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Menachos Daf 2

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Mishna

Counting for the Owner

[The usual procedure in making a minchah offering consisted of the following four services: scooping a handful out of the meal offering, placing it into a service vessel, bringing it near to the Altar, and burning it. These services correspond respectively to the four main services in connection with animal sacrifices, viz., slaughtering, receiving the blood, bringing it near to the Altar, and sprinkling it.]

Any *minchah* (meal) offerings whose *kemitzah* (the Kohen would scoop a handful of flour, and that scoopful would be burned on the Altar) was performed not for their own sake is valid, however, it does not count for the owners towards the fulfillment of their obligation, except for the sinner’s *minchah* (a person who transgressed certain prohibitions and who cannot afford to bring a sacrifice from an animal or bird) and the *sotah*’s *minchah*. The sinner’s *minchah* and the *sotah*’s *minchah* that had its *kemitzah* performed not for its own sake, or its *komeitz* was placed in the service vessel (not for its own sake), or it was brought to the Altar or burned on the Altar (not for its own sake), or he performed one of those services for their own sake and not for their own sake, or not for their own sake and for their own sake, they are invalid. What is the case of “for their own sake and not for their own sake”? First he had intent for the sake of the sinner’s *minchah* and then he intended for the sake of a donated *minchah*. What is the case of “not for their own sake and for their own sake”? First he had intent for the sake of the donated *minchah* and then he intended for the sake of a sinner’s *minchah*. (2a)

The *Gemora* notes from the wording of the *Mishna* that the *korban* does not count for the owners towards the fulfillment of their obligation, but it still retains its original sanctity, and therefore it is forbidden to alter it any more. This follows that which Rava said: An *olah* which was slaughtered not for its own sake – it is nevertheless forbidden to sprinkle its blood not for its own sake. This ruling may be derived from the following logic: Just because an alteration was made once, should there be continuous alterations with it?! It, alternatively, may be derived from the following verse: *That which emerges from your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you vowed to Hashem your God, a donation* etc.: Now, is this a *nedavah* (donation)? Is the verse not referring to a *neder* (vow)? The meaning of the verse is as follows: If you have acted as you vowed (*by slaughtering it for its own sake*), it will be (*the fulfillment*) of your *neder*, but if not (*that it was slaughtered not for its own sake*), let it be regarded as a *nedavah*. But even if it is a *nedavah*, is it permitted to make a change in it? [No, it is not!] (2a – 2b)

Rabbi Shimon

The *Gemora* asks: Shall we say that our *Mishna* is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, for it was taught in the following *braisa*: Rabbi Shimon said: All *minchah* offerings whose *kemitzah* was taken not for its sake are valid and count towards the obligation of their owners. This is because the *minchah* offerings are different from animal sacrifices, for when one performs a *kemitzah* of a *machavas* offering (*the loaves are hard, for they were fried on a shallow, flat*

griddle, and the fire burns off the oil) for the sake of a *marcheshes* offering (the loaves are soft, for they are fried in a deep pan, and the fire doesn't burn off the oil), its preparation proves that it is a *machavas* offering. If one performs a *kemitzah* of a dry *minchah* offering for the sake of *minchah* offering mingled with oil, its preparation proves that it is a dry *minchah* offering (and he holds that when the product proves that the intention is false, the *korban* is valid). But regarding animal sacrifices it is not so, for there is the same slaughtering for all, the same receiving of the blood for all, and the same sprinkling for all.

The *Gemora* notes: It is well (that the *Mishna* can be in accordance with *Rabbi Shimon*) according to *Rav Ashi*, who says (in order to answer a contradiction regarding *Rabbi Shimon's* opinion) that here (where *Rabbi Shimon* ruled that the *minchah* is valid) is where he declared that he is performing a *kemitzah* of a *machavas* for the sake of a *marcheshes* (for since he did not mention "minchah," but rather the type of vessel, his declaration is nonsensical, and the *minchah* is therefore ruled to be valid), whereas there (where *Rabbi Shimon* ruled that the *minchah* is invalid) is where he declared that he is performing a *kemitzah* of a *minchas machavas* for the sake of a *minchas marcheshes* (and since his declaration is sensible, the *minchah* does not discharge the owner of his obligation); and accordingly, our *Mishna* (which rules that the *minchah* does not discharge the owner of his obligation) is referring to a case where one *minchah* offering was performed for the sake of another *minchah* offering (and it can still be in accordance with *Rabbi Shimon*). However, what can be said according to the answers suggested by *Rabbah* and *Rava*?

