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Zevachim Daf 67

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Mishna

The *Mishna* says that in all of the cases above, the birds do not make one impure by ingesting, but the prohibition of *me'ilah* applies, except for the case of a bird *chatas* sacrificed correctly. [*Me'ilah does not apply to something that has become permitted, and Kohanim are permitted to eat the bird chatas sacrificed correctly.*]

The *Mishna* cites a dispute of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer in the case of an *olah* done as a *chatas* – on the bottom, as a *chatas*, for a *chatas*. Rabbi Eliezer says that *me'ilah* still applies, as it still is an *olah*, while Rabbi Yehoshua says that it doesn't apply, since it gets the status of a *chatas*.

Rabbi Eliezer offers a logical argument for his position. If a *chatas*, which has no *me'ilah* prohibition when done for its sake, gets a *me'ilah* prohibition when done for another sacrifices' sake, certainly an *olah*, which has a *me'ilah* prohibition when done for its sake, keeps its *me'ilah* prohibition when done for another sacrifices' sake. Rabbi Yehoshua answers that in the case of the *chatas*, it has *me'ilah*, as it is done for an *olah*, which itself has *me'ilah*. However, in the case of the *olah*, it is offered for the sake of a *chatas*, which itself has no *me'ilah*, so it does not have *me'ilah*.

Rabbi Eliezer offers another argument from the case of the more severe *kodshei kodashim* sacrifices, which were

slaughtered in the south part of the courtyard, for the sake of the less severe *kodashim kalim*. Although they were changed to a sacrifice that has no *me'ilah*, as most of it is permitted, they still have *me'ilah*. Rabbi Yehoshua answers that even in that case, they were changed to a sacrifice which has *me'ilah* on part of it, i.e., the parts offered on the altar, as opposed to a bird *olah* offered as a *chatas*, since a bird *chatas* is totally permitted, with nothing of it subject to *me'ilah*. (66b - 67a)

Changing the Korban

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: Let an *asham* offering slaughtered in the north as a *shelamim* prove it; though he changed its name, it is subject to *me'ilah*. So you should not be surprised that a bird *olah* is subject to *me'ilah* even though he changed its name.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No. If you say this by an *asham*, where he changed its name but not its location, will you say the same of a bird *olah*, where he changed its name and its location?

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Let an *asham* offering slaughtered in the south as a *shelamim* prove it, where he changed its name and its location, yet it is subject to *me'ilah*. So you should not be surprised that a bird *olah* is subject to *me'ilah* even though he changed its name and changed its place.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No. If you say this by an *asham*, where, although he changed its name and its location, he did not deviate in its procedure; will you say the same of a bird *olah*, where he changed its name and its location and its procedure?

Rava said: [Why was he silent? According to some versions, it was written in the Gemora that Rabbi Eliezer remained silent.] He could have responded with the following case: An *asham* offering which one slaughtered in the south, for the sake of a *shelamim* and for the sake of a different owner, where he changed its name and its location and its procedure, and yet it is subject to *me'ilah*. Now, since he did not answer him like that, you may infer that Rabbi Eliezer discerned Rabbi Yehoshua's reason. That is as Rav Adda bar Ahavah said: Rabbi Yehoshua holds: If a bird *olah* was offered below the red line with the procedure of a *chatas* offering for the sake of a *chatas*, immediately after he performed *melikah* on one of its pipes, it is changed into a bird *chatas* (as will be explained by Rav Ashi).

The Gemora asks: If so, a bird *chatas* which was offered above the red line with the procedure of an *olah* offering for the sake of an *olah*, immediately after he performed *melikah* on one of its pipes, it should be changed into a bird *olah*? And you cannot say that that indeed is so, for surely Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Banna'ah: That is the meaning of the Mishna. Does that not mean - that is the meaning of the Mishna, but no more (that Rabbi Yehoshua only argues in that case, but not in any other cases)?

The Gemora answers: No, it means that is the meaning of the whole Mishna (and perhaps the same halachah would apply in the case of a bird *chatas* which is done above the red line).

Rav Ashi said: [Rabbi Yehoshua only said his halachah by an *olah* bird done below; the explanation is as follows:] As for a bird *olah* offered below with the procedure of a *chatas* for the sake of a *chatas*, it is well (that it is changed), since the fitness of a *chatas* requires (the cutting of) one pipe, whereas that of the *olah* requires both pipes, and (the *melikah* of) a bird *olah* offering cannot be done below, so immediately after he performed *melikah* on one pipe, it is changed into a bird *chatas*. But when one offers a bird *chatas* (above with the procedure of an *olah* and for the sake of an *olah*), since a master said that *melikah* is valid wherever (on the altar) it is done, immediately after he performed *melikah* on one of its pipes, it becomes disqualified; when therefore he performs *melikah* on the second pipe, how can it be changed into a bird *olah* offering?

