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Zevachim Daf 74

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Assumptions and Majority

Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha in the name of Rav: If a ring of idolatry (*used to beautify an idol*) became intermingled with a hundred rings, and one of them fell into the Great Sea, all of them are permitted, because we say: The one which fell was the one which was forbidden.

Rava asked to Rav Nachman from our *Mishna*: Even if one (*forbidden animal became intermingled*) in ten thousand, all must be left to die. Why is that so? Let us say that the first one which dies is the forbidden one?

Rav Nachman replied: Rav ruled in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, for we learned in a *Mishna*: Rabbi Eliezer said: If he offered the head of one of them, all the heads may be offered (*for we assume that it was the head of the blemished olah that was offered; our Mishna is following the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree*).

The *Gemora* asks: But surely Rabbi Elozar said: Rabbi Eliezer permitted the heads to be offered only two at a time (*for then, an unblemished olah is definitely being offered*), but not one at a time? [*Why isn't there a similar qualification regarding the rings?*]

Rav Nachman answered: I also only meant that it is permitted to benefit from the rings, but only two at a time.

Rav said: If a ring of idolatry became intermingled with a hundred rings, and forty of them separated to one place, and sixty to another; if one separated from the forty (*and fell into*

a different mixture), it does not forbid the others, but if one separated from the sixty (*and fell into a different mixture*), it does forbid the others.

The *Gemora* asks: Why is it different in the case where one separated from forty that the new mixture is not forbidden? It is presumably because we say that the forbidden ring is among the majority (*the sixty*). Then in the case where one separated from sixty as well, we should say that the forbidden ring is in the majority (*the fifty-nine rings*)?

Rather, this is what Rav said: If the forty were all separated to one place (*and fell into a different mixture*), they do not forbid the others. [*This is because we assume that the forbidden ring is in the sixty. If, however, they did not become intermingled with others, they would remain forbidden, for even Rabbi Eliezer permits a lenient assumption only where the forbidden item is destroyed, like where it fell into the Great Sea - similar to the case where the head of one of them is offered (but we cannot assume that the forbidden ring is in the sixty and permit the forty, for there is no nullification in a majority by idolatry); however, when the forty became intermingled with others, all are permitted, because now there is a double doubt concerning each ring: firstly, perhaps this ring is from the second group, and even if it is from the forty, perhaps the forty did not contain the forbidden one at all; therefore, they are all permitted.*] However, if the sixty were all separated to one place (*and fell into a different mixture*), they do forbid the others (*for we assume that the forbidden ring is in the sixty*).

When this was stated before Shmuel, he said: Leave idolatry

alone, for a doubt about it and a double doubt are forbidden forever.

The *Gemora* challenges Shmuel from the following *braisa*: The doubt of idolatry is forbidden, but a double doubt is permitted. How so? If a goblet used for idolatry fell into a storeroom filled with goblets, they are all forbidden. If one of these was separated and became intermingled with ten thousand, and from the ten thousand, one separated and became intermingled with another ten thousand, they are permitted. [*Evidently, a double doubt is permitted by idolatry!?*]

The *Gemora* answers: It is actually a matter disputed by the *Tannaim*, for it was taught in a *braisa*: Rabbi Yehudah said: Pomegranates of Badan (*of orlah and terumah*), however small their proportion, prohibit others. How so? If one of them fell into ten thousand, and one of the ten thousand fell into another ten thousand, all are forbidden. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehudah said in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If it fell into ten thousand, they are all forbidden; but if one of the ten thousand fell into a group of three (*two permitted ones, plus this one – as the Gemora will explain below*), and one of the three fell into another place, they are all permitted (*even the group of three*).

The *Gemora* asks: Which *Tanna* is Shmuel following (*when he rules regarding idolatry that even a double doubt is forbidden*)? If he is following Rabbi Yehudah, it should be forbidden even in the case of other prohibitions (*like orlah and terumah*)? If he is following Rabbi Shimon, then even in the case of idolatry, a double doubt is permitted! And if you will say that Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between idolatry and other prohibitions; then let us consider the following *braisa*: A doubt of idolatry is forbidden, but a double doubt is permitted. Who is its author of this *braisa*? It is neither Rabbi Yehudah nor Rabbi Shimon!?

The *Gemora* answers: In truth, the author of this *braisa* is Rabbi Shimon (*who permits a double doubt, even in the case*

of idolatry), while Shmuel holds like Rabbi Yehudah in one matter (*that a double doubt regarding idolatry is forbidden*), but disagrees in another (*and permits a double doubt regarding other prohibitions*).

Alternatively, the *Gemora* answers that Shmuel is following the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. [*Rashi suggests two explanations and prefers the first one, where the Sages rule that bread baked in an oven that was heated up by wood of idolatry is forbidden; if the bread becomes intermingled with other loaves and those intermingle with others, they are all forbidden. Rabbi Eliezer agrees that they are forbidden even though there is a double doubt. He does suggest a solution that one of the loaves may be thrown into the sea and the remainder will be permitted.*]

Rish Lakish said: If a barrel of *terumah* wine became intermingled up with a hundred casks (*of chullin wine*) and one of them fell into the Dead Sea, all of them become permitted, for we assume that the one which fell was the forbidden one.

The *Gemora* notes that the rulings of both Rav Nachman and Rish Lakish are necessary, for Rish Lakish teaches us that this leniency is applicable even by *terumah* which has a permitted use (*it may be sold to Kohanim*); and not only by idolatry which has no permitted use (*and perhaps the leniency would only apply to such a case*). And Rav Nachman teaches us that it applies even to a ring where its absence is not so noticeable (*and people may assume that the mixture is permitted even if one was not destroyed*), and not only by a barrel, where its absence is noticeable (*and people will realize that the missing barrel is the reason the mixture is now permitted*). That is why both rulings were necessary.

