



Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler, Kollel Boker Beachwood

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Rava inquired of Rav Nachman: If he was unaware of both (the tumah and the sanctity of the place), what is the ruling? [Is he liable according to Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, who maintain that it is only the forgetting of tumah which causes liability.]

He said to him: Since there is the unawareness of tumah, he is liable.

Rava asked: On the contrary, since there is the unawareness of Temple, he should be exempt!?

Rav Ashi said: We observe, if because of the tumah he leaves, then it is a case of unawareness of tumah, and he is liable; and if, because it is the Temple, he leaves, then it is a case of unawareness of Temple, and he is exempt.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Does he then leave because it is the Temple, unless it be also because of the tumah? And does he leave because of the tumah, unless it be also because it is the Temple? [When he is told one of the facts, either that he is tumah, or that he is in the Temple, he does not leave because of that one fact; for his tumah, were it not for the fact that he is in the Temple, would not matter; and the fact that he is in the Temple, were it not for his tumah, would also not matter. He leaves, when told one of the facts, because he recollects immediately the other fact also. Since, however, when he entered the Temple while tamei, he was unaware of

both facts, what is the ruling?] Well then, there is no difference. [And he is exempt, because Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva hold that he is liable only for unawareness of tumah by itself, while realizing that he has entered the Temple.] (19a2)

Our Rabbis taught in a Baraisa: Two [public] paths, one tamei, and one tahor; and he walked along one, and did not enter [the Temple afterwards]; then along the other, and entered [the Temple], he is liable [to bring a sliding scale sacrifice]. If he walked along one, and entered [the Temple], and was sprinkled upon [on the third day], and again [on the seventh day], and immersed himself (in a mikvah), and then he walked along the other, and entered [the Temple], he is liable (because either the first or the second time he entered the Temple while tamei). Rabbi Shimon [ben Yochai] exempts him (because, before he entered the Temple either the first or second time, he did not have the knowledge of definite tumah, for, before entering the Temple the first time, he certainly did not have the knowledge of definite tumah (for the first path may have been tahor), and even after walking along the second path he did not have the knowledge of definite tumah, since he had already purified himself from the first possible tumah (and the second path may be tahor); and in order to bring a sacrifice we require knowledge at the beginning of definite tumah; in the previous instance, where he had not purified himself between the two entries, he has the knowledge of definite tumah before entering



the Temple the second time), and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehudah exempts him in all these cases in the name of Rabbi Shimon [ben Yochai].

The Gemara asks: In all of them - even in the first case? But whatever possibility you consider, he is tamei? [After walking through both paths (without purification in the interval) he has the definite knowledge of tumah, and when he enters the Temple later, being unaware of his tumah, he should bring a sacrifice.]

Rava said: Here we are discussing the case of one who walked along the first [path]; and when he walked along the second [path], forgot that he had already walked along the first, so that he has only an incomplete knowledge [of tumah]; and this is in what they differ: The first Tanna holds that we say, an incomplete knowledge is like a complete knowledge. [The first Tanna who states that R' Shimon ben Yochai exempts him only in the case, where there was purification between the two entries, but not in the first case, holds that in the first case he is liable, because, when entering the Temple after having walked along both paths, he is definitely tamei, and though his knowledge is incomplete, for, when walking in the second path, he had forgotten about the first, nevertheless he is liable, for incomplete knowledge of definite tumah is counted as complete knowledge, since he is definitely tamei, and, if he had the complete knowledge, he would have known that he was definitely tamei, whereas in the case where there was purification between, the knowledge he had, though complete, was of doubtful tumah. He knew, that is to say, that he had walked in both paths, and yet, despite this knowledge, he is still doubtful, after walking in the second path, whether he is now tamei (for this path may be tahor; and if the first was tamei he has already purified himself in any case) and is therefore exempt.] Rabbi Shimon [ben Yehudah] holds that we do

not say, an incomplete knowledge is like a complete knowledge (and he is, therefore, exempt even in the first case, where there was no purification between the two entries). (19a2 – 19b1)

[The Gemara quotes the Baraisa's second case:] If he walked along the first [path], and entered [the Temple], and was sprinkled upon [on the third day], and again [on the seventh day], and immersed himself; and then he walked along the second [path], and entered [the Temple], he is liable; and Rabbi Shimon [ben Yochai] exempts him.

The Gemara asks: Why does the first Tanna hold that he is liable, since it is a doubtful knowledge? [For when entering the Temple after walking along the first path he did not have the knowledge of definite tumah (for this path may have been tahor); and when entering the Temple after walking along the second path, he also did not have the knowledge of definite tumah (for he had purified himself from the first path, and the second may be tahor).]

Rabbi Yochanan said: Here they made doubtful knowledge like definite knowledge. [Though his knowledge, in the case of each entry, was doubtful, yet, since he had certainly entered the Temple once while definitely tamei, and he had knowledge at the beginning (though of a doubtful nature), he brings an offering.] And Rish Lakish said: This is in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yishmael, who holds that we do not require knowledge at the beginning.

