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Mishna

If one slaughtered the *pesach* offering or the *chatas* not for their own sake, or if he received their blood, went with their blood (to the Altar), or sprinkled their blood not for their own sake, or (during one of the *avodos*) he began for their own sake and concluded not in their own sake, or not for their own sake and for their own sake, they are invalid.

What is the case where he began for their own sake and concluded not in their own sake? He began for the sake of the *pesach* offering and he concluded for the sake of a *shelamim*. Not for their own sake and for their own sake means: for the sake of a *shelamim* first and then for the sake of the *pesach* offering.

A sacrifice can be disqualified during any one of the four *avodos*: slaughtering, receiving, bringing and sprinkling.

Rabbi Shimon holds that it is valid in the case of carrying with the wrong intent, because the it is impossible to offer a sacrifice without slaughtering, without receiving and without sprinkling, but it is possible to offer it without bringing the blood – one slaughters it at the side of the Altar and sprinkles its blood from there.

Rabbi Eliezer said: If one goes where he needs to go, a wrong intention disqualifies it; however, where he does not need to go, a wrong intention does not disqualify it. (13a)

Avodah of Kabbalah

The *Gemora* asks: Does receiving the blood (with a wrong intention) disqualify? Surely it was taught in the following *braisa*: *And they shall bring*. This refers to the receiving of the blood. You say that it refers to the receiving of the blood; yet

perhaps it is not so, but rather, it refers to the sprinkling? When it says: *And they shall sprinkle*, sprinkling is stated; to what can I apply the verse: *And they shall bring*? It must refer to the receiving of the blood. The *braisa* continues: *the sons of Aaron, the Kohanim*. This teaches us that this service must be performed by a legitimate *Kohen*, dressed in his priestly vestments.

Rabbi Akiva said: How do we know that the receiving of the blood must be performed only by a legitimate *Kohen*, dressed in his priestly vestments? *The sons of Aaron* is stated here, while elsewhere it is written: *These are the names of the sons of Aaron, the Kohanim that were anointed*. Just as there it refers to legitimate *Kohanim*, dressed in priestly vestments, so here too it means by a legitimate *Kohen*, dressed in priestly vestments.

Rabbi Tarfon said: May I bury my sons if I have not heard a distinction made between receiving the blood and sprinkling it, yet I cannot explain what the difference is!

Rabbi Akiva said: I will explain it. Regarding the receiving of the blood, a wrong intention was not treated as a wrong action, whereas regarding sprinkling, a wrong intention was treated as a wrong action. [*This is the part of the braisa which seems to say that there is no disqualification when the receiving of the blood was performed for the sake of a different sacrifice.*] Additionally, if one received the blood outside (of the Temple area), he is not liable to *kares*, whereas one who sprinkles outside is punished with *kares*. Thirdly, if unqualified people received the blood, they are not subject to the death penalty for it, whereas if unqualified people sprinkled it, they are subject to the death penalty for it.

Rabbi Tarfon said to him: I swear by the Temple service that you have not deviated to the right or the left! I heard it, yet could not explain it, whereas you expounded it and it emerged that your teaching agreed with my tradition. In these words Rabbi Tarfon addressed him: Akiva, whoever separates themselves from you is as if they are separating themselves from life!

Rava answers: There is no difficulty, for the *braisa* refers to an intention of *piggul* (a *korban* whose *avodah* was done with the intention that it would be eaten after its designated time; this does not disqualify the *korban* if the intention occurred during the *avodah* of receiving of the blood), while the *Mishna* refers to an intention of not for its own sake (where such intention, during the *avodah* of receiving of the blood, would disqualify the *korban*).

The *Gemora* asks: Now, is it true that an intention of *piggul* during the *avodah* of receiving the blood does not disqualify the sacrifice? Surely it was taught in a *braisa*: You might have thought that an intention of *piggul* is only effective (to disqualify the *korban*) during the *avodah* of the sprinkling; how do we know to include slaughtering and receiving? It is from the following verse: And if any of the meat of the *shelamim* offering will be consumed on the third day, it shall not be accepted. The Torah is speaking of the services (including the receiving of the blood) which lead to consumption (of the *korban*). You might have thought that I should also include (the disqualification of the *korban* with a *piggul* intent) the pouring out of the remainder of the blood (on the base of the Altar) and the burning of the sacrificial parts; therefore it is written: on the third day, it shall not be accepted (referring to the sprinkling of the blood), neither shall it be considered to the one who offers it. Now sprinkling was included in the general category (of things that allow a sacrifice to be eaten), so why was it singled out? It was to draw an analogy to it, saying as follows: Just as sprinkling is a service and is indispensable for atonement, so too every service that is indispensable for atonement is included (in the laws of *piggul*). This excludes the pouring out of the remainder of the blood and the burning of the sacrificial parts, since these are not indispensable for atonement! [This *braisa* demonstrates

that that the laws of *piggul* apply during the *avodah* of the receiving of the blood!]

