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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Mishnah

The *Mishnah* says that anyone who slaughters a sacrifice is valid, since slaughtering any sacrifice (*even the more severe kodshei kodashim*) may be done by all – non-*Kohanim*, women, slaves, and impure people, as long as an impure person does not touch the meat. Since their slaughtering is valid, any incorrect intentions they had invalidates the sacrifice.

If any disqualified person accepted the blood with a thought of beyond its time or outside of its place, if there is still lifeblood from the animal, a valid *Kohen* should accept it (*and do a proper sprinkling in the right place*). If a qualified *Kohen* accepted the blood and passed it to an unqualified person, the latter must return it to the qualified one. If he accepted it with his right hand and placed it into his left hand, he should return it to his right hand. If he accepted it with a sacred vessel and then placed into a non-sacred vessel, he should return it to a sacred vessel. If the blood spilled from the vessel, and the *Kohen* gathered it, the sacrifice remains valid.


If he applied the blood on the ramp or not opposite the base (*of the Altar; a side provided with a foundation; this excludes the south-east corner, which had no base*), or he applied blood that was supposed to be applied below the *chut hasikra* above the *chut hasikra*, or he applied blood that was supposed to be applied above the *chut hasikra* below it (*a red line on the Altar at the point where it was*

five amos high; this was the dividing line between the two halves of the Altar), or if he applied blood that was supposed to be applied in the *Heichal* outside of it, or he applied blood that was supposed to be applied outside the *Heichal* inside of it, if there is still lifeblood from the animal, a valid *Kohen* should accept it (*and do a proper sprinkling in the right place*). (31b4 – 32a2)

Who can Slaughter?

The *Gemara* cites a *Baraisa* which teaches that a *Kohen* is not required for slaughtering a sacrifice. This is derived from the following verse: *He will slaughter (the sacrifice) and the Kohanim will accept the blood*. The *mitzvah* on the *Kohen* only starts with accepting the blood. The slaughtering is before the accepting and, therefore, can be done by one who is not a *Kohen*. It may be slaughtered by women, slaves, people who are *tamei*; this applies even by *kodshei kodashim*. Although our *Mishnah* seems to indicate that a non-*Kohen*, who slaughters the sacrifice, is only valid after the fact, the *Gemara* explains that this is not so. It can be slaughtered by a non-*Kohen* from the outset; it was only stated in such a manner because the *Mishnah* mentioned a *tamei* person as well. A *tamei* should *l'chatchilah*, not slaughter a sacrifice, for we are concerned that he might come into contact with the meat of the animal.

The *Gemara* asks: But is the slaughtering of a *tamei* person even valid? Was it not taught in a *Baraisa* that the



halachah of *shechitah* is juxtaposed to the *halachah* of *semichah* (the owner places his hands on the head of the sacrificial animal before it is slaughtered and leans on it with all his weight): Just as *semichah* must be performed by a person who is *tahor*, so too the *shechitah* must be performed by someone who is *tahor*?

The *Gemara* answers: That is only a Rabbinic law (lest he come into contact with the meat).

The *Gemara* asks: But it is written by *semichah* and *shechitah* “*lifnei Hashem*” (which indicates that it must be performed in the Temple Courtyard, a place where a *tamei* person cannot enter; accordingly, a *tamei* should be Biblically disqualified from performing the *shechitah* just as he cannot perform the *semichah*)!?

The *Gemara* answers: He can perform the *shechitah* with a long knife (while he is standing outside of the Courtyard).

The *Gemara* asks: Why don't we allow the *tamei* person to perform a *semichah* by standing outside and extending his hands inside!?

The *Gemara* answers: This cannot be done, for we hold that even a partial entry (*his hands*) into the Courtyard is regarded as an entry (and therefore it is forbidden).

Rav Chisda cites a different version: Just as *shechitah* must be performed by a person who is *tahor*, so too the *semichah* must be performed by someone who is *tahor*.