We may point out an incongruity between the words of Rabbi Yochanan [here] and the words of Rabbi Yochanan [elsewhere]; and we may point out an incongruity between the words of Rish Lakish [here] and the words of Rish Lakish [elsewhere]; for it has been taught: If he

ate doubtful prohibited fat, and became aware of it [later; and he ate again] doubtful prohibited fat, and became aware of it [later]; Rebbe said: Just as he would bring a sin offering for each one, so he brings a guilt offering for doubtful sin for each one. [He ate a piece of fat about which there was a doubt whether it was prohibited fat (chelev) or permitted (shuman); at the time of eating he thought it was permitted fat, but later became aware that there was a doubt about it. In such a case he brings a suspensive guilt offering. If, after becoming aware of this, he commits this doubtful sin again, he must bring a guilt offering for each separate act, since there was awareness between each act; just as, if he had unwittingly eaten actual (not doubtful) prohibited fat on a number of occasions (with awareness between each act) he would have had to bring a sin offering for each separate act.] Rabbi Shimon ben Yehudah and Rabbi Elozar son of Rabbi Shimon said in the name of Rabbi Shimon [ben Yochai]: He brings only one guilt offering for doubtful sin; for it is said: [And he shall bring a ram . . . for a guilt offering . . .] for his error wherein he erred — the Torah includes many errors for one guilt offering. And Rish Lakish said: Here Rebbe taught that the awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin offerings. And Rabbi Yochanan said: [Rebbe meant:] Just as, the awareness of definite sin elsewhere separates [the acts] for sin offerings, so the awareness of doubtful sin [here] separates [the acts] for guilt offerings. [Hence, there is incongruity between Rabbi Yochanan's statements (for Rabbi Yochanan said, with reference to entering the Temple after walking along two paths, one of which was tamei (with purification between the two walks), that doubtful knowledge is counted as definite knowledge; yet here he says that doubtful knowledge is not the same as definite knowledge in making a division between acts for sin offerings), and between Rish Lakish's statements (for Rish Lakish said above that the Tanna who says he


is liable (in the ease of entering the Temple after walking along two paths etc.) agrees with Rabbi Yishmael that there is no need for knowledge at the beginning; Rish Lakish could have said that he agrees with Rebbe (according to Rish Lakish's exposition of his view) that doubtful knowledge is counted as definite knowledge.)]

Granted that there is no contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yochanan and the other statement of Rabbi Yochanan, [for he said:] Here they made [doubtful knowledge like definite knowledge], and not everywhere in the whole Torah did they do so; for [only] here, because knowledge [at the beginning] is not explicitly written, but is deduced from and it be hidden, [therefore they made doubtful knowledge like definite knowledge;] 'but not everywhere in the whole Torah did they do so', for it is written: [If his sin] be known to him¹⁸ — a definite knowledge we require. But Rish Lakish — why does he establish it as being in accordance with Rabbi Yishmael's view? Let him establish it as being in accordance with Rebbe's view!?

The Gemara answers: This is what he teaches us: Rabbi Yishmael does not require knowledge at the beginning.

The Gemara asks: [But] it is obvious that he does not require [knowledge at the beginning], for he has no extra verse [from which to deduce it, since he requires] and it be hidden to make him liable for unawareness of Temple?

The Gemara answers: Perhaps you might think that he does not infer [that we require knowledge at the beginning] from the verse, but he has it from a tradition; therefore [Rish Lakish] teaches us [that Rabbi Yishmael definitely does not require knowledge at the beginning]. (19b1 - 19b3)



WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, YEDIOS HATUMAH

DAILY MASHAL

Encroaching on another's boundary: exchanging the names of chachamim

Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai (*Sifrei, Devarim, piska 188*) said that it is forbidden to exchange the words of Rabbi Eliezer for the words of Rabbi Yehoshua or the words of Rabbi Yehoshua for the words of Rabbi Eliezer as we are told: "You shall not encroach on the boundary of your companion" (see *Eimek HaNetziv*). He thus wanted to warn the *talmidei chachamim* to cite statements in the name of those who said them (*Sifrei Devei Rav*). Still, as cited in our *sugya*, when Rav Sheishes quoted Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer in our mishnah, he sometimes exchanged their names. Rashi, however, comments that this exchange only pertains to our mishnah, where Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva derive the same halachah from different verses. Since they do not disagree as to the halachah, Rav Sheishes was not heedful to avoid exchanging their names. According to the *Netziv* (*ibid*), the prohibition to exchange names of *chachamim* stems from the possibility that in later generations people will want to discover a chacham's opinion about a certain topic from his statement about another subject. In his opinion, we still must understand why Rav Sheishes exchanged the scriptural sources of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer since the different sources show their opinions about other halachic topics. Apropos, the commentators mention the Yerushalmi (Shabos ch.1:2), that the custom is not to rely on the sources of statements cited by Rav Sheishes as he was blind and sometimes heard a halachah without knowing who said it. As a result, his exchanging the names of the Tanaim caused no real confusion (*Mekor HaChesed on Sefer HaChasidim, os 586*).