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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

### **Mishna**

If his intention was to eat something which measured half the size of an olive and also to burn something which measured half the size of an olive, it is valid, for we do not combine an intention about eating with one about burning. (12b)

### **Combinations**

The *Mishna* says that if one planned on eating half a *zayis* and sacrificing half a *zayis*, this does not combine. The *Gemora* infers that if one planned to eat that second half *zayis*, instead of sacrificing it, it would be *piggul*, even though the half *zayis* that would be sacrificed is not normally eaten.

The *Gemora* says that this is inconsistent with the earlier section of the *Mishna*, which said that only intent to eat something “which is eaten” makes a sacrifice *piggul*.

Rabbi Yirmiyah says that the latter part of the *Mishna* is Rabbi Eliezer, who says consumption of the Altar and of a person are interchangeable.

The *Gemora* cites a *Mishna* about one who plans to eat something not normally eaten, or sacrifice something that is not normally sacrificed at the wrong time. The Sages say it is valid, as these are not valid forms of consumption,

while Rabbi Eliezer says it is invalid, since the types of consumption are interchangeable.

Abaye says that this latter section can also follow the Sages, since the *Mishna* does not mean to infer that if one planned to eat the half *zayis* that would have been sacrificed, it would be *piggul*.

The *Gemora* attempts to explain what this section of the *Mishna* is teaching. It cannot be teaching that if one would plan to eat a second half *zayis* of the remainder (*which is normally eaten*), we already know that from the start of the *Mishna*, which says that if one planned on half a *zayis* at the wrong time and half a *zayis* in the wrong place, it is invalid. It cannot be teaching that eating and sacrificing do not combine, since we would know that from the earlier statement of the *Mishna* that planning to eat half a *zayis* of the remainder (*which is normally eaten*) and planning to eat half a *zayis* of sacrificed items (*which are not normally eaten*), does not make it *piggul*. If planning to eat these two items does not combine, even though they are both plans to eat, surely planning to eat one half and sacrifice one half should not combine, since they are two different actions.

The *Gemora* says that we would not know this from the first statement, since we may have thought that eating sacrificed items is not a valid act, and therefore cannot combine, but sacrificing these items, which is a normative act, may have combined. Therefore, the *Mishna* had to

teach that they do not combine, and not to teach any other implications. (12b – 13a)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, KOL HAMENACHOS

### **Mishna**

If one performed a *kemitzah* on a *minchah* with the intention of eating its remainder on the next day, or with the intention of burning its *komeitz* on the next day, Rabbi Yosi admits regarding this that it is *piggul* and it is subject to *kares*. If he has intention of burning its *levonah* on the next day, it is invalid, but it is not subject to *kares*. The *Chachamim* say: It is *piggul* and it is subject to *kares*. They asked him: what is the difference between this case (*of a minchah*) and that of a sacrifice? He replied to them: It is because regarding a sacrifice, its blood, meat and sacrificial parts are all one (*and therefore intention regarding its sacrificial parts render the sacrifice piggul*); however, the *levonah* is not considered part of the *minchah*. (13a)

### **Rabbi Yosi**

The *Gemora* asks: Why was it necessary to state that Rabbi Yosi admits by this?

The *Gemora* answers: We might have thought that Rabbi Yosi's reason in the next case of the *Mishna* is because one cannot render something *piggul* when his intention is regarding half a permitter (*such as the levonah*), and therefore he would disagree even in the first case (*when the intention was regarding the komeitz, which is only half a permitter*); the *Mishna* therefore informs us that he agrees in this case.

The *Mishna* had stated: If he has intention of burning its *levonah* on the next day, it is invalid, but it is not subject to *kares*.

Rish Lakish said: Rabbi Yosi had ruled that a 'permitter cannot render *piggul* the other permitter.' So too, you may say of the two spoons of *levonah* of the *Lechem hapanim*, that one permitter cannot render *piggul* the other permitter.

The *Gemora* asks: What is meant when it said, "So too, you may say etc."?

The *Gemora* answers: You might have thought that Rabbi Yosi's reason in the case of the *levonah* was that it was not of the same kind as the *minchah* offering, but in the case of the two spoons of *levonah*, since they each contain the same kind, you might have thought that one could render the other *piggul*; we are, therefore taught that this is not so.

The *Gemora* asks: But how can you say that Rabbi Yosi's reason in the case of the *levonah* is not 'that it was not of the same kind as the *minchah* offering'? Surely the *Mishna* explicitly stated: They asked him: what is the difference between this case (*of a minchah*) and that of a sacrifice? He replied to them: It is because regarding a sacrifice, its blood, meat and sacrificial parts are all one (*and therefore intention regarding its sacrificial parts render the sacrifice piggul*); however, the *levonah* is not considered part of the *minchah*.

The *Gemora* answers: The expression that 'the *levonah* is not considered part of the *minchah*' means that it is not dependent like the remainder of the *minchah* upon the *komeitz*; for we do not say that just as the *komeitz* is indispensable to the remainder, for so long as the *komeitz* has not been

Burned, the remainder may not be eaten - so it is indispensable to the *levonah*; but rather, if he wishes, he may burn the *komeitz* first, and if he wishes he may burn the *levonah* first.

The *Gemora* explain the opinion of the *Chachamim*: They hold that we apply the principle of ‘a permitter cannot render *piggul* another permitter’ only to such a case as where the permitters are not established as one by being placed in one vessel, but where they are established as one by being placed in one vessel, they are regarded as one permitter. (13a – 13b)

### ***Gathering the Levonah***

Rabbi Yannai said: If a non-*Kohen* gathered up the *levonah*, it is invalid.

Rabbi Yirmiyah explained this: This touches upon the law of ‘bringing near.’ He is of the opinion that ‘carrying the blood not by foot’ (*when one Kohen hands the blood to another, bringing it closer to the Altar*) is not called carrying (*and a wrong intention during this time would not disqualify the sacrifice*), and it is established that if a non-*Kohen* brought it near, it is invalid.

Rav Mari said: We have also learned like this in a *Mishna*: This is the general rule: Whoever takes the *komeitz*, places it in the sacred utensil, brings it to the altar, or burns it (*with an intention to eat something which is meant to be eaten etc.*). Now it is clear that the taking of the *komeitz* corresponds to the slaughtering of the animal sacrifice; the bringing near of the *komeitz* corresponds to the bringing near of the blood; the burning of the *komeitz* corresponds to the throwing of the blood; but as to the placing of the *komeitz* into a vessel, what service is he performing! You cannot say that it corresponds to the receiving of the blood, for surely there is no comparison

between them, for there, the blood shoots into the vessel by itself, whereas here, the *komeitz* is taken and placed into the vessel. We must therefore say that since it cannot be valid if omitted, it is an important service, and therefore is regarded as corresponding to the receiving of the blood; here too (*regarding the gathering of the levonah*), since it cannot be valid if omitted, it is an important service, and therefore is regarded as corresponding to the ‘bringing near’!

The *Gemora* disagrees: It is not so, for in fact the placing in a vessel corresponds to the receiving of the blood; and as for your challenge that there the blood shoots into the vessel by itself, whereas here, the *komeitz* is taken and placed into the vessel, I may reply that, since in both cases the substances are consecrated in a vessel, there is no difference if it comes into the vessel by itself or if it is taken and placed into the vessel! (13b)

### **DAILY MASHAL**

#### ***Chalos and Dancing***

Ibn Ezra (Vayikra 2:4) explains that the *chalos* are so called because they were round, similar to the terms *chalilah* – circuitous, and *machol* – dancing in a circle.