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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Mishnah

If a person saw people running after a lost object, or after a lame deer, or after young birds that cannot fly, and he said, “My field has acquired it for me,” it has acquired it for him. If the deer was running in its usual manner, or the birds were flying, and he said, “My field has acquired it for me,” he has said nothing (*for they will not remain secure in the courtyard*). (11a1)

Standing by his Field

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: His field can acquire for him provided that he is standing at the side of his field.

The *Gemora* asks: Let the field acquire for him even if he is not standing at the side? Didn’t Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Chanina say that a courtyard of a person can acquire for him even without his knowledge?

The *Gemora* answers: That is correct if the courtyard is guarded (*with a fence*). However, if it is not guarded, it will only acquire for him if he is standing by its side.

And from where do you say that regarding a courtyard which is not guarded – if he is standing beside the field – yes (he acquires the object), but if he is not, no (he does not)? It is from the following *Baraisa*: If one was standing in the city and says, “I know that the sheaf which I have in the field has been forgotten by the workers, and it is my wish that the sheaf shall not be regarded as *shich’chah* (*one or two bundles that are mistakenly left behind during the gathering of the bundles are left for the poor*),” I might think that it shall not be regarded as *shich’chah* (*even if later, the owner himself forgets about it*), the Torah tells us: *And you forget a*

sheaf in the field. This implies that it is *shich’chah* only if it was forgotten while he was in the field; however, if it was forgotten while he was in the city, it is not regarded as *shich’chah*.

The *Gemora* asks: Now, this seems self-contradictory. First the *Baraisa* said: I might think that it shall not be regarded as *shich’chah* - from which it would appear that in fact it is regarded as *shich’chah*. But then the *Baraisa* concludes: it is *shich’chah* only if it was forgotten while he was in the field; however, if it was forgotten while he was in the city, it is not regarded as *shich’chah* - from which it would seem that in the case discussed, it is not regarded as *shich’chah*!?

The *Gemora* explains the *Baraisa* as follows: [*Rashi holds that in order to be regarded as shich’chah, the owner and the workers must forget about it.*] In the field, if it was forgotten in the beginning (*first by the owner and then by the workers*), it must be regarded as *shich’chah*, but if in the beginning it was remembered by the owner and was subsequently forgotten (*by the workers and then by the owner*), it is not regarded as *shich’chah*. The *Gemora* explains the reason for this: Since he was standing near it, the field acquires it for him. But when the owner is in the city, even if the owner remembered the sheaf in the beginning and only later was it forgotten, it must be regarded as *shich’chah*. The reason for this is because he is not there beside it, so that the field cannot acquire possession of the sheaf for him. [*Evidently, an unguarded field cannot acquire for the owner unless he is standing by its side.*]

The *Gemora* asks: How do you know? Perhaps it is a Biblical decree that only that which is forgotten when the owner is in the field shall be regarded as *shich’chah*, but that which is

forgotten when the owner is in the city is not regarded as *shich'chah*?

The *Gemora* answers: This cannot be correct, for it is written: *You shall not go back to take it* - this is to include the sheaf which has been forgotten by the owner while he is in the city.

The *Gemora* asks: But isn't this needed for a prohibition to take that which was forgotten? The *Gemora* answers: If that were so, the torah would only have to say: *Do not take it*. Why does it say: *You shall not go back to take it*? It must be to include the sheaf which has been forgotten by the owner while he is in the city.

The *Gemora* asks: But isn't the verse still required for that which we have learned in the following *Mishnah*: That which is in front of him is not *shich'chah*; that which is behind him is *shich'chah*, as it is included in the prohibition: *You shall not go back*. This is the rule: All that can be included in the prohibition of going back is regarded as *shich'chah*; all that cannot be included in the prohibition of going back is not regarded as *shich'chah*!?! [We do not have a verse now to teach us that *shich'chah* can apply even when the owner is in the city!?!] Rav Ashi said: The Torah says: *It shall be*. This includes that which has been forgotten by the owner when he is in the city.

Ulla and Rabbah bar bar Chanah both said also that the *Mishnah* is referring to a case where he is standing at the side of his field.