For should you accept the answer suggested by *Rabbah* (in order to answer the contradiction regarding *Rabbi Shimon's* opinion) that here (where *Rabbi Shimon* ruled that the *minchah* is valid) is where the change was regarding the sanctity of the offering (for since he performed the *kemitzah* for the sake of a different type of *minchah*, and since the difference between the different types of *menachos* is clearly

evident, his declaration is nonsensical, and the *minchah* is therefore ruled to be valid), whereas there (where *Rabbi Shimon* ruled that the *minchah* is invalid) is where the change was regarding the name of the owner; our *Mishna* is referring to a change regarding the sanctity of the offering, since it states: What is the case of "for their own sake and not for their own sake"? First he had intent for the sake of the sinner's *minchah* and then he intended for the sake of a donated *minchah*. [And since our *Mishna* ruled that the *minchah* is invalid, it cannot be in accordance with *Rabbi Shimon*!?!]

And should you accept the answer suggested by *Rava* (in order to answer the contradiction regarding *Rabbi Shimon's* opinion) that here (where *Rabbi Shimon* ruled that the *minchah* is valid) is where he performed the *kemitzah* of a *minchah* offering for the sake of another *minchah* offering (and it is ruled to be valid based upon the verse: this is the law of the *minchah*, implying that all *menachos* are like one), whereas there (where *Rabbi Shimon* ruled that the *minchah* is invalid) is where he performed the *kemitzah* of a *minchah* offering for the sake of an animal sacrifice; our *Mishna* is referring to a case where he performed the *kemitzah* of a *minchah* offering for the sake of another *minchah* offering, since it states: What is the case of "not for their own sake and for their own sake"? First he had intent for the sake of the donated *minchah* and then he intended for the sake of a sinner's *minchah*. [And since our *Mishna* ruled that the *minchah* is invalid, it cannot be in accordance with *Rabbi Shimon*!?!]

Rather, it is evident then that according to *Rabbah* and *Rava*, our *Mishna* is not in accordance with *Rabbi Shimon*.

The *Gemora* now notes the contradiction regarding *Rabbi Shimon's* opinion (mentioned above): For it was taught in a *braisa*: *Rabbi Shimon* said: It is most holy, like a *chatas* and like an *asham*. Sometimes a *minchah* is likened to a *chatas*, and sometimes it is likened to an *asham*. A sinner's *minchah* offering is like a *chatas*, therefore if its *kemitzah* was

performed not for its own sake, it is invalid; a donated *minchah* offering is like an *asham*, therefore if its *kemitzah* was performed not for its own sake, it is valid. And it is like the *asham* - that is, just as the *asham* is valid but does not provide acceptance (*it does not satisfy the obligation of the owner*), so too the donated *minchah* offering is valid but does not provide acceptance.

Rabbah answered: It is not difficult, for here (*where Rabbi Shimon ruled that the minchah is valid*) is where the change was regarding the sanctity of the offering (*for since he performed the kemitzah for the sake of a different type of minchah, and since the difference between the different types of menachos is clearly evident, his declaration is nonsensical, and the minchah is therefore ruled to be valid*), whereas there (*where Rabbi Shimon ruled that the minchah is invalid*) is where the change was regarding the name of the owner.

Abaye asked him: But since it is established by a Scriptural analogy (*from animal sacrifices*) that a wrongful intention invalidates a *minchah* offering, what difference does it make whether the change was regarding the sanctity of the offering or regarding the name of the owner?

