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Mishnah

[On Shavuos, two loaves are offered as minchah offerings. Two lambs are brought together with them, as shelamim. The slaughtering of those lambs sanctify the loaves and permit them for consumption.] If the lambs were slaughtered with the intention that one of the loaves will be eaten the next day (beyond its prescribed time), or the spoons of *levonah* were burned with the intention that one of the arrangements of breads (six from the *lechem hapanim*) will be eaten the next day, Rabbi Yosi said: The loaf and the arrangement of breads that were thought about are *piggul* and they are subject to *kares* (if eaten). The other loaf or arrangement of breads are invalid, but are not subject to *kares*. The Sages maintain that both loaves and both arrangements are *piggul* and they are subject to *kares*. (13b4)

One Thigh to the Other

Rav Huna said: Rabbi Yosi used to say: If one (during one of the services) had a *piggul* intention on the animal's right thigh, the left thigh is not rendered *piggul*.

What is the reason? The reason for this can either be based upon logic, or alternatively, it can be based upon a Scriptural verse. The logic is as follows: An improper *piggul* thought cannot be better than an act of *tumah*; if one limb of a *korban* would become *tamei*, would the entire *korban* become *tamei*?! [It certainly would not! So too regarding

piggul: One thigh is rendered piggul, but not the other.] Alternatively, it is written: *and the person that eats from it shall bear his sin*. The verse says, *from it*, which implies, "not from its friend (the other limb)."

Rav Nachman asked Rav Huna from the following *Baraisa* (which is discussing the two loaves offered on Shavuos): They are never subject to *kares* unless there was a *piggul* intent regarding both of them – at least the amount of an olive (from both of them). [If he intended to eat from one of them, the second one is not rendered *piggul*. If he intended to eat a *k'zayis* from both of them together, they both are rendered *piggul*.] We can imply from the *Baraisa* that if he intended to eat from only one of them, the second one is not rendered *piggul*. Now, who is this going according to? It cannot be the Sages, for they maintain that *piggul* is effective even if he intends to eat from only one of them. Evidently, it is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi. Now, if he would hold that an animal (both limbs) is regarded as one (with respect to *piggul*), it is understandable why the two loaves can combine (in the case when he intends to eat a *k'zayis* from the two loaves – for he mentally combined the two) for *piggul*; however, if he would hold that the animal (both limbs) is regarded as two (with respect to *piggul*), how can the two loaves combine?

The Gemara answers: It is following the opinion of Rebbe, for it was taught in a *Baraisa*: If one of the lambs was slaughtered with the intention that half a *k'zayis* of one

loaf will be eaten the next day (*beyond its prescribed time*), and the other lamb was slaughtered with the intention that half a *k'zayis* of the other loaf will be eaten the next day, Rebbe says: I say that it is valid. We can imply from the *Baraisa* that it is only because he specified "half of this one" and "half of the other"; however, if he would have intended to eat a *k'zayis* from both of them, they would combine (*for piggul, for he has mentally connected the two loaves*).

The *Gemara* asks: Now, who is Rebbe going according to? It cannot be the Sages, for they maintain that *piggul* is effective even if he intends to eat from only one of them. And if it is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, the question returns.

The *Gemara* answers: It must be that he is in accordance with the Sages, but do not read (*in the Baraisa*) unless he expressed an intention with "*shteihen*" (*in female form – meaning "both the loaves"*), but rather read it as follows: unless he expressed an intention with "*shneihen*" (*in male form – meaning "both the lambs"*); but even though the intention was only with respect to one of the loaves (*it is piggul; this would be according to the Sages*). The point of the *Baraisa* is to exclude the view of Rabbi Meir, who said that a *piggul* intention expressed during the service of half a *permitter* is effective; and the *Baraisa* teaches us that this is not so (*and the piggul intention must be during the slaughtering of both lambs*).

The *Gemara* asks: If so, why does the *Baraisa* use the expression "they are never subject to *kares* unless etc." (*which seems to indicate that there are two exclusions*)? It would have been well if the *Baraisa* had meant that the *piggul* intention must be regarding both loaves and with both lambs, and it would be in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, and rejecting the opinions of Rabbi Meir (*who maintains that a piggul intention can be effective with half a*

permitter – just one of the lambs), and that of the Sages (*who hold that one of the loaves can be rendered piggul without the other*); and that is why the *Baraisa* stated that "they are never subject to *kares* unless etc." But if you merely say that the *Baraisa* is following the view of the Sages, rejecting only the view of Rabbi Meir, why then did the *Baraisa* use the expression "they are never subject to *kares* unless etc."? [Accordingly, the *Baraisa* definitely reflects Rabbi Yosi's viewpoint, and if Rav Huna is correct regarding the two thighs (*that one will be rendered piggul but not the other*), how can this *Baraisa* rule that a *piggul* intention of a *k'zayis* from the two loaves is effective?]