Rabbi Abba challenged Ulla from the following *Mishnah*: It happened once that Rabban Gamliel and some elders were traveling on a ship. Rabban Gamliel said to them: The tithe (*ma'aser rishon*) which I shall measure off when I come home is given to Yehoshua (*ben Chananyah, who was a Levi*) and the place where it lies is leased to him. [*Rabbi Yehoshua gave him a perutah for the rental and acquired the ma'aser together with the land with kinyan agav.*] And the other tithe (*ma'aser ani*) which I shall measure off is given to Akiva

ben Yosef that he may acquire possession of it for the poor, and the place where it lies is leased to him.

Rabbi Abba asks: Were Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva standing at the side of Rabban Gamliel's field? Ulla responded: It would seem that Rabbi Abba is like one who never learned this *halachah* (as the *Gemora* will explain below).

When Rabbi Abba came to Sura, he related to the Rabbis there: This is what Ulla said and this is the challenge that I placed before him. One of the Rabbis then answered him: Rabban Gamliel made them acquire the movable property with a *kinyan agav* (one can acquire movable property together with the acquisition of land; the *kinyan* of *chatzeir* – courtyard was not used in that case). Rabbi Zeira accepted this reply, but Rabbi Abba did not accept it.

Rava said: Rabbi Abba was correct in not accepting it. Do you think that those *Tannaim* did not have a kerchief by which to acquire from Rabban Gamliel the tithes as *chalifin* (the buyer gives the seller something as a token exchange to settle the transaction)? It must therefore be explained that the small enjoyment of the right to give the tithes to whom one likes is not regarded as something that has a money value by which one could acquire through a *kinyan chalifin*. Here also, it must be said that the small enjoyment of this right is not regarded as something that has a money value for the purpose of being acquired through a *kinyan agav*.

The *Gemora* disagrees with Rava: But this is not so: In regard to the Kohanic gifts, the term "giving" is written in the Torah. *Chalifin* cannot be used, for it is a type of business transaction (and not a "giving"), whereas the acquisition of movable property through immovable property is a transaction which can be regarded as "giving."

Rav Pappa answers: In a case where there is a person transferring ownership of them (to the courtyard), it is different (and the recipient does not need to be standing by the side of the field in order to acquire it).

And from where do you know this? For we learned in our *Mishnah*: If a person saw people running after a lost object etc. And Rabbi Yirmiyah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: This is correct only if he can run after them and can reach them (*before they leave his field*). Rabbi Yirmiyah then asked: What is the *halachah* regarding a gift? Rabbi Abba bar Kahana accepted the distinction implied in this question, and he answered: They become his even if he runs after them and he cannot reach them. What is the reason for this? Is it not because where there is a person transferring ownership of them, it is different!

Rav Simi asked Rav Pappa: Behold there is the case of a bill of divorcement (*when the husband places the get into the wife's house or courtyard*), where there is a person transferring ownership of them, and yet Ulla said that she must be standing by the side of her house or her courtyard? The *Gemora* answers: The case of a *get* is different, for it may be given even against her will.

Rav Sheishes the son of Rav Idi asks: Would it not be a *kal vachomer*: If [in the case of] a *get*, which may be given against [the wife's] will, it is valid if she is standing by the side of her house or her courtyard, but not otherwise, how much more should this be so in the case of a gift, for which [the recipient's] consent [is necessary]? Rather, Rav Ashi said: A person's courtyard is included in his hand to acquire things, but it is no less effective than agency. Therefore, in the case of a bill of divorcement, where it is disadvantageous for her, we say that one may not disadvantage a person except when the person is present. But by the case of a gift, where it is beneficial to the recipient, we say that one may benefit a person even when the person is not present. (11a1 – 12a1)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

THE REQUIREMENT OF "TZEVRIM"

QUESTION: The *Gemara* discusses whether *Metaltelin* (mobile property) acquired through *Kinyan Agav* must be "piled" ("*Tzevurim*") on the land through which it is being

acquired, or whether the *Kinyan* takes effect even when the *Metaltelin* are situated somewhere else.

