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MISHNAH: One who slaughtered a *Korban Pesach* not for its own sake,¹ or received, walked with, or threw its blood on the *mizbeich* not for its own sake, or if initially the Kohen intended that the offering be for the *Korban Pesach*, and then he intended for a different offering, or if initially the Kohen intended not for the sake of the *Korban Pesach* and then he intended for the *Korban Pesach*, the *Korban Pesach* is invalid.² How is ‘for its own sake and for another sake’ meant? In the name of the *Korban Pesach* [first] and [then] in the name of a *shelamim*; ‘for another sake and for its own sake’ [means] in the name of a *shelamim* [first] and [then] in the name of the *Korban Pesach*. (59b3)

GEMARA: Rav Pappa inquired: Did we learn [of a dual intention expressed even] in respect to one *avodah* - service,³ or did we learn [only of a dual intention expressed] at two separate services? If the Mishnah refers to two intentions during one *avodah*, then the

Mishnah is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosi who maintains that one is held responsible even for his final words.⁴ For if it would be [in accordance with] Rabbi Meir, why – he maintains that⁵ we only concern ourselves with his first statement.⁶ Or perhaps our Mishnah is referring to a case where one had two intentions during two *avodos*, then even according to Rabbi Meir, who maintains that we follow the first statement, that is only said regarding two intentions in one *avodah*. Regarding two intentions in two *avodos*, even Rabbi Meir would agree that the offering is invalid.⁷

I will tell you: to which [case does this problem refer]? Shall we say, to [the case where it was] for another sake [first] and [then] for its own sake, then whether it was in connection with one *avodah* or in connection with two *avodos*, according to both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi it was disqualified by the first [wrongful intention],

¹ He intended for a different offering, i.e. a *shelamim*.

² The reason the sacrifice is invalid is because it is said *you shall say, “It is the Pesach sacrifice,”* which implies that the offering must be slaughtered for the sake of the *Korban Pesach*. The word *hu*, meaning *it*, teaches us that if the offering was not slaughtered for the sake of the *Korban Pesach*, then the offering is invalid even after the fact.

³ I.e., even if he declared at one of the services, e.g., the slaughtering, that he was doing it for its own sake and for another sake.

⁴ An example of this in a Mishnah learned elsewhere that discusses one who says “this animal is an exchange for an *olah*, an exchange for a *shelamim*” (known as *temurah*, literally meaning exchange. When an animal is exchanged for an offering, both animal now have sanctity). According to Rabbi Yosi, the words “an exchange for a

shelamim,” is binding like the first words “an exchange for an *olah*.” Rabbi Yosi thus maintains that one is responsible for any statement that he makes, so when he one has an intention for a *Korban Pesach* for its sake and not for its sake, the offering is invalid.

⁵ Regarding the case of exchanging sanctity for an animal.

⁶ Which was “an exchange for an *olah*, and similarly, when the Kohen initially had an intention for the sake of the *Korban Pesach*, the offering will be valid, as we are not concerned with the second intention which is not for its own sake.

⁷ This is because an improper intention in any of the four *avodos* can cause the offering to be invalid, and performing one *avodah* with proper intention has no relevance to an invalid intention in a later *avodah*, so even Rabbi Meir would agree that the offering is invalid.

for according to Rabbi Yosi too, he holds that a man is held responsible for his last words also? — Rather, [the problem refers] to [where it was done] for its own sake [first] and then for another sake: what then? (59b3 – 60a1)

Come and hear: One who slaughtered a *Korban Pesach* not for its own sake,⁸ or received, walked with, or threw its blood on the *mizbeich* not for its own sake: how is it meant? Shall we say, [literally] as he teaches it,⁹ why must he intend all of them [for a wrong purpose]? From the first it is disqualified! Hence he must teach thus: One who slaughtered a *Korban Pesach* not for its own sake, or even if he slaughtered it for its own purpose, but he received, walked with, or threw its blood [on the *mizbeich*] not for its own sake, or even if he slaughtered it, caught [its blood], and walked [with it] for its own purpose, but sprinkled it for another purpose, so that it is [a question of] two *avodos*.¹⁰ Then consider the second clause: for its own purpose and for

