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Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said that Shmuel said: They did not teach this¹ except in the case of a claim of a creditor and admission [of a portion] on the part of the debtor; but in the case of a claim of a creditor and the testimony of one witness, even if he claimed only a perutah, he is liable². What is the reason? Because it is written: One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin; for any iniquity, or for any sin, he does not rise up, but he rises up for an oath; and it was taught: Wherever two [witnesses] make him liable for money, one witness makes him liable for an oath.

And Rav Nachman said that Shmuel said: If he claimed from him wheat and barley, and the other admitted one of them, he is liable. Rabbi Yitzchak said to him: Well said! And so said Rabbi Yochanan.

The Gemora analyzes: Do we infer that Rish Lakish disagrees with him? — Some say, he [Rish Lakish] was waiting [for R' Yochanan] and was silent; and some say that he was drinking and was silent.

Shall we say this supports him: If he claimed from him wheat, and the other admitted barley, he is exempt; but

¹ That the claim must be at least two ma'ahs to make the debtor liable for an oath, if he admits a portion and denies the rest.

² If the debtor denies the whole claim, and one witness testifies that he owes the money, he must take an oath, even if the whole claim was only for a perutah; for if there had been two witnesses, the debtor would have had to pay; and wherever two witnesses impose payment, one witness imposes an oath.

³ For, since it is a loan, he may have spent the money, and, in order to gain time, he denies it; but he is not really dishonest; and though witnesses testify that he owes he money (and he had denied it, but not

Rabban Gamliel makes him liable³. — The reason [he is exempt] is because he claimed from him wheat, and he admitted barley; but [if he claimed from him] wheat and barley, and he admitted one of them, he is liable! — No! The same rule applies: even [if he claimed] wheat and barley, [and the other admitted one,] he is also exempt; and why they disagree in the case of wheat is to show you the power of Rabban Gamliel⁴.

Come and hear: If he claimed from him vessels and lands, and he admitted the vessels, and denied the lands; or [admitted] the lands, and denied the vessels, he is exempt; if he admitted a portion of the lands, he is exempt; a portion of the vessels, he is liable. Now, the reason [he is exempt] in the case of vessels and lands is because for land no oath is imposed; but for vessels and vessels similar to vessels and lands he is liable⁵! [No!] The same rule applies: even in the case of vessels and vessels he is also exempt; and the reason it states vessels and lands is because it wishes to teach us that if he admits a portion of the vessels, he is liable also for the lands.

on oath), we still assume that he merely wishes to gain time, and will pay later, and he is therefore still qualified to be accepted as a witness in a case.

⁴ That even when the admission is not of the same kind as the claim he holds that he is liable.

⁵ If he claimed two different vessels, and the other admitted one (which is similar to claiming vessels and lands, the other admitting one of them), he is liable. Hence, it supports Rav Nachman.

What does he [intend to] teach us [thereby]? The law of subjection⁶!? We have already learned it! They (movable property) can subject real property, to take an oath for them. — Here is the primary place [for the enunciation of this law]; there he mentions it merely incidentally.

The Gemora asks: And Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yochanan said: If he claimed from him wheat and barley, and the other admitted to him one of them, he is exempt. — But didn't Rabbi Yitzchak say: Well said! and so said Rabbi Yochanan.

The Gemora answers: They are Amoriam who disagree as to Rabbi Yochanan's view.

Come and hear: If he claimed from him wheat, and the other admitted to him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel makes him liable. — The reason [he is exempt] is because he claimed from him wheat, and he admitted barley; but [if he claimed from him] wheat and barley, and he admitted one of them, he is liable⁷!

The Gemora defends him: [No!] The same rule applies: even [if he claimed] wheat and barley, [and the other admitted one,] he is also exempt; and the reason it states it thus is to show you the power of Rabban Gamliel's opinion.

Come and hear: If he claimed from him vessels and lands, and he admitted the vessels, and denied the lands; or [admitted] the lands, and denied the vessels, he is exempt; if he admitted a portion of the lands, he is exempt; a portion of the vessels, he is liable. — The reason [he is exempt] in the case of vessels and lands is because for land no oath is

⁶ That the vessels may 'subject' the lands, i.e., that because he must take an oath for the vessels in any case, the lands are joined and included in the oath.

⁷ This is a challenge to R' Chiya bar Abba's opinion.

⁸ Who though he requires the admission to be of the same kind as the claim, considers the claim of two objects of different species and the admission of one of them to be an admission in like kind to the claim.

imposed; but for vessels, and vessels similar to vessels, and lands he is liable!

The Gemora replies: [No!] The same rule applies: even in the case of vessels and vessels he is also exempt; but this he teaches us that if he admits a portion of the vessels, he is liable also for the lands.