Why does the *Gemara* entertain the possibility that the *Metaltelin* must be resting on the land in order to be acquired through *Kinyan Agav*? If it must be resting on the land, the buyer acquires it through *Kinyan Chatzer* (and *Kinyan Agav* is not necessary). *Kinyan Agav* is necessary *only* when the *Metaltelin* are not resting in the *Chatzer*. (**RITVA**)

ANSWERS:

(a) The **RITVA** explains that the *Chatzer* with which the person makes the *Kinyan Agav* is "*Einah Mishtameres*," it is not protected. Therefore, it cannot acquire the *Metaltelin* through *Kinyan Chatzer*, and *Kinyan Agav* is necessary even though the *Metaltelin* are resting on the land.

The answer of the *Ritva* does not seem to conform with all of the opinions mentioned in the *Gemara* in *Bava Metzia* (11b). The *Gemara* there discusses whether a *Chatzer* which is not protected can acquire objects through *Kinyan Chatzer*. *Ula* and *Shmuel* rule that such a *Chatzer* cannot acquire unless the *Chatzer's* owner is present (and thus it is guarded). *Rebbi Aba* attempts to prove that the *Chatzer* acquires the object even when the owner is not present. He cites the incident (which the *Gemara* here cites as well) involving *Raban Gamliel* and the *Zekenim* who were traveling together on a boat. *Rebbi Aba* assumes that the *Zekenim* who accompanied *Raban Gamliel* acquired the *Ma'aser* and *Ma'aser Ani* from him through his *Chatzer* which he leased to them, even though the *Chatzer* was not guarded. The *Gemara* there refutes this proof in two ways. The *Gemara* ("*ha'Hu me'Rabanan*") suggests that the *Zekenim* acquired the *Ma'aser* through *Kinyan Agav* and not *Kinyan Chatzer*. *Rav Papa* refutes the proof by saying that a *Chatzer* which is not guarded *is* an effective *Kinyan Chatzer* for a *gift* (because someone consciously gives the object to the recipient -- "*Da'as Acheres Makneh*"), just like the gift *Raban Gamliel* gave to the *Zekenim*; it is *not* an effective *Kinyan Chatzer* for an object of *Hefker*.

The Ritva's explanation is consistent with the first answer in Bava Metzia which maintains that even when someone gives a gift ("Da'as Acheres Makneh"), a Chatzer which is not guarded cannot acquire the gift for the recipient. The only way the Zekenim could have acquired the Ma'aser (which was resting in a Chatzer which was not guarded) was through Kinyan Agav. However, according to Rav Papa's answer, the Zekenim were able to acquire the Ma'aser resting in their Chatzer through Kinyan Chatzer even though the Chatzer was not guarded.

Every case of Kinyan Agav is, by definition, a case of "Da'as Acheres Makneh," because Kinyan Agav requires that a giver tell a recipient to acquire the object through Kinyan Agav (as the Gemara on 27a says). If, however, Agav requires "Tzevurim," the recipient should always acquire the Metaltelin through Kinyan Chatzer and there should be no necessity for Kinyan Agav.

Apparently, the Ritva means that the Gemara here does not accept the opinion of Rav Papa that one can give a gift to a recipient by placing it in a Chatzer which is not guarded. The Gemara here maintains that the only way to acquire an object resting in an unprotected Chatzer is through Kinyan Agav. Therefore, the Gemara asks whether Kinyan Agav requires "Tzevurim" or not, and it does not assume that if the Metaltelin are "Tzevurim" that one acquires them through Kinyan Chatzer.

Rav Papa, on the other hand, certainly maintains that the Metaltelin do not need to be resting on the property in order to be acquired through Kinyan Agav. (This is also the way the Gemara here concludes.)

(b) The **SHITAH LO NODA L'MI** cites the "**BA'ALEI TOSFOS**" who write that the reason why Metaltelin piled in a Chatzer cannot be acquired through Kinyan Chatzer is that Kinyan Chatzer is effective only for an object which entered the Chatzer *after* the Chatzer became the property of the buyer. It is not effective for an object which was in the Chatzer *before* it became the recipient's property. The original

source for this explanation may be the **TOSFOS CHITZONIYOS** cited by the **SHITAH MEKUBETZES** in Bava Metzia (end of 25b, and quoted by the **KETZOS HA'CHOSHEN** 198:2 and the **MACHANEH EFRAIM**, Hilchos Kinyan Chatzer #13) who give this answer. The **HAGAHOS ASHIRI** there also mentions this distinction.

