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Zevachim Daf 9

Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler, Kollel Boker Beachwood

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Residual Pesach

The *Gemora* asks: But let us say that the *pesach* should become whatever type of offering it was slaughtered for?

Rabbi Avin answers: We cannot transfer sacrifices that may be eaten to sacrifices that cannot be eaten.

The *Gemora* asks: But a *chatas* and *asham* may be eaten!?

The *Gemora* answers: We cannot transfer sacrifices that may be eaten by everyone to sacrifices that cannot be eaten by everyone.

Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Avin answers: We cannot transfer sacrifices that are *kodashim kalim* to sacrifices that are *kodshei kodashim*.

Rav Yitzchak the son of Rav Savriv asked: Let us say that if one slaughtered it (*the pesach during the year*) for the sake of *ma’aser*, it should be regarded as *ma’aser*!? Accordingly, it should not require libations, and that the penalty of lashes should be incurred by one who sells it, for he is violating the prohibition of, *it shall not be redeemed*!?

The *Gemora* answers: It is written: The tenth shall be sanctified, which implies that only the tenth one can be *ma’aser*, but not any other one.

The *Gemora* asks: But let us say that if one slaughtered it for the sake of a *bechor*, it should be regarded as a *bechor*!

Accordingly, it should not require libations, and it should be given to the *Kohanim*!?

The *Gemora* answers: The laws of *bechor* are derived from the laws of *ma’aser* with a *gezeirah shavah* using the word “*avarah*.” [Only a firstborn can be a *bechor*.]

The *Gemora* asks: But let us say that if one slaughtered it for the sake of a *temurah* (*the owner illegally attempts to exchange a different animal with the original korban; the halachah is that the temurah animal gets the same sanctity as the original one, and both animals must be brought as a korban*), it should be regarded as a *temurah*! Accordingly, he should receive lashes on its account, and that it should be the subject to the prohibition of, *it shall not be sold or redeemed*!?

Mar Zutra the son of Rav Nachman: It is written: Both it and its substitute shall be holy, which implies that only this is a *temurah* (*if it was exchanged for another*), but no other may be a *temurah*.

The *Gemora* asks: But let us say that if one slaughtered it for the sake of a *todah*, it should be regarded as a *todah*! Accordingly, it should require the additional bread with it!?

The *Gemora* answers: Can there be a case where the *pesach* offering itself does not require bread, yet its residual does require bread?!



The *Gemora* asks: If so, then can we not argue the following: Can there be a case where the *pesach* offering itself does not require libations, yet its residual does require libations?!

The *Gemora* explains: This was our argument: Can there be a case where the residual of the *todah* itself does not require bread, yet the residual which comes from elsewhere (*the pesach offered for the sake of a todah; and not coming from the todah itself*) shall require bread?!

[The *Gemora* above (8b) explained how it is known that a *pesach* offering outside its time which was slaughtered for the sake of any type of offering becomes a *shelamim*. The father of Shmuel explains how we know this: The verse states: *And if from the flock is his sacrifice for a shelamim sacrifice to Hashem etc.* This implies that something that comes from flock (i.e. a *pesach*) should be considered a *shelamim* (if it is not brought in its proper time).] Rav Yeimar the son of Rav Hillel asked: And how do you know that it (*the above verse*) is written in reference to the residual of a *pesach* offering; perhaps it is written in reference to the residual of an *asham* offering?

Rava answers: It is written in that verse: *And if from the flock is his sacrifice for a shelamim sacrifice to Hashem*, which implies that it refers to something for which the entire flock (*sheep and goats*) is equally fit (*which is the pesach, and not the asham, which only comes from sheep, not goats*).

Rav Avin bar Chiya, and others say, Rabbi Avin bar Kahana, asked: Everywhere else the term “from” is a limitation, yet here “from” is an inclusion!?

Rabbi Mani answered: Here too “from” is a limitation, for it is in reference to the *pesach* offering, which cannot be two years old, nor a female.

