man prepared an *eiruv* [while he was dressed] in black he must not go out in white; [if he was then dressed] in white he must not go out in black? Whose [view, it is asked, is this]? — Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak replied: It is [that of] Chananya in accordance with the view of Beis Shammai. - According to Chananya, however, is it only in black that he must not go out but may go out in white? Did he not in fact rule [that an *eiruv* is invalid] ‘unless the man takes out his bed and all the objects he uses’? — It is this that was meant: If he prepared an *eiruv*

<sup>1</sup> one who vows to become a *nazir* must abstain from wine and contact with dead people in a way where one becomes impure

<sup>2</sup> the separation of a certain amount of produce which is then given to a Kohen

[while he was dressed] in white and then required black he must not go out even in white. In agreement with whom [is this ruling]? Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak replied: It is in agreement with that of Chananya in accordance with the view of Beis Shammai. (30a – 30b)

The Mishnah had stated: Sumchos ruled: with unconsecrated produce. But [against the ruling that an eiruv may be prepared] for a nazir with wine he does not contend. What is the reason? [Is it] because it is possible that he might ask to be released from, his nezirus? But, if so, is it not equally possible for him to ask for the release of the terumah? — Were he to ask for its release it would return to its state of tevel. But he could [still] set aside [the Kohanic dues] for it from some other produce? — Chaveirim are not suspected of setting aside terumah from [produce] that is not in close proximity [to the produce for which it is set aside]. But he can [still] set aside the terumah for it from [the very eiruv] itself? - [This is a case] where it would not contain the prescribed quantity. But why this certainty? This rather [is the reply:] Sumchos holds the same opinion as the Rabbis who had land down that every kind of occupation that may be classed as shevus has, as a preventive measure, been forbidden [on the Shabbos Eve] at twilight. Whose view is followed in what we learned: There are [some measures] which the Rabbis have prescribed in accordance with each individual. [E.g.,] 'his handful' of the meal-offering, 'his handful' of incense, the drinking of a mouthful on Yom Kippur, and [the requirement] of food [sufficient for] two meals in the case of an eiruv? In agreement with whose view, [it is asked, is this Mishnah]? — Rabbi Zeira replied: It [is in agreement with that of] Sumchos who had land down that [the food for an eiruv] must be such as is fit for the person [for whom it is prepared]. - Must it be assumed [that this Mishnah] differs from the view of Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar, it having been taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar ruled: An eiruv for a sick, or for an old man is to consist of food sufficient for him [for two meals], and for a glutton, [each of the two meals is to consist] of a moderate meal for an average man? — The explanation [is that the

Mishnah refers] to a sick, and an old man; but [not to] a glutton whose habit is disregarded in the view of the average man. (30b)

The Mishnah had stated: [An eiruv] may be prepared] for a Kohen in a beis haperas; for Rav Yehudah stated in the name of Shmuel: A man may blow away [the earth of] a beis haperas and continue on his way. Rabbi Yehudah bar Ammi ruled in the name of Rav Yehudah: A trodden beis haperas is tahor. (30b)