



Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler, Kollel Boker Beachwood

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Moshe Raphael ben Yehoshua (Morris Stadtmauer) o"h
Tzvi Gershon ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o"h

May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Me'ilah Until When?

The *Gemora* continues to try to resolve the question of what must become permitted to remove *me'ilah*.

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa* in which Rabbi Shimon says that sometimes one is liable for *me'ilah* when eating *nosar* – *leftover sacrifice meat*, and sometimes not. If the blood has not yet been applied, one is liable for *me'ilah*, but otherwise one is not.

The *Gemora* assumes that there was an opportunity to apply the blood in both cases, yet Rabbi Shimon says that until the blood is actually applied, *me'ilah* is still in effect. This proves that *me'ilah* applies until the sacrifice is permitted for eating.

The *Gemora* deflects this, saying that the *braisa* is referring to whether there was an opportunity to apply the blood or not (*before sunset*), not whether it was actually applied, and is stating that *me'ilah* is in effect until the sacrifice is permitted for applying its blood.

The *Gemora* cites another *braisa* in which Rabbi Shimon says the same about *piggul*, and the *Gemora* follows the same line of proof and deflection.

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa* which says that one is liable for *me'ilah* on *piggul* – *a sacrifice which one planned to eat improperly* of more severe *kodshei kodashim*.

The *Gemora* assumes that the *braisa's* statement applies even after the blood was applied, implying that in a regular

valid sacrifice, *me'ilah* applies until the blood is applied. This proves that it applies until the sacrifice may be eaten.

The *Gemora* deflects this, saying that the *braisa* is referring to *piggul* only before the blood was applied, implying that a valid sacrifice is not subject to *me'ilah* even then, once it is permitted to apply the blood.

The *Gemora* challenges this, as the *braisa* continues to say that one is not liable for *me'ilah* on *piggul* of the sacrificial fats of the less severe *kodshim kalim*. If *me'ilah* doesn't apply to *piggul* once the blood is applied, the *braisa* could have used that case as the permitted case in the second section, without having to change to a case of *kodshim kalim*.

The *Gemora* deflects this, saying the *braisa* wishes to illustrate the extent of the ease of removing *me'ilah* and the difficulty of creating the prohibition. Therefore, the *braisa* first chose the case *piggul* of *kodshei kodashim*, illustrating that any blood application removes *me'ilah*, and then the case of *piggul* of *kodshim kalim*, illustrating that only an application of blood of a valid sacrifice can create the prohibition of *me'ilah*. (6a)

Meat which left the Courtyard

The *Mishna* discusses the effect of applying the blood of a *kodesh kodashim* sacrifice on its meat which left the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer says that it has no effect, and therefore, one would still be liable for *me'ilah* on it, but not liable for eating it if it is *piggul* – *improper thought*, *nosar* – *leftover*, or impure. Rabbi Akiva says that it has the standard

effect, removing *me'ilah*, and introducing liability for *piggul*, *nosar*, and impurity. Rabbi Akiva supports his position from the case of one who designated an animal as a *chatas*, and then designated a replacement when it got lost. If he finds the first one, when he applies the blood of one of them, neither meat is prohibited in *me'ilah*. If the blood of one *chatas* can remove *me'ilah* from the meat of another animal, surely the blood of a sacrifice can remove *me'ilah* from its own meat.

The *Mishna* concludes by stating the same dispute about the effect of applying the blood of *kodshim kalim* on its sacrificial fats which left the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer says it has no effect, making one exempt for *me'ilah*, and for eating it if it is *piggul*, *nosar*, or impure, while Rabbi Akiva says it has the usual effect, introducing liability for all of these prohibitions.

The *Gemora* explains that the *Mishna* had to teach the dispute in both the case of *kodshei kodashim* meat and the case of the fats of *kodshim kalim*, since we may have thought that it is easier for any type of blood application to introduce *me'ilah* than to remove it. Therefore, we may have thought that Rabbi Eliezer agrees to Rabbi Akiva in the case of the fats, or that Rabbi Akiva agrees to Rabbi Eliezer in the case of *kodshei kodashim* meat.

Rabbi Yochanan says that Rabbi Akiva only says that the blood application takes effect if some of the meat still remained inside, but not if all of it left.

Rav Assi challenged Rabbi Yochanan, as his colleagues in the Diaspora taught that if one had improper plans for a part of the sacrifice which is lost or burned, it renders the sacrifice *piggul*, implying that even something that is totally unfit is still considered part of the sacrifice.

The *Gemora* asks how Rav Assi could ask this question, as he asked Rabbi Yochanan whether improper plans while spilling the leftover blood makes *piggul*.