He replied: The rule of Rabbi Shimon that “the preparation of the *minchah* indicates” is based on a logical reason, for Rabbi Shimon generally expounds the reasons of Scriptural law; therefore a wrongful intention which is not clearly recognizable (*as being senseless*), the Torah declares it capable of invalidating an offering, but a wrongful intention which is recognizable (*as being senseless*), the Torah declares it incapable of invalidating an offering. (2b)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Types of Menachos and how they are Offered

This week Daf HaYomi learners everywhere will finish Zevachim and start Menachos, the second tractate in Seder

Kodashim. Our tractate addresses *menachos*, sacrifices that come from the vegetable kingdom. Rambam writes (*Hilchos Ma'aseh HaKorbanos*, 12:1) that “all *menachos* are of fine wheat flour (*soles*) except for the *minchah* of a *sotah* and that of the *omer*, which are of barley.” There are three public *menachos* – the *omer*, the two loaves (*shtei halechem*) and the showbread – and there are nine *menachos* offered by individuals: a sinner’s *minchah* (*a person who transgressed certain prohibitions and who cannot afford to bring a sacrifice from an animal or bird*), the *minchah* of a *sotah*, the inaugural *minchah* (*minchas chinuch: a minchah brought by a Kohen on the first day of his service in the Temple*), the *minchah* of the *Kohen Gadol*, a *minchah* of fine flour (*minchas soles*), *minchas machavas*, *minchas marcheshes* (*types of frying pans*), a *minchah* of *chalos* baked in an oven and a *minchah* of *rekikin* baked in an oven. There is also a *minchas nesachim* brought with a public or individual sacrifice as a *minchah* accompanying the sacrifice. Aside from these sacrifices, called *menachos*, our tractate deals with the *todah* loaves, though they are not called *minchah*.

As we start Menachos, we should mention that *menachos* were sacrifices in every sense and, indeed, the *minchah* generally corresponds to the service of animal sacrifices. We shall now focus on what is alike and what is different between *menachos* and animal sacrifices.

Four corresponding services in sacrifices and *menachos*: In Zevachim we learned about the four services (*avodos*) applying to animal sacrifices: slaughtering, *kabalah* (*receiving the blood in a vessel*), *holachah* (*bringing the blood to the altar*) and sprinkling (*the blood on the altar*). *Menachos* also feature four services which correspond to the four services of animal sacrifices: *kemitzah* (*the Kohen takes a handful [kometz] of the minchah*), which corresponds to slaughtering; *matan keli* (*putting the kometz in a keli shareis*), which corresponds to *kabalah*; *holachah*, identical to bringing the blood; and burning the *kometz* on the altar, corresponding to sprinkling the blood, which is the service that atones for the owner of the sacrifice. Just as a thought



of “not for its own sake” (*shelo lishmah*) or *piggul* during one of the services of a sacrifice disqualifies it, the same thoughts disqualify a *minchah* during any of its services.

Despite the similarity of *kemitzah* to slaughtering, *kemitzah* is stricter in that it must be performed by a *Kohen* as opposed to slaughtering, which may be accomplished by any Jew. Another outstanding difference between animal sacrifices and *menachos* is that some animal sacrifices are *kodshei kodoshim*, eaten by *kohanim* only in the *Azarah*, and some are *kodshim kalim*, eaten by non-*Kohanim* in Yerushalayim, whereas all *menachos* are defined as *kodshei kodoshim*, eaten by *kohanim* only in the *Azarah*.

The tractate we are about to learn: There is much similarity between the first two chapters of Zevachim and the first two chapters of Menachos: all of them treat the disqualification of *shelo lishmah*, *piggul* and other defects. The next two chapters focus on certain cases where a number of factors depend on each other and one prevents the performance of the other. For example, just as a *minchah* needs fine flour as well as oil and a *kometz* needs *levonah*, the two goats of Yom Kippur depend on each other. The two *parashayos* in a *mezuzah* depend on each other and the *techeiles* in *tzitzis* depends on the white cords, etc. Apropos, the *Gemora* addresses the matters of *sifrei Torah*, *mezuzos* and *tzitzis* and thus 15 *dafim* in the midst of Menachos are the main Talmudic source where the halachos of *tzitzis* and writing *sifrei Torah*, *tefillin* and *mezuzos* are finely clarified.

In Chapters 5-8 we shall learn about the details of preparing *menachos* and their being offered, including the halachos of *minchas ha'omer*, the *todah* loaves and matters dealing with the *mitzvah* of counting the *Omer*. Chapter 9 begins to address the materials from which *menachos* are brought, such as flour, oil and wine and Chapter 10 deals with the utensils with which one sanctifies *menachos*. We should mention that in volumes of the *Mishna* the order of the chapters is different: Chapter 6 of the *Gemora* appears as Chapter 10. (See *Melech Shlomo* on the *Mishna*, beginning

of Ch. 10). Chapter 11 discusses the *shte halechem*, the showbread and the form of the table in the *heichal*. Chapters 12-13 address the halachos of vowing sacrifices.