another purpose: how is it meant? Shall we say: in respect of two *avodos*: then it is identical with the first clause! Hence it must surely be in respect of one *avodah*, and this agrees with Rabbi Yosi, who maintained: A man is held responsible for his last words too!¹¹ — No. After all it refers to two *avodos*, but the first clause [discusses] where he is standing at [engaged in] the slaughtering and intends [with due purpose] in respect of the slaughtering, or again he is standing at the sprinkling and intends [for another purpose] in respect of sprinkling.¹² While the second clause means when he is standing at the slaughtering and intends in respect of the sprinkling, when he [for instance] declares, ‘Behold, I slaughter the *Korban Pesach* for its own purpose, [but] to sprinkle its blood for another purpose’; and he [the Tanna] informs us that you can intend at one service for another *avodah*,¹³ and that is Rav Pappa's question.¹⁴ (60a1 – 60a2)

⁸ He intended for a different offering, i.e. a *shelamim*.

⁹ Viz., that all four services were performed for another purpose.

¹⁰ I.e., this clause states the case of a legal purpose at one service and an illegal purpose at another service.

¹¹ The Gemara assumed that the first case of the Mishnah refers to a case where one slaughtered the *Korban Pesach* not for its own sake, or if one slaughtered the *Korban Pesach* for its own sake but received the blood, walked it to the *mizbeich*, and threw the blood on the *mizbeich* not for its own sake. Alternatively, he slaughtered the *Korban Pesach*, received its blood and walked it to the *mizbeich* for its own sake, but he threw the blood not for its own sake. This would be a case of performing two *avodos*. The end of the Mishnah where one slaughters for its own sake and not for its own sake and the *Korban Pesach* is invalid, must then be referring to a case where one had two intentions for one *avodah* and this would be in accordance with Rabbi Yosi who maintains that one is responsible even for his final words.

¹² ‘Slaughtering’ and ‘sprinkling’ are taken merely as examples, the same applying to the other services. Each was performed with the due or undue intention, as the case may be, in respect of itself.

¹³ And that such intention is taken into account, so that if it is illegitimate the sacrifice is disqualified.

¹⁴ The Gemara concludes that the end of the Mishnah refers to a case where one had two intentions concerning two *avodos*. The

difference between the two cases in the Mishnah is that the first part of the Mishnah refers to a case where he is performing the slaughtering and his intention is regarding the slaughtering, or he is involved in throwing the blood and his intention is regarding throwing the blood. This means that the first case is when he slaughtered the *Korban Pesach* intending that the slaughtering is for a different offering, but he threw with blood for the sake of the *Korban Pesach*. The next case in the first part of the Mishnah is when he slaughtered the offering for the sake of the *Korban Pesach* but threw the blood with the intention for different offering. The end of the Mishnah, however, refers to a case where he is involved in slaughtering and intends regarding the throwing of the blood, so he is stating, “I am slaughtering the *Korban Pesach* for its own sake with the intent of throwing the blood not for its own sake.” The offering is invalid because his second intent regarding the throwing of the blood is not relevant to his first intention which is regarding the slaughtering of the offering. This teaches us even if he intends while slaughtering the offering that the throwing of the blood should not be for its own sake (*from one avodah to another avodah*), the *Korban Pesach* is immediately invalidated (*and this was Rav Pappa's inquiry in Tractate Zevachim*), even if he does not end up throwing the blood not for its own sake.

Come and hear from the last part of our Mishnah: or for another purpose and for its own purpose, it is disqualified. What is meant there? If we say that it is referring to a case of two *avodos*, then seeing that where if the first is for its own purpose and the second is for another purpose, you say that it is disqualified; is it necessary to state it where it is first for another purpose and then for its own purpose (*for the very first improper intention invalidated it; how then is it to regain its validity with a proper intention in the next avodah*)? Therefore, it must surely refer to one *avodah*, and since the second clause refers to one *avodah*, the first clause as well refers to one *avodah* (*proving that the Mishnah is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, who maintains that a person is held accountable even for his latter intention*)!