The Ketzos ha'Choshen and Machaneh Efraim question this distinction based on the Gemara in Bava Metzia, where Rav Papa clearly says that the Zekenim acquired the Ma'aser from Raban Gamliel through Kinyan Chatzer, even though Raban Gamliel gave them the Chatzer *after* the Ma'aser was already resting there.

Apparently, the Tosfos Chitzoniyos also assumes that the question of the Gemara here does not conform with the opinion of Rav Papa, but rather with the first opinion in the Gemara in Bava Metzia (that the Zekenim acquired the Ma'aser with Kinyan Agav). The Tosfos Chitzoniyos suggests that not only does that opinion disagree with Rav Papa and maintain that a Chatzer which is not guarded cannot effect a Kinyan Chatzer, it also maintains that any object which enters the Chatzer before the recipient buys the Chatzer is not acquired through Kinyan Chatzer. That is why objects piled there ("Tzevurim") can be acquired only through Kinyan Agav and not through Kinyan Chatzer (according to the possibility that "Tzevurim" is necessary).

The Acharonim question the approach of the Tosfos Chitzoniyos from another Gemara. The Gemara in Gitin (21a) teaches that when a man places a Get in the hands of his servant and then gives the servant to his wife as a gift, she becomes divorced because of the principle of "Gitah v'Yadah Ba'in k'Echad." The Gemara clearly understands that the woman acquires the Get even though it was in the Eved's hand before the Eved became her property. Apparently, the Tosfos Chitzoniyos understands that the Gemara there follows the opinion of Rav Papa (and the way the Gemara here concludes) -- that Kinyan Agav does not require "Tzevurim." Accordingly, an object which is "Tzavur" and resting in the Chatzer (or in the hands of the Eved) is



acquired through Kinyan Chatzer and does not need Kinyan Agav.

(c) Even if Kinyan Agav is effective only when the Metaltelin are "Tzevurim," there exists another difference between Kinyan Agav and Kinyan Chatzer. The **RITVA** and **TOSFOS RID** here (27a) write that when one transfers ownership of an object through Kinyan Agav, the land and its mobile contents are transferred simultaneously. However, when the recipient acquires the Metaltelin with Kinyan Chatzer, he first must acquire the Chatzer and only afterwards does he acquire the Metaltelin. (See **CHASAM SOFER** OC 117, DH Mah she'Kasuv Ma'alaso. See Insights to Gitin 77:3.)

(The following case demonstrates a practical difference between Kinyan Agav and Kinyan Chatzer. Reuven sells land to Levi, but Levi has not yet made a Kinyan on the land. Resting on the land are Metaltelin, which Reuven sells to Shimon with the condition that Shimon will acquire it only at the moment that *Levi* makes a Kinyan on the land (on which the Metaltelin rests). Reuven then instructs Levi to make a Kinyan on the land and thereby acquire the Metaltelin (that is, the Metaltelin which he has already sold to Shimon). If Levi's Kinyan of the Metaltelin constitutes Kinyan *Chatzer*, then only *after* the land (Chatzer) has become his can it acquire the Metaltelin for him. However, *at the same moment* that he acquires the land, *Shimon* becomes the owner of the Metaltelin because of Reuven's stipulation, and thus Levi cannot acquire it a moment later. In contrast, if Levi's Kinyan of the Metaltelin constitutes Kinyan *Agav*, then his Kinyan on the Metaltelin occurs at exactly the same moment as Shimon's Kinyan, and thus they divide the Metaltelin between them.)

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FROM YESTERDAY'S DAF

to refresh your memory

Q: Can one seize a debtor's property on behalf of a creditor, thereby causing loss to the debtor's other creditors?

A: No (except if he makes him an agent – according to Rashi).

Q: Where is the *kinyan* of four *amos* ineffective?

A: Either in a private property, or in a public domain.

Q: Does a minor girl have a right to acquire things through her courtyard or four *amos*?