The *minchah* is characterized as the sacrifice of a poor person who cannot bring a sacrifice from an animal, or even a bird. The last *Mishna* in the tractate (110a) relates to that fact: “It is said about an *olah* from an animal “a sweet smell” and about an *olah* from a bird “a sweet smell” and about a *minchah* “a sweet smell” to tell you that the same applies to someone who brings a lot or a little as long as he directs his heart to Heaven.”

The connection of the *minchah* prayer to *menachos*: Some explain that the *minchah* prayer is so called because its time is in the afternoon when the sun approaches its place of rest, so to speak (*Tosfos Yom Tov*, Berachos 4:1). Still, some Rishonim say that the afternoon is called *minchah* because at that time the *minchah* of the afternoon *tamid* was offered and the name of the prayer corresponds accordingly (*Tosfos* in Pesachim 107a, s.v. *Samuch*; see further, *ibid*, that Eliyahu was answered at the time of offering the *minchah* and it is a time of good will and see Radak’s *Sefer HaShoroshim*, the entry for *manach*).

DAILY MASHAL

A Minchah – Like a Body Without a Soul

An amazing quote appears in the writings of the students of HaGaon Rav Chayim of Volozhin zt”l in his name: Prayer resembles the *tamid* sacrifice. We have the tradition that “prayer without concentration is like a body without a soul”. This means that prayer without concentration does not have the advantage of a sacrifice from a live animal, which has a soul, but the advantage of a *minchah*, which is a “body without a soul” (*Tosefes Ma’aseh Rav*, 12; *Keser Rosh*, 22; *Beur rabeinu Chayim MiVolozhin*, 163).



Starting Menachos

by: Hakhel

Today, the Daf Yomi Cycle began Mesechta Menachos, discussing the Menachos, the *flour offerings* that were brought in the Beis HaMikdash. It is fascinating to note that this Mesechta comes after Mesechta Zevachim (completed yesterday) which discusses *animal offerings* in the Beis HaMikdash. One would have thought that the study of Menachos would come before the study of Zevachim, for after all, don't we move up the ladder from a Tzome'ach, vegetation--to Chai, living creatures. Upon quick reflection, however, we note that in this week's Parsha (non-coincidentally discussing both Zevachim, animal offerings and Menachos, meal offerings), we find that the Parsha of Zevachim is taught to us in the Torah before the Parsha of Menachos. Thus, the Torah She'Be'al Peh is simply following Torah She'Bechsav in its order. The issue, however, returns--should not Menachos be presented first in the Torah--for as we see in the Sheishes Yemei Bereshis creation progresses from Domeim (like stone) to Tzomeach (like the Menachos)--and then to Chai (like the Zevachim)?! We may suggest that there is a fundamental lesson here. When we focus upon dedication to the service of Hashem to Torah and Mitzvos, we should also focus--at the outset and from the beginning on apportioning our very best. We are taught to start with the best that we have to offer--the animals, and not the vegetable. This appears, indeed, to be a great difference between the Korban of Kayin and the Korban of Hevel--with Kayin starting out by offering the lower level Tzomeach and Hevel demonstrating that this is not the correct approach, but that rather one should begin from "Mebechoros Tzono U'Meichelbeihen...from the first of his flock and from their choicest" (Bereishis 4:4). Thus, the lesson is taught to all mankind at the beginning of the Torah and reiterated for us here in our more sublime service. As Rabbi Avrohom Ehrman, Shlita, teaches in his Sefer *Journey to Virtue*: "Whenever performing a Mitzvah, whatever its form, it

should be done with the best materials and in the finest possible fashion that one can." Likewise, the Sefer *Orchos Tzadikim* notes that Yaakov Avinu went back by himself to retrieve 'Pachim Ketanim'--even small containers which he had left behind. Yet, he was willing to give up all of the wealth he had acquired in the house of Lavan (which was, of course, enormous) in order to acquire Eisav's portion in the Me'aras Hamachpeila. By this, he demonstrated to his children forever the importance of knowing how and when to spend one's money, and the importance of its proper apportionment in the performance of Mitzvos.