And furthermore, Rav Ashi asked on Rav Huna from the following *Baraisa*: Rebbe said in the name of Rabbi Yosi (*regarding the bulls and the goats that were burned*): If while performing a service outside (*in the Courtyard*) he expressed a *piggul* intention with respect to another service which is performed outside, the offering is rendered *piggul*. If, however, it was with respect to a service which is performed inside (*in the Sanctuary*), it is not *piggul*. The *Baraisa* explains: If while he was standing outside (*in the Courtyard*) he said, "Behold I am slaughtering with the intention of sprinkling the blood (*in the Sanctuary*) after its time," it is not rendered *piggul*, for this is an intention expressed while serving outside regarding a service performed inside. Likewise, if while he was standing inside he said, "Behold I am sprinkling the blood with the intention of burning the sacrificial parts after its time," or, "with the intention of pouring out the remnants of the blood after its time," it is not rendered *piggul*, for this is an intention expressed while serving inside with respect to a service performed outside. If, however, while he was standing outside he said, "Behold I am slaughtering with the intention of pouring out the remnants of the blood after its time," or, "with the intention of burning the sacrificial parts after its time," it is rendered *piggul*, for this is an intention expressed while

serving outside with respect to a service performed outside. Now, in the case where the intention was to pour out the remnants of the blood, what part of the offering is rendered *piggul* (*and subject to kares if eaten*)? It cannot mean that the blood becomes *piggul*, for it was taught in a *Mishnah*: These are the things for which one is not liable (*to kares*) on account of *piggul* (*for the following things do not have anything that permit them for consumption*): The *kometz*, the *levonah*, the incense, the *minchah* offering of the *Kohanim*, the libations which are brought by themselves, the *minchah* offering of the anointed *Kohen*, and the blood! Obviously then it is the meat that becomes *piggul*. Now if in that case where no intention was expressed with regard to the meat at all, Rabbi Yosi holds that it nevertheless becomes *piggul*, how much more so in this case where he actually expressed an intention with regard to the meat of the offering, should we not say that when the intention was regarding the right thigh, the left thigh is rendered *piggul* as well!?

Furthermore, Ravina cited the following *Mishnah*: If one performed a *kemitzah* on a *minchah* with the intention of eating its remainder on the next day, or with the intention of burning its *komeitz* on the next day, Rabbi Yosi admits regarding this that it is *piggul* and it is subject to *kares*. Now, in the case where the intention was to burn the *komeitz*, what part is rendered *piggul*? It cannot mean that the blood becomes *piggul*, for it was taught in a *Mishnah*: These are the things for which one is not liable (*to kares*) on account of *piggul* (*for the following things do not have anything that permit them for consumption*): The *kometz*, etc. Obviously then it is the remainder that becomes *piggul*. Now if in that case where no intention was expressed with regard to the remainder at all, Rabbi Yosi holds that it nevertheless becomes *piggul*, how much more so in this case where he actually expressed an intention with regard to the meat of the offering (*should*

we not say that when the intention was regarding the right thigh, the left thigh is rendered piggul as well!?)

Rather, Rabbi Yochanan said: This is the explanation for Rabbi Yosi: The Torah regards the two loaves as one unit, and the Torah also regards them as two units. It is one unit since one cannot be offered without the other; and it is two units since the Torah instructed us that each loaf shall be prepared separately. Therefore, if he combined them (*in the case when he intended to eat a k'zayis from the two loaves – for he mentally combined the two*), they are thereby united, since the Torah regards them as one unit; however, if he separated them (*in the case where he had an intention regarding one of the loaves*), they remain separated, since the Torah regards them also as two units. (13b4 – 14b1)

Rabbi Yochanan inquired: What is the *halachah* if one expressed a *piggul* intention with respect to one of the type of loaves of the *todah* offerings? [*Are the other types rendered piggul as well?*] Likewise, what would be the *halachah* if he expressed a *piggul* intention with respect to one of the type of loaves of the baked *minchah* offering? [*Is the other type rendered piggul as well?*]

Rav Tachlifa of *Eretz Yisroel* taught the following *Baraisa* to him: And similarly (*the dispute mentioned in the Mishnah*), by the loaves of the *todah* offering, and that of the baked *minchah* offering. (14b1)

The *Gemara* cites a *Baraisa*: If during the slaughtering he intended to eat half an olive's volume of the meat after its prescribed time, and during the throwing of the blood he also intended to eat half an olive's volume of the meat after its prescribed time, the offering is rendered *piggul*, for the slaughtering and the throwing can be combined as one.

Some said that this applied only to the slaughtering and the throwing of the blood since they are both permitters, but not to the receiving and the bringing of the blood; whereas others said that if it (*the combination*) applied even to these services which are far apart from each other, it will certainly apply to those services which are near each other.

The *Gemara* asks from a *Baraisa* which Levi taught which states that the four services, i.e., slaughtering, throwing the blood, accepting it and bringing it to the altar, do not combine to effect *piggul*!?

Rava answered that one *Baraisa* is following Rebbe's opinion, and the other *Baraisa* is following the Sages. For it was taught in a *Baraisa*: If one of the lambs was slaughtered with the intention that half a *k'zayis* of one loaf will be eaten the next day (*beyond its prescribed time*), and the other lamb was slaughtered with the intention that half a *k'zayis* of the other loaf will be eaten the next day, Rebbe says: I say that it is valid.

