

2 Tishrei 5781  
Sept. 20, 2020



Eiruv Daf 42

Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler, Kollel Boker Beachwood

Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

**Moshe Raphael ben Yehoshua (Morris Stadtmauer) o”h**  
**Tzvi Gershon ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o”h**

Mav the studing of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and mav their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Rav Pappa said: Fruits that were carried beyond the Shabbos limit and were returned [on the same day], even if this was done intentionally, do not lose their original place. What is the reason? — They were carried under compulsion.

Rav Yosef bar Shemayah raised an objection against Rav Pappa: Rabbi Nechemiah and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov ruled, [The fruits] are always forbidden unless they are unintentionally returned to their original place; [from which it follows, does it not, that only if they are returned] unintentionally is this law applicable, but not [if they are returned] deliberately? — On this question Tannaim differ. For it was taught: Fruits that were carried beyond the Shabbos limit unwittingly may be eaten, [if they were carried] wittingly they may not be eaten; while Rabbi Nechemiah ruled: If they are in their original place they may be eaten but if they are not in their original place they may not be eaten. Now what [are the circumstances under which they came to be] in their original place? If it be suggested that they were in their original place through some intentional act, surely [it could be retorted] was it not specifically taught: ‘Rabbi Nechemiah and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov ruled, [the fruits] are always forbidden unless they are unintentionally returned to their original place’, from which it follows, does it not, that only if they are returned] unintentionally is this law applicable but not [if they are returned] intentionally? Must we not then admit that they [came to be] in their original place through some unintentional act, and that some words are missing, the correct reading being as follows: Fruits that were carried outside the Shabbos limit unwittingly may be

eaten, but if they were carried wittingly they may not be eaten. This applies only where they are not in their original place but if they were in their original place they may be eaten even if they were carried intentionally. And in connection with this Rabbi Nechemiah came to lay down that even when they are in their original place the law applies only where they were carried unwittingly but not when it was done wittingly? — No; if they are in their original place through an intentional act no one disputes the ruling that they are forbidden, but the difference of opinion here is [one regarding fruits] that are not in their original place through an unintentional act. The first Tanna is of the opinion that if they are not in their original place through an unintentional act they are permitted while Rabbi Nechemiah maintains that even [if they were carried] unintentionally they are permitted only in their original place but not where they are not in their original place. Since, however, it was stated in the final clause, ‘Rabbi Nechemiah and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov ruled, [The fruits] are always forbidden unless they are unintentionally returned to their original place’ [from which it follows that only if they’ are returned [unintentionally is this law applicable but not [if they are returned] intentionally, it may be concluded that the first Tanna is of the opinion that [the fruits] are permitted even [if they are returned] intentionally. This is conclusive.

Rav Nachman stated in the name of Shmuel: If a man was walking and did not know where the Shabbos limit ended he may walk a distance of two thousand moderate paces; and this constitutes for him the Shabbos limit.



Rav Nachman further stated in the name of Shmuel: If a man took up his Shabbos abode in a valley around which gentiles put up a fence on the Shabbos, he may only walk a two thousand cubits distance in all directions but may move objects throughout all the valley by throwing them, but Rav Huna ruled: He may walk the two thousand cubits but may move objects within four cubits only. But why should he not be allowed to move objects throughout all its area by throwing them? — He might be drawn after his object. Then why should he not be allowed to move objects in the usual way within the two thousand cubits? Because the [area in which he is permitted to walk] is like a partition along the full width of which a breach was made towards a place into which it is forbidden to carry anything from it.

Chiya bar Rav ruled: He may walk the two thousand cubits and may also move objects within these two thousand cubits. In agreement with whose view? Is it neither in agreement with that of Rav nor with that of Rav Huna? — Read: He may move objects within four cubits. If so, isn't his ruling identical with that of Rav Huna? — Read: And so ruled Chiya bar Rav. Said Rav Nachman to Rav Huna: Do not dispute the view of Shmuel since in a Baraisa it was taught in agreement with his view. For it was taught: If a man was measuring [the distance from his eiruv] and advancing [towards another town], and his measuring [of the permitted two thousand cubits] terminated in the middle of the town, he is allowed to move objects throughout the town provided only that he does not pass his Shabbos limit. Now, in what manner could he move the objects? Obviously by throwing. And Rav Huna? — He can answer you: No; by pulling.