The *Gemara* asks: But it is written by *semichah* “*lifnei Hashem*” as well!?

The *Gemara* answers: We allow the *tamei* person to perform a *semichah* by standing outside and extending his hands inside.


The *Gemara* asks: Why don't we allow the *tamei* person to perform a *shechitah* with a long knife?

The *Gemara* answers: This is in accordance with Shimon Hatimni who maintains that the hands of the slaughterer must be further inside the Courtyard than the animal being slaughtered. For it was taught in a Baraisa: And he shall slaughter the bull before Hashem: the bull [must be] before Hashem, but the slaughterer need not be before Hashem. Shimon Hatimni said: From where do we know that the slaughterer's hands must be on the inner side of the slaughtered? From the text: And he shall slaughter the bull before Hashem: he that slaughters the bull [must be] before Hashem. (32a2 – 32b1)

Partial Entry

Ulla says in the name of Rish Lakish: A *tamei* person who extends his hands into the Courtyard incurs lashes, as it is stated (regarding a woman who has given birth): She may not touch anything sacred. This, he derives, through an analogy from touching. Just as a partial touching (*with his fingers*) is regarded as touching, so too a partial entry is regarded as an entry.

Rav Hoshaya asked Ulla from a Baraisa: A *metzora* whose eighth day (of purification) fell on Erev Pesach, but on that day had an emission of semen (resulting in the fact that he now cannot enter the Temple Mount to complete his purification process), and then immersed himself, the *Chachamim* said that although an ordinary *tevul yom* (one who has immersed in a mikvah but still has tumah on him until nightfall) may not enter the Temple Mount until nightfall, this one may enter in order to complete his purification process, thus enabling him to bring his pesach offering. It is preferable for a positive commandment that involves *kares* (pesach obligation) to override a positive



commandment that does not involve *kares* (entering the Temple Mount while being a *tevul yom*). And Rabbi Yochanan maintains that it is only Rabbinically forbidden for a *tevul yom* to enter the Temple Mount. For it is said: And Yehoshaphat stood in the congregation of Judah and Jerusalem, in the house of Hashem, before the new Courtyard. What does 'the new Courtyard' mean? That they introduced a new law there and ruled: A *tevul yom* must not enter the Camp of the Leviim.

Now, Rav Hoshaya asks, if you maintain that a partial entry is regarded as an entry, how do we allow the *metzora* to insert his thumbs into the Courtyard? This is also a transgression that is punishable by *kares*, so how can it be overridden by the *pesach* commandment?

Ulla answers: From your bundle that you cited, I can answer you. Why do we allow this *tevul yom* to enter? Since we would allow an ordinary *metzora* to enter the Courtyard in order to complete his purification process, we allow a *metzora* who has had an emission of semen to enter as well.

Rav Yosef observed: It emerges that Ulla holds that if (on Erev Pesach) the majority (of the community) were *zavin* (a man who has an emission similar but not identical to a seminal discharge) and they became *tamei* with corpse *tumah*, since they are permitted in respect of their corpse *tumah* (for that is the law regarding the *pesach* offering; if the majority of the community were *tamei* through corpse *tumah*, the *pesach* offering is nevertheless offered), they are permitted in respect of their *zivah* as well.

Abaye asked him: How can you compare? *Tumah* was permitted, but *zivah* was not permitted!?

The *Gemara* suggests that Rav Yosef meant the following: If the majority were *tamei* with corpse *tumah* and they

become *zavin*, since they are permitted in respect of their *tumah*, they are permitted in respect of their *zivah* as well.

Rav Yosef replied: Yes; that is what I meant to say.

Abaye asked him: Yet they are still not comparable. In the case of a *metzora*, it is permitted (for him to extend his thumbs into the Courtyard), and since it is permitted in respect of a *metzora*, it is permitted (in respect of his seminal emission as well). But *tumah* (by the *pesach* offering) is merely pushed aside (when the majority are *tamei*): perhaps then, in respect of the *tumah*, it was pushed aside, while in respect of the *zivah*, it was not pushed aside!?