Abaye asked him: Perhaps Rebbe said that they do not combine when the intent was by half a permitter and it was regarding half of the amount required for eating; however, when it was by an entire permitter and regarding half of the amount required for eating, he did not say that (*and they do combine*)!?

Rava bar Rav Chanan asked Abaye: And if Rebbe maintains that when the thoughts may combine when they were by an entire permitter and regarding half of the amount required for eating, shouldn't he issue a decree that they should combine as well by the case where the thoughts were by half a permitter and it was regarding half of the amount required for eating!? For we find that Rabbi Yosi issues such a decree, and the Sages as well! Rabbi Yosi decrees in the following *Mishnah*: If he had an intention to

burn the *levonah* beyond its time, Rabbi Yosi says that it is invalid, but it is not subject to *kares*. [*Evidently, he decrees that this case is invalid to safeguard against the case where he intended to burn the komeitz beyond its time – where it is rendered piggul!*] The Sages say that it is *piggul*, and it is subject to *kares*. The Sages also issue such a decree in the following case: If one had intention during the *komeitz*, but not the *levonah*, or during the *levonah* but not the *komeitz*, Rabbi Meir says that it is *piggul*, and it is subject to *kares*. The Sages say that it is not *piggul* until he has intentions during the entire permitter. [*They do, however, agree that the offering is invalid, and cannot be eaten.*]

He replied: There is no comparison between the cases. The decrees you mentioned are understandable for the following reasons: Rabbi Yosi rules that the *minchah* is invalid in the case where the *piggul* intention was with respect to the *komeitz* of *levonah* as a safeguard against the case where the *piggul* intention was with respect to the *komeitz* of the *minchah*; and also that the Sages ruled that the *minchah* is invalid in the case where the *piggul* intention was during the burning of the *komeitz* (*and not of the levonah*) as a safeguard against the case where the *piggul* intention was expressed during the burning of the *komeitz* of the sinner's *minchah* (*which has no levonah*); and that they ruled that the (*standard*) *minchah* is invalid in the case where the *piggul* intention was expressed during the burning of the *levonah* (*and not of the komeitz*) as a safeguard against the case where the *piggul* intention was expressed during the burning of the spoons of *levonah* (*by the lechem hapanim, where there is no other permitter*); and in the case of the lambs too, they ruled that the loaves are invalid in the case where the *piggul* intention was expressed during the slaughtering of one lamb as a safeguard against the case where the *piggul* intention was expressed during the slaughtering of the other lamb as well; and they ruled that the *lechem*

hapanim is invalid in the case where the *piggul* intention was expressed during the burning of one spoon of *levonah* as a safeguard against the case where the *piggul* intention was expressed during the burning of the other spoon as well! In our case (*where during the slaughter of one of the lambs he had a piggul intention regarding half of a k'zayis*), however, is there ever a case of a *piggul* intention expressed during the service of half a permitter regarding half of the amount required for eating that renders *piggul*, so that we should stand up and issue a decree here!? [This is why he rules that it is valid!]

Indeed it stands to reason that this is the explanation of the view of the Rabbis, for in the next clause [of that Mishnah] it states: The Rabbis, however, agree with Rabbi Meir that if it was a sinner's minchah or a minchah of jealousy (that which is offered by the husband of the suspected sotah), and he expressed an intention which makes *piggul* during the burning of the *komeitz*, the offering is *piggul* and the penalty of *kares* is incurred on account of it, since the *komeitz* [alone] is the [entire] permitter. Now why was it necessary for this [last expression] to be stated? It is quite obvious, for is there then [in these cases] any other permitter? We must therefore say that it teaches us this: namely, the reason [why the Rabbis declare the offering invalid in the case where a wrongful intention was expressed during the burning] of the *komeitz* [of the 'ordinary minchah-offering] is that there is the *komeitz* of the sinner's minchah which is similar to it [and which is a real case of *piggul*]. (14b1 – 14b4)

DAILY MASHAL

Rebbe – "I Say"

Rebbe says: I say that it is valid.

Many times in *Shas*, it is found that Rebbe used this terminology, "I say etc." What was his intention with these words?

Reb Yosef Engel in *Beis Haotzar* explains that it is known that Rebbe was a tremendously humble person. The *Gemara* in *Sotah* (49a) states that when Rebbe died, humility ceased. Perhaps what Rebbe was saying was that it appears to him that the *halachah* is like this-and-this, but not that it is most definitely so.

He also writes that it is clear from the *seforim* of the students of the Baal Shem Tov that lofty people are constantly thinking that their words and actions are not emanating from their own power and strength; rather, it is all coming from the Ribono shel Olam. In *kabbalah*, the *Shechinah* is referred to as "Ani," "I." This is the explanation in the *Gemara Sukkah* (53a) when Hillel said, "If I am here, then everyone is here." The "I" did not refer to himself, for Hillel, we also know was extremely humble. Rather, he was referring to the *Shechinah*. This, perhaps, is what Rebbe was saying when he said, "I say." The *Shechinah* which is inside of me is saying that the *halachah* is like this.