Rav Huna ruled: If a man was measuring [the distance from his eiruv] and his measuring [of the permitted two thousand cubits] terminated in the middle of a courtyard he has only a half of the courtyard [in which to move]. Isn't this obvious? — Read: He has a half of the courtyard [in which to move]. Isn't this also obvious? — It might have been presumed that there was cause to fear that one

might carry objects about all the courtyard, hence we were informed [that no such possibility need be considered].

Rav Nachman stated: Huna agrees with me that if a man was measuring [the distance from his eiruv] and was thus advancing [towards another town], and his measurement [of the two thousand cubits] terminated at [a line corresponding to] the edge of a roof he is allowed to move objects in any part of the house. What is the reason? Because [the projection of] the roof of the house would strike him.

Rav Huna son of Rabbi Nassan said: [The divergence of opinion here is] like that between the following Tannaim: If he was taken to another town, or if he was put in a cattlepen or in a cattle-fold, he may, ruled Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah, move through the whole of its area; but Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva ruled: he has only four cubits. Now didn't Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah rule that the man may move through the whole of its area, because they do not forbid walking in a cattle-pen or in a cattle-fold as a preventive measure against the possibility of walking in a valley, and since evidently they have not forbidden walking [in the former] as a preventive measure against walking [in the latter] they, likewise, did not forbid the moving of objects [by throwing them beyond the Shabbos limit] as a preventive measure against the possibility of walking [beyond that limit]; while Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva ruled: He has only four cubits because they forbid walking in a cattle-pen or in a cattle-fold as a preventive measure against walking in a valley; and since evidently they have forbidden walking [in the former] as a preventive measure against walking [in the latter] they also forbid the moving of objects [by throwing them beyond the Shabbos limit] as a preventive measure against the possibility of walking [beyond that limit]? — From where [could this be proved]? It is in fact possible that Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah did not forbid walking in a cattle-pen or in a cattle-fold as a preventive measure against the possibility of walking in a valley for the sole reason that two different



places are there involved, but [as regards forbidding the] movement of objects [as a preventive measure] against the possibility of walking which involves one and the same place they may well have enacted a prohibition as a preventive measure against the possibility of being drawn after one's object. As to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva also, whence [could it be proved that they restricted the walking to four cubits] because they have enacted a preventive measure? — It is in fact possible that [the reason for their restriction is] that they hold the view that all the house is regarded as four cubits only while a man occupied a place within its walls while it was yet day but not where he did not occupy the place while it was yet day.

#### **INSIGHTS TO THE DAF**

The Rashba asks that Rabbi Akiva, who is stringent and argues that even someone who was on a boat before Shabbos can only walk in his four cubits on Shabbos, seems very difficult. Rabah's explanation for Rabban Gamliel, that being in a place surrounded with walls before Shabbos entered is reason to permit walking in that entire domain on Shabbos, seems like a very strong reason. Why would Rabbi Akiva argue?

The Rashba suggests that Rabbi Akiva is stringent because the person went in before Shabbos knowing that he was going to be taken out of his techum on Shabbos.

Alternatively, the Rashba gives a broader view of the argument. He states that the Gemara dealt with three cases. In the case of a person who was in a valley on Shabbos, and the valley was then surrounded on Shabbos with walls (by gentiles), even Rabban Gamliel holds that he only has four cubits. This is because the walls were not up before Shabbos. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Akiva argue in a case where a person was forcibly taken to a place with walls, such as a jail. In that case, our Gemara suggested that Rabbi Akiva decrees he only has four cubits lest one come to be lenient in the case of the valley. Rabban Gamliel did not make this decree. Despite the fact that the

Gemora asked a question on understanding their argument in this fashion, the Rashba concludes that it could be a valid way to understand their argument.

In our case, there is the similar argument of whether to extend this decree to the case of the boat. Rabbi Akiva extends it, while Rabban Gamliel, of course, does not. The Rashba therefore answers his question by explaining that while Rabbi Akiva does not have a straight halachic objection to the case of the boat, he does hold that the decree should be extended.