Rather, the *Gemora* says: There is no difficulty, for the first *braisa* refers to a case where he said, "I am slaughtering this sacrifice with the intention of receiving its blood tomorrow (and it does not become *piggul*, for he is not thinking about an act of consumption, such as sprinkling the blood, eating the meat, or burning the sacrificial parts on the Altar), while the other *braisa* refers to a case where he said, "I am receiving the blood with the intention of pouring out the remainder of the blood tomorrow."

One of the Rabbis said to Rava: Now does an improper intention not disqualify a sacrifice at the pouring out of the remainder and the burning of the sacrificial parts? Yet surely it was taught in a *braisa*: You might think that intention is effective only in connection with the eating of the meat. How do we know to include the pouring out of the remainder and the burning of the sacrificial parts? It is from the verse: And if it will be consumed at all. The Torah refers to two consumptions, viz., eating by man and eating by the Altar. [This *braisa* states that the disqualification of *piggul* does apply by the pouring of the remainder of the blood!?

The *Gemora* answers: There is no difficulty, for this *braisa* refers to a case where he said, "I am sprinkling the blood with the intention of pouring out the remainder of the blood tomorrow." Whereas the other *braisa* refers to a case where he said, "I am pouring out the remainder of the blood with the intention of burning the sacrificial parts tomorrow. [This does not render it *piggul*, since the wrongful intention was not during one of the four services.] (13a – 13b)

Dipping of the Finger

Rabbi Yehudah the son of Rabbi Chiya said: I have heard that the dipping of the finger in the blood (with a *piggul* intent) renders the inner *chatas piggul*. [If he dipped his finger in the blood with the intention of burning the sacrificial parts the next day, the sacrifice becomes *piggul*.]

Ilfa heard this and said it before Bar Padda. Bar Padda said: Isn't *piggul* learned from a *shelamim*? Then just as the dipping of the finger does not render a *shelamim piggul*, so in the case of an inner *chatas* too, the dipping of the finger should not render it *piggul*!?

The *Gemora* answers: But do we really derive everything from a *shelamim*? If so, we should say as follows: Just as a service for the sake of a different sacrifice does not remove a *shelamim* from *piggul*, so too a service for the sake of a different sacrifice does not remove a *chatas* from *piggul*. [The *Gemora* below states that if a sacrifice is slaughtered with a *piggul* intent, it remains *piggul* only if the subsequent services are performed without any other disqualifying intention. Now if one slaughtered a *shelamim* with a *piggul* intent, and then performed the subsequent services for the sake of a different sacrifice, it remains *piggul*, since this change of name does not disqualify a *shelamim*. A *chatas*, however, in a similar circumstance removes it from the category of *piggul*, since a change of name does disqualify it. (Though the meat obviously remains forbidden, it is not forbidden as *piggul*, so that eating it does not render one liable to *kares*.) But if *piggul* of other sacrifices were completely analogous to *piggul* of a *shelamim*, as Bar Padda's objection implies, then the *chatas* too should not be removed from *piggul*.] What then can you say? That the laws of *piggul* are derived from some superfluity implied in the Scriptural texts (for each specific *korban*); so here too it is derived from the superfluity implied in the Scriptural texts.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: In this upper story I heard that the dipping of the finger in the blood (with a *piggul* intent) renders the inner *chatas piggul*.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish wondered: Isn't *piggul* learned from a *shelamim*? Then just as the dipping of the finger does not render a *shelamim piggul*, so in the case of an inner *chatas* too, the dipping of the finger should not render it *piggul*!?

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi answers: But do we really derive everything from a *shelamim*? If so, we should say as follows: Just as a service for the sake of a different sacrifice does not remove

a *shelamim* from *piggul*, so too a service for the sake of a different sacrifice does not remove a *chatas* from *piggul*.

Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina said: Yes, indeed, we really learn everything from *shelamim*: (here is why a "change of name" intention removes a *chatas* from the category of *piggul*, but it does not remove a *shelamim*) Since the intention to consume it outside of its place disqualifies a *shelamim* (but there is no *kares* if one eats from its meat), and the intention for the sake of a different sacrifice disqualifies a *chatas*, then just as the intention to consume it outside of its place, which disqualifies the *shelamim*, removes it from *piggul*, so too performing a service for the sake of a different sacrifice, which disqualifies the *chatas*, removes it from the category of *piggul*.