The *Gemora* rejects the proof: No, it refers to two *avodos*, and logically indeed it is not required, but the Mishnah speaks of ‘for its own purpose and for another purpose,’ it also mentions ‘for another purpose and for its own purpose. (60a2)

Come and hear from the next Mishnah: If he slaughtered the *korban pesach* for those who cannot eat it or for those who were not registered for it, for uncircumcised or for *tamei* people, it is disqualified. Now here it obviously refers to one *avodah* (*for only one intention is mentioned*), and since the second clause refers to one *avodah*, the first clause as well refers to one *avodah* (*proving that the Mishnah is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi*)!

The *Gemora* rejects the proof: What proof is this? This one is according to its nature, while the other is according to its nature; the end of the Mishnah refers to one *avodah*, while the beginning of the Mishnah may refer either to one *avodah* or to two *avodos*. (60a2)

Come and hear from the next part of the Mishnah: If he slaughtered it for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is valid. What are the circumstances of the case? Shall we say that it is referring to two *avodos*, and the reason that it is valid is because he intended it (*for those who cannot eat it*) at the sprinkling, for there can be no effective intention regarding those who eat at the sprinkling; therefore, if it were at one *avodah*, e.g., at the slaughtering, where an intention with reference to those who eat is effective, it would be disqualified, but we have an established law that if there are some who eat, it is not disqualified? Rather, it surely refers to one *avodah*, and since the end of the Mishnah refers to one *avodah*, the first part as well refers to one *avodah*!

The *Gemora* rejects the proof: What proof is this? This one is according to its nature, while the other is according to its nature; the end of the Mishnah refers to one *avodah*, while the beginning of the Mishnah may refer either to one *avodah* or to two *avodos*. (60a2 – 60b1)

The scholars inquired: What is the law of a *korban pesach* which he slaughtered at any other time of the year for its own purpose and for another purpose? Does the other purpose come and remove its own purpose, and therefore make it valid, or not?

The *Gemora* answers: When Rav Dimi came, he said: I stated the following argument before Rabbi Yirmiyah: Since slaughtering it for its own purpose makes it valid at its own time (*on the fourteenth of Nissan*), while slaughtering it for another purpose makes it valid at a different time; then just as the slaughtering for its own purpose, which makes it valid at its own time, does not remove it from the disqualifying effect of another

purpose, so as well, the slaughtering for another purpose, which makes it valid at a different time, does not remove it from the disqualifying effect of its own purpose, and it is invalid. Whereupon he said to me: It is not so (*for the following reason*): You may say like that in respect to another purpose, because it operates in the case of all sacrifices; will you say the same where it is slaughtered for its own purpose, seeing that it does not operate as a cause of invalidation in the case of all other sacrifices, but only in the case of the korban pesach alone?

The *Gemora* asks: What is our conclusion regarding this? Rava said: A korban pesach which he slaughtered at any other time of the year for its own purpose and for another purpose is valid. This is because it stands, without it being specified, to be slaughtered for its own purpose, yet even so, when he slaughters it for another purpose, it is valid, which proves that the other purpose comes and removes it from its own purpose. Therefore, when he slaughters it for its own purpose and for another purpose as well, the other purpose comes and removes it from its own purpose.

Rav Adda bar Ahavah said to Rava: Perhaps where he (*explicitly*) states it, it is different from where he does not state it? For if he slaughters it for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is valid, yet when he slaughters it for those who cannot eat it alone, it is invalid. And why is this so; surely it stands, without it being specified, for those who can eat it? Rather, you must admit that where he (*explicitly*) states it, it is different from where he does not state it; so here as

well, where he states it, it is different from where he does not state it.

Rava replied: Is this a proof at all? As for there, it is understandable, for as long as he does not expressly undermine it at the slaughtering, its destiny, without being specified, is certainly to be slaughtered for its own purpose. But here, does it, without it being specified, stand for those who are registered to eat it? Perhaps these will withdraw and others will come and register for it, for we learned in a Mishnah: They may register and withdraw from it until he slaughters it. (60b1 – 60b2)