It was stated above: Rav Adda bar Ahavah said: Rabbi Yehoshua holds: If a bird *olah* was offered below the red line with the procedure of a *chatas* offering for the sake of a *chatas*, immediately after he performed *melikah* on one of its pipes, it is changed into a bird *chatas* (and, according to the Gemora's present assumption, it will be a valid *chatas* sacrifice, and he may fulfill his obligation with it).

The Gemora asks from a Mishna: [After giving birth, a woman, if poor (and unable to purchase a lamb), brings two birds; one for an *olah* offering and one for a *chatas* offering. In this case, two women, rochel and Leah, had each brought one bird; one had brought for an *olah* and the other brought her *chatas*. They then purchased a pair of birds together, appointing one bird for Rochel's *chatas* and one for Leah's *olah*, as each required, and gave them to the Kohen.] In the case of a *chatas* offering for one (Rochel) and an *olah* offering for the other (Leah), if the Kohen offered both above the red line, half is valid (the *olah*) and half is invalid (the *chatas*); if he offered both below, half is valid (the *chatas*) and half is invalid (the

olah); if he offered one above and one below, both are invalid, for I assume that he offered the *chatas* above and the *olah* below. The *Gemora* asks: Yet even granted that he did offer the *olah* below, let it be changed into a *chatas*?

The *Gemora* answers: Although Rabbi Yehoshua ruled like that in the case of one man, did he rule like so in the case of two people? [Obviously not! For one woman's *olah* offering cannot acquit the other woman of her liability to a *chatas* offering.]

The *Gemora* asks from the next *Mishna*: [Two women, Rochel owed a bird *olah* offering and Leah owed a bird *chatas* offering. Additionally, they both owed another set of birds, one *olah* and one *chatas*. Now, they purchased three pairs of birds together. They took one of the pairs and appointed one bird as an *olah* offering for Rochel and one for a *chatas* offering for Leah. The second pair they left unspecified, not stating which was the *olah* or which was the *chatas*, nor did they specify that it belonged to any particular woman. Regarding the third pair, they did specify that one was for an *olah* and the other for a *chatas*, but they did not state the owner of each. The *halachah* regarding birds is that they may be specified at the time of their purchase or at the time of their offering. See *Rashi* as to what the *Kohen* should have done in such a case.] In the case of a *chatas* offering for one (Rochel) and an *olah* offering for another (Leah), and an unspecified pair of birds and a specified pair; if the *Kohen* offered all of them above the red line, half are valid (for the *olos*) and half are invalid (all the *chataos*); if he offered all of them below, half are valid (all the *chataos*) and half are invalid (all the *olos*); if he offered half of them above and half of them below, only the unspecified pair are valid and they share them (one is valid for Rochel and one for Leah). Now, the *Gemora* notes that the specified ones are not valid; but

why is that so? Although the *olah* might have been offered below, let it be changed into a *chatas* offering?

And should you answer that this *Mishna* (in *Kinnim*) does not follow the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, here is another *Mishna* (which proves that it is indeed following his opinion), for it was taught: If a woman declared, "I vow to bring a pair of birds (*as olos*) if I give birth to a male child, and she indeed bore a male child, she must bring two pairs, one for her vow (*two olos*), and one for her obligation (*a chatas and an olah*). When she gives them to the *Kohen*, the *Kohen* must offer three above and one below. If he did not do so, but offered two above and two below, not having consulted her, she must bring another bird (*as an olah*) and offer it above, provided that they were both of the same species (*either turtledoves or young pigeons*). However, if they were of two species (*one pair were turtledoves, and the other pair were young pigeons, and the Kohen does not remember which pair was offered first*), she must bring two birds (*as olos, one a turtledove and one a young pigeon; this is because we do not know which one was the olah of the second pair that became disqualified*).

The *Mishna* continues: If she defined her vow (*but does not remember if she specified turtledoves or young pigeons*), she must bring another three birds (*and offer them as olos*), provided that they both (*pairs*) were of the same species. However, if they were of two species, she must bring four (*as olos*). [When she vowed, she specified which types of birds she would bring, but subsequently forgot which she had vowed. When she comes to fulfill her vow, she would need two pairs for the vow alone, viz., a pair of turtledoves and a pair of pigeons, to cover both contingencies, and in addition one pair of either on account of her obligation, i.e., three pairs in all. She, however, had brought only two pairs of which the first was offered for her obligation, while the second was left for her

vow, and of that, one bird became invalid. Therefore she now owes one bird of the same species to replace the disqualified one, and a pair of the other species, in case it was the other species that she had vowed. But if the two pairs which she had brought were of different species, she must now bring four birds, all for olah offerings, because we do not know which species was offered second for the vow, and it is that species which must be completed. She cannot simply bring a pair of one species, for she does not know whether she owes one turtledove and two pigeons, or vice versa. Therefore she must bring two turtledoves and two pigeons and stipulate, "Let one of these, the one from the species which I vowed, replace the one that became disqualified, and let the second of that pair be another voluntary offering, and let the second pair cover the doubt of my definite declaration."