Rabbah said: Rish Lakish permitted the mixture only in a case of a barrel, whose absence is noticeable, but not a fig (*of terumah*). However, Rav Yosef said that he would permit the mixture even in a case of a fig, for just as its falling in (*cause the mixture to become forbidden*), so too its leaving (*will*



permit the entire mixture). [People will understand that although a fig is small, it can prohibit an entire mixture and it can permit it as well.]

Rabbi Elozar said: If a closed barrel of *terumah* (wine) became intermingled with a hundred barrels (and cannot be nullified, for a closed barrel of wine is considered significant), he opens one of them, removes from it the proportion of the mixture (which is 1/101 of the wine in the barrel) and he may drink the rest.

Rav Dimi sat and related this ruling. Rav Nachman said to him: We see here quaffing and drinking! [When will the law that a closed barrel cannot be nullified ever applicable?!] Rather, if one of them was opened accidentally, he may remove from it the proportion of the mixture and drink the rest.

Rabbi Oshaya said: If a closed barrel of *terumah* (wine) became intermingled with a hundred and fifty barrels, and a hundred of them were opened accidentally, he removes from them the proportion of the mixture and drinks, but the rest are forbidden until they are (accidentally) opened, for we do not assume that the forbidden one is in the majority. (74a – 74b)

Identifying the Forbidden One

The *Gemora* asks on the *Mishna*: As for all the others (such as an animal that has been sodomized), it is well, for their disqualification is not discernible (and therefore it cannot be identified and removed); but how is this case of *tereifah* possible? If it is discernible, let the *Kohen* come and remove it, and if it is not recognizable, how does he know that a *tereifah* became intermingled?

The academy of Rabbi Yannai said: We are dealing with a case where an animal was pierced by a thorn (which does not render it a *tereifah*) became intermingled with one that was attacked by a wolf (and we cannot distinguish between the two).

Rish Lakish answers: It became intermingled with a fallen animal (from a roof, which is ruled to be a possible *tereifah*).

The *Gemora* asks: Let us examine it (by seeing if it can walk)!

The *Gemora* answers: He holds that if it stood up after its fall, it needs twenty-four hours (before it can be slaughtered); and even if it walked, it needs examination (afterwards).

Rabbi Yirmiyah answers: It became intermingled with the offspring of a *tereifah*, and it is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the offspring of a *tereifah* cannot be offered at the altar.

The *Gemora* notes: The other Rabbis did not explain the *Mishna* as the academy of Rabbi Yannai, for they maintain that you can distinguish between an animal pierced by a thorn from one attacked by a wolf, as the perforation of the wolf is elongated, whereas that of the thorn is round. They did not explain it like Rish Lakish, for they maintain that if a fallen animal stood, it does not need require twenty-four hours; and if it walked, it does not need require an examination. They did not explain it like Rabbi Yirmiyah, because they did not want the *Mishna* to be following (the minority opinion of) Rabbi Eliezer. (74b)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Falling off the Roof

When an animal falls off a roof we are concerned that it became a *tereifah*. If it stood within twenty-four hours, an examination is sufficient. This is only if it stood by itself; if, however, someone stood the animal up, that is meaningless and it is not a proof that it's not a *tereifah*.

Some say that if the animal stood and walked - even if there are changes in its limbs, there is nothing to be concerned about - as long as the change is not severe enough by itself

to render it a *tereifah*.

If it walks, it is kosher and does not require an inspection - even if twenty-four hour time did not pass. This, however, is only if it walks properly, but if it walks with a limp, it requires an inspection.

Some say that nowadays we are not experts in this type of internal inspections, and it's only permitted if it walks. This is indeed our custom.

It is only regarded as walking if it walks four amos, and only if it walks normally - in the manner that it walked before it fell, or in the manner that other animals walk. If it initially walked, but afterwards it could not, it has the status like other animals that are endangered.

Pischei Teshuvah cites Reb Akiva Eiger who rules regarding an ox that before its fall was extremely powerful and had the ability to walk with greater strength than an ordinary ox, but afterwards it was only able to walk in a regular manner. Although the Rem" a seems to indicate that it is not a *tereifah* only if it walks in the manner that it did before its fall; nevertheless, from the Poskim it would seem that as long as it is not limping, it is not ruled to be a *tereifah*. He concludes that if there is a substantial loss, we can rely on an internal examination.

DAILY MASHAL

A Spark of Holiness

Kol kavua kmechtze al mechtze domi – anything fixed in place is not nullified.

The passuk in Hoshea says בקרברך קדוש (Hoshea 11:9). The Sifra in Kedoshim Chap. 1 explains this to mean that every Jew has a spark of holiness inside him that cannot be destroyed, and the soul of a Jew remains holy whether he actively develops his holiness or not.

The Imrei Emes connects this to the dictum of our Gemara and says that this source of holiness must be established and “fixed” in the person so that even if it is the minority of his makeup, it will still be as significant as if it comprises half of him.

The Gemara says in Kiddushin 40b that a person should always view himself that if his actions were to be weighed, the scale would be evenly balanced between his good and bad deeds. This is a difficult statement to understand as the odds of his actions being equally divided between good and bad are minuscule. The Imrei Emes explains that this Gemara is also based on the same rule, and if the person focuses on that spark of holiness and uses it to propel acts of holiness, even though his evil action may outweigh the good, it is considered as if he is evenly balanced, so that one additional good deed can tip the scales for his acquittal.