Rabbi Yirmiyah said: The refutation of this analogy is at its side. You cannot prove from the intention of consuming it outside its place, which disqualifies a *shelamim*, (for it is logical that it will remove it from the category of *piggul*) for it operates as a disqualification in all sacrifices; will you say the same of performing a service for the sake of a different sacrifice, which operates in the case of a *pesach* offering and the *chatas* only? Rather, the following must be the explanation: That which disqualifies a *shelamim* removes it from *piggul*, while any service which is indispensable for it renders it *piggul*; so here too (by a *chatas*), that which disqualifies it removes it from *piggul*, and any service which is indispensable to it (including the dipping of the finger) renders it *piggul*.

Rav Mari proves that the dipping of the finger with a *piggul* intent can render the inner *chatas piggul* from the following *Mishna*: This is the general rule: Whoever takes the *komeitz* (scoopful from the *minchah*), places it in the sacred utensil, brings it to the Altar, or burns it (with a *piggul* intent renders it *piggul*). Now as for taking the *komeitz*, it is well (that this effects *piggul*), as it corresponds to slaughtering (by an animal sacrifice); bringing it corresponds to the bringing of the blood, burning it corresponds to the sprinkling of the blood. But to what does placing it into a utensil correspond? Shall we say that it is similar to receiving the blood? Are they really similar? There it (the blood spurting into the vessel) happens by itself, whereas

here he takes it and places it himself in the utensil! The explanation must be that since you cannot dispense with placing it in the utensil, it is evidently an important service; so here too (*by the inner chatas*), since one cannot dispense with it, it must be part of the bringing of the blood to the Altar!

The *Gemora* argues: No! In truth, placing the *komeitz* into a utensil is similar to the receiving of the blood, and as to your objection that there it (*the blood spurting into the vessel*) happens by itself, whereas here he takes it and places it himself in the utensil, the answer is that both are cases of placing (*something holy*) in a utensil; what difference does it make whether it happens on its own or whether he takes it and places it himself in the utensil?

The *Gemora* suggests that Rav Mari's contention that the dipping of the finger is in the category of the bringing of the blood can be a matter of dispute between the following *Tannaim*, for one *braisa* taught: The dipping of the finger renders a *chatas piggul*; while another *braisa* taught: It does not effect *piggul*, nor does it become *piggul* (*if he slaughtered or received the blood with the intention of dipping the finger tomorrow*).

The *Gemora* counters (*that perhaps both braisos agree that the dipping of the finger is in the category of the bringing of the blood*) that the argument between the *Tannaim* is as follows: One *braisa* is in accordance with the Rabbis (*who hold that the bringing of the blood can effect piggul*), and the other *braisa* is in accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon (*of our Mishna who maintains that there can be no piggul during the bringing of the blood*).

The *Gemora* asks: If it follows Rabbi Shimon, why did the *braisa* mention only the dipping of the finger (*as a service that cannot effect piggul by an inner chatas*)? [*In truth, the inner chatas is not subject to the laws of piggul at all – by any of the services!?*] Did Rabbi Shimon not say that any sacrifices which are not offered on the outer Altar, such as the *shelamim*, are not subject to the law of *piggul*?

The *Gemora* answers: Rather, both *braisos* agree with the Rabbis, yet there is no difficulty, for one *braisa* refers to an outer *chatas*, while the other refers to the inner *chatas*.

The *Gemora* asks: That there is no *piggul* by an outer *chatas* (*during the dipping of the finger*) is obvious, since "*and he shall dip*" is not written in connection of it!?

The *Gemora* answers: It is necessary, for one might have thought that since "*and he shall take*" (*the blood from the utensil and apply it on the horns of the Altar*) is written, and if a monkey came and placed the blood upon his finger, the *Kohen* must take it again, it is therefore as though "*and he shall dip*" were written (*and the dipping of the finger would be regarded as a service*). Therefore he informs us that for that very reason "*and he shall dip*" is not written, so that it may indicate the one (*that the dipping of the finger cannot effect piggul*) and indicate the other (*that the Kohen must dip his finger in to get the blood*). (13b – 14a)

DAILY MASHAL

Even the Chatas of a Nasi Is Disqualified Shelo Lishmah

In his *Meshech Chochmah* (Vayikra 4:22), Rabbi Meir Simchah HaKohen of Dvinsk zt"l writes that it is interesting that the disqualification of a *chatas* not performed for its own sake is learnt from the verses treating the *chatas* of a *nasi*. This is according to Rabbi Yochanan, in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, that an *'olah* and a *chatas* are slaughtered in the same place to avoid shaming sinners: those looking on think that the person is offering an *'olah*, which is a voluntary sacrifice.

A *nasi* who sinned must bring a flawless male goat. This sacrifice resembles an *'olah*, which can be a goat. The *nasi's* honor is the honor of the whole people, the public does not know if he is bringing a *chatas* or an *'olah* and the Torah helps him to hide his shame. An *'olah* not performed for its own sake is not disqualified. We might tend to think that a *nasi's chatas* should be likewise regarded. The Torah therefore teaches the disqualification of a *chatas* from the verses dealing with his sacrifice.