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Zevachim Daf 30

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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

### **Intention by One, or Two?**

Ilfa said: the argument (between the *Tanna Kamma* and Rabbi Yehudah) applies to two services (*when there was an “outside of its place” intention during one avodah, and a “beyond its time” intent in the other one*), but if both intentions occurred in one service, everyone would agree that it is a mixture of intentions (*and it cannot be piggul*). Rabbi Yochanan said: They argue even by one *avodah*.

The *Gemora* asks on Ilfa from our *Mishna*: Rabbi Yehudah says: This is the rule: If the intention to consume it beyond its time preceded his intention to consume it outside of its place, it is invalid and one who consumes it receives *kares*. Now, according to Rabbi Yochanan, it is understandable why he said, “this is the rule” (*for he was stating that the law applies in all cases*). But according to Ilfa, what is the implication of the *Mishna* when it says, “this is the rule”? The *Gemora* notes that this is indeed a difficulty. (30a)

### **Contradicting Expressions**

We learned in a *Mishna* elsewhere: One who says, “This animal is an exchange for an *olah*, an exchange for a *shelamim* (*known as temurah, literally meaning exchange; when an animal is exchanged for an offering, both animal now have sanctity*),” Rabbi Meir maintains that the animal becomes an exchange for an *olah* (*we only concern ourselves with his first statement, which was “an exchange for an olah”*). Rabbi Yosi holds that if he intended to make both declarations, and the reason why he said one before the other was because he couldn’t state both statements

simultaneously, his words are valid (*and the animal is regarded as an olah and a shelamim; it must be sent out to pasture until it gets a blemish*). However, if he said, “This animal is an exchange for an *olah*,” and then he changed his mind and he said, “This animal is an exchange for a *shelamim*,” the animal becomes an exchange for an *olah* (*for the sanctity of the olah cannot be removed*).

They inquired: What is the law if one said, “This animal is an exchange for an *olah* offering and a *shelamim* offering,” or he said, “This animal should be halved as an exchange (*for an olah offering and a shelamim offering*)”?

Abaye said: In this (*last*) case, Rabbi Meir would certainly agree (*that they both take effect*). Rava said: There would still be an argument.

Rava said to Abaye: According to you who maintain that here Rabbi Meir certainly agrees, but is our *Mishna’s* case of slaughtering not analogous to the case where he said, “it should be halved,” and yet they disagree?!

Abaye said to him: Do you think that the slaughtering counts only at the end? It is legally regarded as a slaughtering from the beginning until the end, and our *Mishna* is referring to a case where he declared that he is cutting the first organ intending to consume it beyond its time and he is cutting the second organ intending to consume it outside its place.



Rava asks: Yet surely *kemtizah* (taking the scoopful of meal from the flour offering) is analogous to halves, and yet they disagree?!

Abaye answers: There too the *Mishna* is referring to a case where he burned a *kometz* of the *minchah* offering intending to consume it beyond its time and a *kometz* of the *levonah* (frankincense) intending to consume it outside its place.

Rava persists: Yet they disagree in respect of the *kometz* of a sinner's *minchah* offering, where there is no frankincense?

Abaye responds by saying that they do not disagree there.

Rav Ashi said: If you should say that they do disagree, they disagree in a case of steps (when the Kohen had different intentions during different steps, as he was bringing the *kometz* to the Altar).

When Rav Dimi came to Bavel, he said: Rabbi Meir stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that we regard a person's first expression (to be considered legally significant, and not his later expression). For we learned in our *Mishna*: R Rabbi Yehudah says: This is the rule: If the intention to consume it beyond its time preceded his intention to consume it outside of its place, it is invalid and one who consumes it receives *kares*.

Abaye said to him: Yet surely Rabbah bar bar Chanah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi only disagree in what they disagree explicitly about, and they do not disagree regarding anything that they did not explicitly argue about, for Rabbi Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that they all agree in a case where he said, "Let this sanctity (*olah*) take effect upon the animal and after that, let that sanctity (*shelamim*) take effect upon it," the latter does not take effect. And if he said, Let this sanctity not take effect upon it unless the other takes effect upon it as well," they all agree that the latter does take effect upon it. They disagree only where he said, "Let this animal be

an exchange for an *olah*, an exchange for a *shelamim*." Rabbi Meir holds: Since he should have said (if he wanted them both to take effect), "an exchange for an *olah* and an exchange for a *shelamim*," but he said instead, "an exchange for an *olah*, an exchange for a *shelamim*," you may infer that he has indeed retracted (and since we do not regard his retraction as legally significant, it is an *olah*). Rabbi Yosi holds that had he said, "an exchange for an *olah* and an exchange for a *shelamim*," I might have thought that he intended for it to be half as an *olah* and half as a *shelamim*; therefore he said, "an exchange for an *olah*, an exchange for a *shelamim*," to indicate that the entire animal should be an *olah* and the entire animal should be a *shelamim*. [We see from here that Rabbi Meir would agree that if he would have said, "an exchange for an *olah* and an exchange for a *shelamim*," both would take effect; this proves that we do not regard his first expression as being the legally significant one!?!]

Rav Dimi responded: Rabbah said that they do not disagree, but I maintain that they do disagree. (30a – 30b)

## DAILY MASHAL

### A Halachah to Get Angry

HaGaon Rav Yitzchak Zeev of Brisk zt"l told his son-in-law, HaGaon Rav Y.M. Feinstein zt"l: From this Gemara we learn a halachah – how to react when it comes to Torah. If you hear distorted opinions, you should react vehemently according to the severity of the error. Levi was therefore sure that if his question was in error, Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi would respond sharply and angrily. This is also the explanation for Raavad's sharp remarks on Rambam – not because of anger or disdain but due to the halachah, that one should react accordingly (*Shai Latorah*).