What does he [intend to] teach us [thereby]? The law of subjection!? We have already learned it! They (movable property) can subject real property, to take an oath for them. — Here is the primary place [for the enunciation of this law]; there he mentions it merely incidentally.

Rabbi Abba bar Mammal raised an objection against Rabbi Chiya bar Abba: If he claimed from him an ox, and he admitted to him a lamb; or [he claimed] a lamb, and he admitted an ox, he is exempt; if he claimed from him an ox and a lamb, and he admitted one of them, he is liable! — He said to him: This [Braisa] is the view of Rabban Gamliel. If it is Rabban Gamliel's view, even in the first clause [he should be liable]! — But it is the view of Admon⁸; and I am not putting you off [with an incorrect answer], for it is an accepted teaching in the mouth of Rabbi Yochanan: it is the view of Admon.

Rav Anan said that Shmuel said: If he claimed from him wheat [and was about to claim barley also]; and the other quickly came forward, and admitted to him barley⁹, then, if he appears to act guilefully¹⁰, he is liable¹¹, but if he merely intends [to reply to the claim], he is exempt¹².

And Rav Anan said that Shmuel said: If he claimed from him two needles, and he admitted one of them, he is liable; for

⁹ Before the claimant had mentioned barley.

¹⁰ Admitting barley quickly before the claimant mentions it, so that it appears that the claimant demanded wheat, and he admitted barley, and therefore he would be exempt from an oath.

¹¹ For the claimant in fact demands both, and he admits one.

¹² The claimant having, as yet, only demanded wheat; and he replies, denying wheat, but admitting barley.

therefore were ‘vessels’ expressly mentioned — whatever their value¹³.¹⁷

Rav Pappa said: If he claimed from him vessels and a perutah, and he admitted the vessels, and denied the perutah, he is exempt; if he admitted the perutah, and denied the vessels, he is liable.

The Gemora explains: In one law he agrees with Rav, and in the other with Shmuel. In one law he agrees with Rav, who holds that the denial in the claim must be two ma'ahs¹⁴; and in the other he agrees with Shmuel, who holds that if he claimed from him wheat and barley and he admitted one of them, he is liable¹⁵.

The Mishnah had stated: “A maneh of mine you have in your possession.” — “I have nothing of yours in my possession;” he is exempt.

Rav Nachman said: But they impose upon him a *hesseis* oath¹⁶. What is the reason? Because it is a presumption that a man will not claim [from another] unless he has a claim upon him.

The Gemora asks: On the contrary, it is a presumption that a man will not be so brazen [to deny] before his creditor¹⁷!

The Gemora answers: He is merely trying to slip away from him [for the moment], thinking, “When I will have money, I will pay him¹⁸.”

¹³ The verse (Shmos 22:6) states: If a man give to his fellow silver or vessels to keep; and we deduce that ‘silver’ implies a thing of value, and ‘vessels’ implies two. But the Torah could have said ‘silvers’ and we could have deduced both laws (that the claim must be for two things of value). Hence, since the Torah specifically mentions ‘vessels’ separately, we infer that vessels need not be of value.

¹⁴ Therefore for the denial of a perutah, he is exempt.

¹⁵ Therefore if he claimed a perutah and vessels, and he admitted the perutah but denied the vessels, he is liable (and the vessels need not be of the value of two ma'ahs, as has been explained).

Know [that this is so], for Rav Idi bar Avin said that Rav Chisda said: He who denies a loan, is fit for testimony; a deposit, is unfit for testimony¹⁹.

Rav Chaviva taught [Rav Nachman's law] as applicable to the later clause: “A maneh of mine you have in your possession;” he said to him, “yes.” On the next day he said to him: “Give them to me;” [and the other replied,] “I have already given them to you;” he is exempt. — And Rav Nachman said: But they impose upon him a *hesseis* oath.

The Gemora notes: He who applies [Rav Nachman's law] to the first clause will certainly apply it to the second clause; but he who applies it to the second clause [may say] here it is applicable because there is money at stake; but there where there is no money at stake, it is not applicable.

¹⁶ Though, being a ‘kofer hakal’ — one who denies everything, he is legally exempt from an

oath, the Beis Din, as a matter of equity, impose an oath.

¹⁷ And since he does deny the whole claim, he must be speaking the truth; then why an oath?

¹⁸ The denial is therefore not effrontery, but an excuse to gain time; hence, he may not be speaking the truth, and he must take an oath.

¹⁹ For a deposit is not intended to be spent; and where witnesses testified that at the time of denial it was in his possession, he must be considered dishonest