Rav Chana of Baghdad challenged this: Can you say that this verse is written in reference to the residual *pesach* offering? Surely since it states: *If a lamb ... if a goat*, it would seem that

it does not refer to a residual *pesach* offering (*for if so, the phrases would be redundant*)!?

The *Gemora* answers: That is required for what was taught in a *braisa*: *Lamb*; this is to include the *pesach* offering, in respect of its fat tail (*that it's burned on the Altar*). *If a lamb*; it is coming to include a *pesach* offering more than a year old, and a *shelamim* which comes because of a *pesach* offering (*the chagigah which is brought with the pesach offering on the fourteenth of Nissan*) - in respect of all the *halachos* of a *shelamim*, viz., that they require *semichah* (*the laying of the hands on the head of the animal*), libations, and the waving of the breast and thigh. And *if a goat*; it interrupts the subject and teaches us that a goat does not require the burning of the fat tail on the Altar.

The *Gemora* asks: But is that (*that the residual pesach is offered as a shelamim*) derived from here? Surely it is derived from the verse which Shmuel's father taught us? For Shmuel's father said: *And if from the flock is his sacrifice for a shelamim sacrifice to Hashem* teaches that whatever comes from the flock (*a pesach offering*) must be for a sacrifice of a *shelamim*.

The *Gemora* asks that Shmuel's father's *halachah* can be derived from that which Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha. For Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: How do we know that the leftover of a *pesach* offering (*if an animal designated for a pesach sacrifice was lost, so its owners registered for another animal, and then the first was found after the second was sacrificed*) is offered as a *shelamim*? It is because it is written: *And you shall slaughter the pesach offering to Hashem, your God, of the flock and of the cattle*. Now surely the *pesach* offering comes only from lambs or from goats (*why is cattle mentioned*)? We learn from here that the residual of the *pesach* offering is to be used for something which comes from the flock and from the cattle (*males and females*); and what is it? It is a *shelamim*.

Rather, these three verses teaches us the following: One refers to a *pesach* sacrifice, whose time to offer it has passed (*the fourteenth of Nissan has passed*) and whose year has passed (*it is offered as a shelamim*); and one is required for a *pesach* sacrifice, whose time to offer it has passed but whose year has not passed (*it is offered as a shelamim*); and the third is required for a *pesach* sacrifice, whose time to offer it has passed but whose year has not passed (*it is still fit for the pesach sacrifice, but nevertheless, if it is offered for the sake of a shelamim, it is valid*). The *Gemora* explains why each of these are necessary (*and why we could not derive one from the others*). (8b – 9b)

Nachshon's Chatas

Rav said in the name of Mavog: If one slaughtered a *chatas* for the sake of Nachshon's *chatas* (*the chatas that each Nasi brought by the dedication of the Mishkan; Nachshon was the Nasi of Yehudah*), it is valid, for it is written: *This is the law of the chatas*, which teaches us that there is one law for all *chataos*.

Rava sat and related this discussion, whereupon Rav Mesharshia challenged him from the following *braisa*: Rabbi Shimon said: All *minchah* (*meal*) offerings whose *kemitzah* (*the Kohen would scoop a handful of flour, and that scoopful would be burned on the Altar*) was taken not for its sake are valid and count towards the obligation of their owners. This is because the *minchah* offerings are different from animal sacrifices, for when one performs a *kemitzah* of a *machavas* offering (*the loaves are hard, for they were fried on a shallow, flat griddle, and the fire burns off the oil*) for the sake of a *marcheshes* offering (*the loaves are soft, for they are fried in a deep pan, and the fire doesn't burn off the oil*), its preparation proves that it is a *machavas* offering. If one performs a *kemitzah* of a dry *minchah* offering for the sake of *minchah* offering mingled with oil, its preparation proves that it is a dry *minchah* offering (*and he holds that when the product proves that the intention is false, the korban is valid*). But regarding animal sacrifices it is not so, for there is the

same slaughtering for all, the same receiving of the blood for all, and the same sprinkling for all. It emerges that it is only because its preparation (*the minchah*) demonstrates its true nature; however, if its preparation did not demonstrate its nature, this would not be so (*and the minchah would be invalid*). But why? Let us say that the verse, "*this is the law of the minchah offering*" indicates that there is one law for all *minchah* offerings (*in the same way that Rav ruled regarding all chataos*)!?