Rava replied to him: On the contrary! The logic is the reverse: In the case of a *metzora*, where it is permitted; then, perhaps then, it is permitted in respect of the *metzora*, but not permitted in respect of the seminal emission. But *tumah* is pushed aside; what difference does it make then whether it is pushed aside in one instance or whether it is pushed aside in two instances?!

The *Gemara* draws a conclusion that they both hold that the *tumah* is merely pushed aside when the public is involved (and it is not "permitted"). (32b1 – 33a1)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

IS IT PREFERABLE TO VIOLATE A TOLDAH RATHER THAN AN AV (FOR ONE WHO IS DEATHLY ILL)?

The Tchebeiner Gaon (Dovev Meisharim, 3:82) inquires as to what the halacha would be in the following case. We are permitted to desecrate Shabbos for one who is deathly ill. Is it preferable to perform a labor which is only a *toldah*, a derivative of the *av melocha*, the primary categories of

labor forbidden to do on Shabbos; or perhaps, there is no halachic difference since both are Biblically forbidden?

He ruled on this issue and cited support from our *Gemara*. It was taught in a *Baraisa*: A *metzora* whose eighth day (of purification) fell on Erev Pesach, but on that day had an emission of semen (resulting in the fact that he now cannot enter the Temple Mount to complete his purification process), and then immersed himself, the Chachamim said that although an ordinary *tevul yom* (one who has immersed in a mikvah but still has tumah on him until nightfall) may not enter the Temple Mount until nightfall, this one may enter in order to complete his purification process, thus enabling him to bring his pesach offering. It is preferable for a positive commandment that involves *kares* (pesach obligation) to override a positive commandment that does not involve *kares* (entering the Temple Mount while being a *tevul yom*).

Rabbi Yochanan maintains that it is only Rabbinically forbidden for a *tevul yom* to enter the Temple Mount.

Ulla said: Why do we allow this *tevul yom* to enter? He answers: Since we would allow an ordinary *metzora* to enter the Temple Mount in order to complete his purification process, we allow a *metzora* who has had an emission of semen to enter as well.

Tosfos (in Yevamos) asks: Ulla maintains that a partial entry into an area which is forbidden to enter is regarded as a full entry. If so, why do we limit this *metzora*, who is a *tevul yom* to insert his right ear, thumb and big toe into the Temple Courtyard, let him be permitted to enter entirely? What would be the distinction?

Tosfos answers: Entering completely into the Courtyard is regarded as being more severe than a partial entry. The Torah forbids a *tevul yom* from entering completely into

the Courtyard explicitly, but a partial entry is only derived through the means of a *hekesh* (a Midrashic juxtaposition). Although both prohibitions are Biblical, the one that is written explicitly is stricter than the one which is merely derived from an exposition.

It emerges from here that a Biblical prohibition written explicitly is more stringent than one which is only derived through an exposition. He therefore posits that it would be preferable to engage in the labor which would only be violating a *toldah* rather than one which would constitute an *av melocha*. This is because a *toldah* is not written explicitly in the Torah.

DAILY MASHAL

Who should Slaughter?

The Cheshek Shlomo (Menachos 19b) cites the Zohar which appears to say that a *Yisroel* should perform *shechitah*, not a Kohen. The Cheshek Shlomo suggests that the Zohar is referring to *korbonos yachid* in that there is a *mitzvah* for the owner to slaughter his own *korban* (as above). However, a *korban tzibur* should be slaughtered by a *Kohen* (as Tosfos says in Kiddushin).

The Bais Yitzchak, in explanation of the Zohar, suggests that it was preferable to have *Yisroelim* perform *shechitah* so that the *Kohanim* would avoid staining their *bigdei kehunah* - priestly garments. [The *Gemara* on 65b says that if a Kohen performs an *avodah* while wearing soiled garments, the *avodah* is *posul* - invalid.]