A: It is a *machlokes Amoraim*.

DAILY MASHAL

The following story, related by Horav Yitzchak Zilberstein, Shlita, does not actually address the parsha. Its lesson and message, however, is compelling. It is especially significant in that it conveys to us the far-reaching effect of our behavior. We hope that our actions will all have similar positive consequences as evidenced in this episode.

A young kollel fellow in Yerushalayim went to a Judaica library in search of a certain volume not accessible in the local shuls. Knowing that the library was not located in an area that had a kosher restaurant, he brought along a sandwich for lunch. After a period of time perusing through the sefer, the young man decided to wash and eat lunch. He moved to a corner of the library and ate his meal. He then began to bentch with great kavanah, devotion.

As he finished bentching, the librarian came over and asked to speak to him. She remarked that listening to him bentch brought a question to her mind. "We implore Hashem in bentching. Shelo neivosh v'lo nikalem v'lo nikashel, that we not feel inner shame, nor be humiliated, and not stumble/falter. I do not understand why the words v'lo nikashel are included. They do not seem to fit in," she commented. The young woman added that while she had strayed away from Yiddishkeit and was no longer observant, she still remembered that this question had bothered her when she would bentch.

The young man, who had been used to bentching with this nusach, version, ever since he was a child, was stymied for an answer. He began to search through the various volumes in the library for a source for this version of bentching, but he was not successful. He said that he would go home and find a bentcher which included the phrase, "and not stumble," in it and send her a copy. He returned home, and after some searching, he located a copy of bentching in an old Haggadah. He made a copy and circled the words, "v'lo nikashel," and sent it to the librarian. After he did this, he forgot about the incident.

Many months after the episode in the library, the kollel fellow received an invitation to attend a wedding. He stared at the names and was at a loss; he did not recognize either the chossan or the kallah or their families. He assumed that the invitation was some sort of a mistake.

It happened "by chance" that on the day of the wedding, he was on the street where the wedding was taking place. His curiosity was aroused, so he figured he would walk in and see who it was that was getting married. Perhaps he could find out why he had been invited. He entered the hall, searched through the wedding, and found no one whom he recognized. As he was about to leave he told his wife, who happened to be with him that day, "I guess it must have been a mistake."

At that same moment, someone came over to him and asked his name. When the messenger heard his name, he said, "Please come with me; the kallah would like to meet you." Now, his curiosity was truly piqued. "Do you not recognize me?" asked the kallah. "I was the librarian who questioned you in regard to the correct version of bentching." Suddenly, she became very emotional and said, "I want you to know that, in truth, you are the biggest mechutan, relative, at this wedding. Indeed, if not for you, there would be no wedding. It was indirectly because of you that I was inspired to return to a life of Torah observance.

She began to relate what had transpired since that fateful day that they met in the library. "It happened to be that, tragically, I was engaged to a non-Jew. Yet, I still had doubts. I still had feelings that pulled me back to the faith of my ancestors. I vacillated back and forth, obviously, to the concern and eventual disdain of my fiancé. He gave me an ultimatum: either I said yes by a certain day, or the engagement was off. He could not marry a Jewess who was not prepared to sever all of her ties to her faith. The day soon arrived, and I was prepared to make my decision to give my affirmative answer. "I arrived at the library a nervous wreck. I was about to renege my religion, the religion of my parents, the religion for which so many had died. I was in love, however, and love conquers all. I walked into my office at the library, and behold, in front of my eyes, laying on top of my desk, was your letter. I cannot remember how this letter was moved "by chance" from room to room, to end up on my desk on that specific day. I opened the envelope and glaring straight at me were the words "v'lo nikashel", and "not stumble," circled in red. "I began to scream at myself. How could you stumble like this? How could you throw everything away? I was ruining my life. I called off my engagement and gradually returned to become a chozeres bi'teshuvah. Shortly afterward, I was blessed to meet a wonderful ben Torah, whom I have tonight wed. Thank you so much for bentching that day with such feeling that I was moved enough to approach you about the nusach of the bentching."

What a powerful story. What is most significant is the knowledge of the effect we have on those around us. We never know who is watching. We must make sure that what they observe is of a positive nature.