Rather if stated, it was stated as follows: Rav said in the name of Mavog: If one slaughtered a *chatas* so that Nachshon should receive atonement, it is valid, for there is no atonement for the dead (*and a "change of owner" intention only invalidates when the other fellow also needs atonement*).

The *Gemora* asks: Why was Nachshon chosen? He should have stated this *halachah* regarding any dead person?

The *Gemora* answers: He is teaching us that if he would have slaughtered it for the sake of a live person, similar to Nachshon (*i.e. a chatas that does not come to atone for a sin*), it would be invalid. And what would be examples of such a *chatas*? The *chatas* of a *nazir* or *metzora*.

The *Gemora* asks that these are actually like an *olah* offering (*for they do not come to atone for a sin, and therefore the halachah would be that the korban is valid, for it would be like a case where someone slaughtered a chatas for the sake of someone who was obligated to bring an olah*)!?

Rather if stated, it was stated as follows: Rav said in the name of Mavog: If one slaughtered a *chatas* for the sake of someone who is obligated in Nachshon's *chatas* (*i.e. a chatas that does not come to atone for a sin, such as the chatas of a nazir*), it is valid, for the *chatas* of Nachshon is similar to an *olah* offering.

The *Gemora* cites a different version: Rav said in the name of Mavog: If one slaughtered a *chatas* for the sake of Nachshon's *chatas* (i.e. a *chatas* that does not come to atone for a sin, such as the *chatas* of a *nazir*), it is valid, for the *chatas* of Nachshon is similar to an *olah* offering.

The *Gemora* asks: Why didn't he just say the *chatas* of a *nazir* or *metzora*?

The *Gemora* answers: He mentioned the original *chatas* of that nature.

Rav said: If one slaughtered a *chatas* of *cheilev* for the sake of a *chatas* of blood, or for the sake of a *chatas* for idolatry, it is valid. However, if one slaughtered it for the sake of a *chatas* of a *nazir* or *metzora*, it is invalid, for they are regarded as *olah* offerings.

Rava inquired: If one slaughtered a *chatas* of *cheilev* for the sake of a *chatas* for *tumah* of the Temple and its holy things, what is the law? Do we say that the latter is subject to *kares* just as the former (and therefore it is not considered a "change of name"), or perhaps the latter is not a fixed obligation (for a poor person can bring birds) like itself (and therefore, it would be invalid, for it is regarded as a "change of name")?

Rav Acha the son of Rava taught all these cases as being invalid (even a *chatas* for *cheilev* slaughtered for the sake of one for blood). What is the reason? And he shall slaughter it for a *chatas* implies that it must be slaughtered for the sake of that *chatas*.

Rav Ashi asked him: How then do you understand Rava's inquiry?

He answered: We understood it in reference to a "change in owner" case, and this is how he said it: Rava said: If one slaughtered a *chatas* of *cheilev* for the sake of someone who was obligated to bring a *chatas* of blood, or for the sake of

someone who was obligated to bring a *chatas* for idolatry, it is invalid. However, if one slaughtered it for the sake of someone who was obligated to bring a *chatas* of a *nazir* or *metzora*, it is valid. And as for the inquiry, this is what Rava asked: If one slaughtered a *chatas* of *cheilev* for the sake of someone who was obligated to bring a *chatas* for *tumah* of the Temple and its holy things, what is the law? Do we say that the latter is subject to *kares* just as the former (and therefore it is considered a "change of owner"), or perhaps the latter is not a fixed obligation (for a poor person can bring birds) like itself (and therefore, it would still be valid, for it is not regarded as a "change of owner")? The *Gemora* leaves the question unresolved. (9b)