Rabbi Zeira answered that we see from the status of the neck sinews of a carcass, which combines with other food to become impure, but is not itself impure as part of the carcass, that something which is insubstantial as food does not have the status of proper meat. Similarly, this blood, which is being discarded, is not considered part of the sacrifice. From this answer, Rav Assi should have also said that meat which is unfit is not considered part of the sacrifice.

Rava answers that the statement Rav Assi cited refers to meat which eventually was lost or burnt, but was fit at the time of applying the blood.

Rav Pappa says that Rabbi Akiva's position is limited to a case where the meat left the courtyard, but not when the blood which was applied first left.

He supports this with a *braisa*, which says that if one properly slaughtered a sacrifice, and then then blood left, even if he returned the blood inside and applied it, he did nothing. Therefore, one still is liable for *me'ilah* on the meat, if it was *kodshei kodashim*, and one is not liable for *me'ilah* on the sacrificial fats, if it was *kodshim kalim*. (6b – 7a)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Applying the Blood of Piggul

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa* in which Rabbi Shimon says that one is liable for *me'ilah* on *piggul*, but only before the blood is applied. The *Gemora* attempts to prove from this that *me'ilah* applies until the meat may be eaten, and not just until the blood may be applied. The *Gemora* deflects this, saying that the application in the *braisa* refers to whether there was time in the day to apply the blood after it was slaughtered.

Tosfos (6a ta shma) asks what made the sacrifice *piggul* in the case where there was time to apply the blood, but it was not applied?

Tosfos explains that he had the *piggul* plan at the end of receiving the blood, making it *piggul*, but since it could have been applied from the start of receiving the blood, it is considered permitted to apply the blood already.

When the *Gemora* assumed that the *braisa* was referring to actual application of the blood, Rabbi Shimon was saying that once the blood is applied on a *piggul* sacrifice, *me'ilah* is removed. Tosfos notes that this is inconsistent with Rav Gidal, who said (3b) that applying the blood of a *piggul* sacrifice does not remove *me'ilah*.

Tosfos answers that Rav Gidal maintains that the *braisa* is referring to the potential for applying the blood, as the *Gemora* itself deflects.

Tosfos notes that this would make Rav Gidal say that the permitted stage referred to in the *Mishna* is the blood being permitted to be applied, yet earlier the *Gemora* (5b) explained the *Mishna* to refer to the permission to eat, following Rav Gidal.

Tosfos answers that Rav Gidal can maintain that the section of the *Mishna* discussed on 5b (about Rabbi Yehoshua's statement) says that the permitted stage is for eating, while Rabbi Shimon in the *braisa* says it is permission to apply the blood. However, the opinion that says that the permission is to eat will maintain that Rabbi Yehoshua agrees with Rav Gidal's statement, but Rabbi Shimon in the *braisa* does not.

Me'ilah, trespassing against Hekdesh, the Sanctuary or its vessels, is a Hebrew term which implies the unauthorized use of sacred property. In the laws applying to *me'ilah*, we find a distinction between *me'ilah* of an object that is *kadosh kedushas haguf*, the actual item, whose "body" is sacred; and an object which is only *kadosh kedushas damim*, its value has been sanctified. Concerning an item which has only *kedushas damim*, the law states that once it has undergone one *me'ilah* its *kedushah*, sacredness, is gone. The reason for this is that the individual who had made use of it had intended to remove it from the custody of the Sanctuary. By doing so, he profaned and transferred it out of the dominion of the Sanctuary. An item that is in itself inherently sacred retains its sanctity under all circumstances. Even if it has been the subject of *me'ilah*, it does not lose its status of *kedushah*. Thus, an object whose value is consecrated can only undergo *me'ilah* once. Afterwards, it is no longer holy. An object which is essentially holy can undergo *me'ilah* as often as a person uses it in an unauthorized manner.

Rabbi A. L. Scheinbaum, in *Peninim on the Torah* cites a *Bais HaLevi*, who extends this distinction to *kedushas Yisrael*, the inherent holiness of each and every Jew. This *kedushah* is a *kedushas haguf*, whereby every Jew has an essential sanctity that permeates his entire essence. This *kedushah* is irrevocable. Thus, we understand the Rabbinic dictum that, *Yisrael - af al pi she'chatah - Yisrael hu*, "A Jew - even if he has sinned - remains a Jew." This applies regardless of the gravity of the transgression. Even if a Jew were to worship an idol with the express intention of apostatizing himself from the Jewish People, he nonetheless retains his *kedushas Yisrael* and does not need to convert back to Judaism when he is ready to repent. On the other hand, prior to performing *teshuvah*, repenting, he cannot say, "I do not ascribe to the Jewish religion." He remains a Jew, reflecting both the positive and negative implications of the word.

DAILY MASHAL

If a man commits treachery and sins unintentionally against Hashem's Holies.