The scholars asked: What is the law of a Korban Pesach which was slaughtered during the rest of the year with a change of its owners?¹⁵ Is a change of owner like a change of sanctity,¹⁶ and it validates it; or not? — Said Rav Pappa: I stated the following argument before Rava: Since a change of sanctity disqualifies it at its own time, and a change of owner disqualifies it at its own time; then just as a change of sanctity, which disqualifies it at its own time, validates it at a different time, so a change of owner, which disqualifies it at its own time, validates it at a different time. But he said to me: It is not so; if you say thus in the case of a change of sanctity, [that is] because its disqualification is intrinsic,¹⁷ and it is [operative] in respect of the four services, and it is [operative] after death,¹⁸ and it is [operative] in the case of the community as in the case of an individual;¹⁹ will you say [the same] of a change of owner, where the disqualification is not intrinsic, and it is not [operative] in respect of the four services,²⁰ and it

¹⁵ The animal was set aside for a certain person and then slaughtered for a different person, but for its own purpose.

¹⁶ I.e., like slaughtering it as a different sacrifice.

¹⁷ I.e., an illegitimate intention is expressed in respect to the sacrifice itself.

¹⁸ If the owner of the sacrifice died, his son must bring it, and if the latter slaughters it for a different purpose it is disqualified.

¹⁹ public sacrifice, just like a private sacrifice, is disqualified if offered for another purpose.

²⁰ In the case of sacrifices other than the Korban Pesach, a change of owner is a disqualification only when it is expressed in

is not [operative] after death,²¹ and it is not [operative] in the case of the community as in the case of an individual? And though two [of these distinctions] are not exact, two nevertheless are exact. For how is a change of owners different, that [you say] its disqualification is not intrinsic; because its disqualification is merely [one of] intention? Then with a change of sanctity too, its disqualification is merely one of intention. Again, as to what he says: A change of owners is not [operative as a disqualification] after death, then according to Rav Pinchas the son of Rav Ammi who maintained: There is [a disqualification in] a change of owner after death, what is there to be said? Two [of these distinctions] are nevertheless exact! Rather, said Rava: A Korban Pesach which he slaughtered during the rest of the year with a change of owners is regarded as though it had no owners in its proper time,²² and it is disqualified. (60b3 – 61a1)

DAILY MASHAL

A Mother's Prayers

Once there was a wealthy and respected businessman who desired nothing less for his daughter than the most learned and righteous husband he could find. When his daughter came of age, the shadchanim began to make proposals of the most outstanding students from the nearby yeshivos. They knew that the girl's father would not be stingy in regard to her shidduch, and whoever managed to find a suitable match would be well rewarded for his efforts.

The commotion that was made over his search for the "perfect" shidduch aroused the envy of some

connection with the sprinkling of the blood, i.e., he declares that he will sprinkle the blood on behalf of another person.

²¹ When its owner dies the sacrifice loses his name, and therefore even if it is offered in another man's name it is fit.

unscrupulous neighbors. They began to spread malicious lies about her, accusing her of all sorts of terrible conduct. Soon, the gossip spread, and the girl's prospects for finding a good shidduch began to dwindle. The girl grew older and older, and her parents were beside themselves with grief. Finally, they decided that the time had come to reconsider their goals. They could not find for her the Torah scholar she so desired, but she needed to get married nonetheless. A proposal was then suggested with a boy named Aharon Heller, an apprentice to a local wagon driver. Aharon had never learned in yeshiva, and could hardly even read. The girl and her family agreed to the shidduch. They were engaged, and a wedding date was set soon after.

On the day of the wedding, she locked herself in a room and cried out to Hashem. "Master of the Universe! Through no fault of my own, I was made the subject of cruel lies. I lost my life's desire, to marry a true Torah scholar. Please Hashem, You alone know that my intentions are sincere. If I did not merit to marry a *talmid chachom*, please let my children be *talmidei chachomim*."

As the years passed by, she saw that her tefillos were answered far beyond her highest hopes. She merited four sons, all of whom became distinguished Torah scholars: R' Yechiel Heller (author of *Amudei Or*), R' Yehoshua (author of *Chosen Yehoshua*), R' Yisrael and R' Menachem. In the introduction to *Amudei Or*, R' Yechiel writes that the sefer was named in honor of his dear parents. "Or" in Hebrew stands for Aharon and Rivka, his parents' names.

²² I.e., as though it were slaughtered on Erev Pesach as a Korban Pesach, but for no persons in particular.