If she fixed her vow (to her obligatory offering; she is vowing to bring two voluntary olos that are the same type as the olah she is bringing for her obligation; now, even if she fails to do so, she can fulfill her vow by bringing three birds – the same type as her olah childbirth offering; she, however, had brought only two pairs of which the first was offered for her obligation, while the second was left for her vow, and of that, one bird became invalid), she must bring another five birds (as olos) to be offered above, provided that they both (pairs) were of the same species. However, if they were of two species, she must bring six (as olos). [If she affixed her vow to her statutory obligation, and then brought two pairs of birds to the Kohen, who offered them as above, she owes another five or six, as stated. Her vow made her liable to three olah offerings together, had she remembered what she had vowed. As she did not remember, she required five olah offerings initially, one for her childbirth obligation, and four consisting of a pair of young pigeons and a pair of turtledoves, since she did not know which she owed. Now, what she has already brought does not count, for she does not know these were the birds

which she had vowed. Nor can she simply bring another four on account of the vow, since these must be sacrificed together with the other offering. Hence she must now bring five, one for the childbirth offering and four on account of the vow. If, however, she had vowed them of two species, she does not know which species she owes. Therefore she must bring six: viz., two turtledoves and two young pigeons on account of the doubt of what she had specified, and one turtledove and one young pigeon, because the voluntary sacrifices had to be offered together with her statutory obligation.]

If she gave them to the Kohen, but does not know what she gave; and the Kohen went and offered them, but he does not know how he offered them, she now requires four birds on account of her vow and two on account of her childbirth obligation, and one chatas offering. Ben Azzai said: Two chatas offerings. [If she gave the birds to the Kohen but does not know whether they were turtledoves or young pigeons, or a pair of each, and he does not know what he sacrificed, whether all above or all below or half above and half below, perhaps she did not even fulfill her childbirth obligation, for he may have sacrificed all above, so that she lacks a chatas offering; or all below, and she is missing an olah. She must then bring four birds for her vow, since she does not remember which of the two species she specified, and two for her childbirth olah offering, viz., a turtledove and a young pigeon, since there is a possibility that the first were all offered below, as a chatas, and now she requires an olah of the same species. Or perhaps the first were offered half above and half below, and she has fulfilled her obligation with the first pair offered. But as she had vowed to bring her voluntary olos, and of the same species together with her childbirth offerings, she must now bring a turtledove and a young pigeon to cover this doubt. Additionally, she must bring one chatas of whichever species she wishes, for perhaps the first were all offered below, and this will

combine with the bird she brought as her olah. Though she has already brought the latter, yet the chatas does not need to be of the same species as the first, according to the Rabbis who disagree with Ben Azzai, for they hold that it all dependent on the chatas. Therefore, since she must bring two olos, as explained, that of the same species as the chatas combines with it. But Ben Azzai maintains that it all depends on the first, i.e., a chatas must be brought of the same species as the first olah which was correctly offered for her childbirth obligation. Now, perhaps all the first were offered above, in which case she has fulfilled this obligation, and so she must bring a chatas of the same species. As, however, she does not know which species this was, she must bring two chatas, one of each.] Rabbi Yehoshua observed: This is the case where people say (about a ram): When it is alive it has one voice, and when it is dead, it has seven voices! [When a ram is alive, it has only one voice, but when it is dead it has seven: i.e., the two horns are used for two trumpets; out of the two thighs two flutes are made; the skin is used for drums; the stomach for a lyre, and the guts are used for the strings of harps. In a similar way here too, when she vowed and did not know what she had specified, she merely required four birds and two for her childbirth obligation. However, now that she has already brought four, she still needs another eight, four on account of her vow and four on account of her obligation. Since Rabbi Yehoshua makes this comment, you may infer that he is the author of these Mishnayos!?!]

The Gemora answers: Granted that Rabbi Yehoshua ruled like this (that an olah bird can change to a chatas) in respect of liberating it from being subject to me'ilah, but he did not rule this way in respect of converting it into a valid chatas offering! (67a – 68a)

DAILY MASHAL

Thoughts of the Heart

The Gemora discusses the difference in how much the melikah of an olah or chatas bird separated. Melikah of an olah separates both wind and food pipes, while melikah of a chatas does not.

The Avnei Neizer (Vayira 5675) says that this difference hints at the lesson of an olah sacrifice. The Midrash (Vayikra Rabbah 7) states that an olah is offered on improper thoughts of the heart.

The Avnei Neizer explains that although one thinks with his brain, one's brain processes a large multitude of streaming thoughts, some of which may be improper. This chaotic streaming of thoughts is impossible to control, and therefore Hashem does not take a person to task for any of them. However, as the thoughts stream through the brain, the person's heart monitors them, and decides which ones to dwell on more deeply. This process is one that a person can control and is responsible for. Thus, the sin one atones for with an olah is the thoughts of the heart – the fact that the heart dwelt on things it shouldn't have. Therefore, the Torah mandates that the head, containing the brain, should be fully severed from the body, containing the heart, emphasizing that the only area at issue is the heart, but not the brain.