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Uncertain Metzora

[*The Gemara asks on that which was stated that the oil of the possible metzora was offered on the altar:*] But there is the remainder, which was needed to refill the *log*, whereas we have this little oil on whose account no *kemitzah* was taken?

The *Gemara* answers: He redeems that oil.

The *Gemara* asks: Where does he redeem it? If he does so within the Temple, then he is bringing *chullin* into the Temple's Courtyard!? If he does so outside the Temple, it becomes unfit through taking it out!?

The *Gemara* answers: In truth, he redeems it within the Temple, but it becomes *chullin* automatically (*when he redeems it; he is not violating any prohibition, for he is not "bringing" it inside*).

The *Gemara* asks: Yet surely Rabbi Shimon holds that one cannot bring oil as a voluntary offering!?

The *Gemara* answers: A person's remedy is different (*in order for him to become tahor*). (77a1)

Rav Rechumi sat before Ravina, and stated in the name of Rav Huna bar Tachlifa: Yet let him declare: Let this asham be an asham taluy?[1]

The *Gemara* notes: By the fact that he could not stipulate (*that if he was not a confirmed metzora*) that the *asham* should be an *asham taluy*, you may infer that the *Tanna* who disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer and maintains that you cannot bring a voluntary *asham taluy* is Rabbi Shimon.

Ravina said to him: Torah! Torah! You have confused lambs with rams![2] (77a1 – 77a2)

Mishnah

If the limbs of a *chatas* became mixed up with the limbs of an *olah* - Rabbi Eliezer says: He places them on the top (*of the altar*), and I regard the meat of the *chatas* on the top as wood (*and therefore there is no prohibition against burning the remnants*). But the Sages say: Let their forms deteriorate and then take them out to the place of burning. (77a2)

[1] To atone for a sin doubtfully committed. For Rabbi Eliezer holds that such can be offered voluntarily, since every man stands in doubt whether he has sinned or not. This is preferable to declaring it as a shelamim, as the former too may only be eaten one day, and so we would not reduce the time permitted for consumption,

[2] A metzora's asham must be a year old lamb, whereas an asham taluy must be a two year old ram.

Firewood

The *Gemara* explains Rabbi Eliezer's reason: *For a pleasing aroma you may not offer upon the altar* (*something that may be eaten*); but you may offer up for the sake of wood.

The *Gemara* explains the Rabbis' position: The Torah expressed a limitation in the word "*them*" in that verse: "*them*" (*leavening and honey*) you may not bring up for a pleasing aroma, but you may bring them up as wood; but, anything else, cannot be brought up for any reason.

Rabbi Eliezer uses the word "*them*" to teach that it is only "*them*" (*leavening and honey*) that I have included (*the prohibition of burning on*) the ramp, just as the altar, but, anything else, does not have that prohibition.

The Rabbis infer both things from it. (77a2 – 77a3)

The *Gemara* notes: Our *Mishnah* does not agree with the following *Tanna*, for it was taught in a *Baraisa*: Rabbi Yehudah said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages had no disagreement regarding the limbs of a *chatas* which were mixed up with the limbs of an *olah* - for they both agree that they must be offered up; and they had no disagreement regarding a valid offering which became intermingled with a *rovea* (*an animal which sodomized a person*) or with a *nirva* (*an animal that was sodomized by a person*) – for they both agree that they must not be offered. Regarding what case do they disagree? It is about the limbs of an unblemished *olah* which became intermingled with the limbs of a blemished one - there Rabbi Eliezer maintains that they must be offered up on the altar, and I consider the meat of the blemished animal on top as mere wood; while the Sages say that they must not be offered up.

Now, according to Rabbi Eliezer, why are *rovea* and *nirva* different? Presumably, it is because they are not fit (*to be burned on the altar*). A blemished animal too is not fit (*so why does he hold that it can be burned for the sake of wood*)?

Rav Huna said: It refers to a case where there were cataracts in the eye of the animal, and is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that if such animals ascended the altar, they do not need to be brought down (*for he holds that an animal with such a blemish – that would not disqualify a bird sacrifice, does not get taken down*).

The *Gemara* asks: Granted that Rabbi Akiva ruled like this after the fact; but did he rule like this even at the very outset?

Rav Pappa answered: We are dealing here with a case where they were brought up the ramp (*and they may be brought up to the altar*).

The *Gemara* asks: If so, even when they are by themselves (*and they were not intermingled*), they should be offered!?

Rather, the following is Rabbi Eliezer's reason: The Torah expressed a limitation in, "*there is a blemish in them*" (*they shall not be accepted*); only when there is a blemish in them shall they not be accepted, but when they are intermingled with other valid limbs, they are accepted.

The Rabbis expound as follows: Only when the blemish is in them shall they not be accepted, but if their blemish heals, they are accepted.

Rabbi Eliezer derives that from the fact the Torah writes "*in them*" twice.

The Rabbis do not consider that repetition to be significant.

The *Gemara* asks: If so, why does Rabbi Eliezer say that he regards the burning as firewood, surely the Torah permitted it!?

The *Gemara* answers: Rabbi Eliezer is responding to them according to their ruling: In my opinion, the Torah permitted it, but even according to your view, you should at least admit that the meat of a blemished animal is like wood, just like it is regarding the meat of a *chatas*.

The Rabbis disagree with the logic, for they say that here (*by the limbs of a blemished animal*) it is repulsive; but there (*by the meat of the chatas*) it is not repulsive. (77a3 – 77b2)

Mishnah

If the limbs of *olah* offerings became intermingled with the limbs of a blemished *olah*, Rabbi Eliezer said: If the *Kohen* offered the head of one of them, all the heads are to be offered (f*or we may assume that the one offered was the forbidden one*); the legs of one of them, all the legs are to be offered. The Sages, however, maintain that even if they had offered all except one of them, it must go to the place of burning. (77b2)

Two at a Time

Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Eliezer permitted the heads to be offered only two at a time (*for then, an unblemished olah is definitely being offered*), but not one at a time.

Rabbi Yirmiyah asked from our *Mishnah* which stated: The Sages, however, maintain that even if they had offered all except one of them, it must go to the place of burning. [*Evidently, Rabbi Eliezer disagrees even by one!?*]

The *Gemara* answers: It means that one pair (*two heads*) was left. (77b2)

Mishnah

If the blood (*which was in the service vessel – prior to its sprinkling on the altar*) was mixed with water (*which fell in*), if it retains the appearance of blood, it is valid. If it was mixed with wine, we regard it as though it were water (*and we determine if the blood would have been recognizable in that amount of water – then it would be valid*). If it was mixed with the blood of a domesticated animal (*an unconsecrated one*) or a wild beast, we regard it as though it were water. Rabbi Yehudah says: Blood does not nullify blood. [*Accordingly, if a small amount of blood from a sacrifice fell into regular blood from an animal, it can still be sprinkled on the altar.*] If blood from a sacrifice was mixed with blood that is unfit for a sacrifice (*such as that of an animal that sodomized a person*), it should be spilled into the stream in the Courtyard (*that led to Nachal Kidron*). Rabbi Eliezer says: The blood is valid for sprinkling. If he did not ask what to do and sprinkled it,

it is even valid after the fact, according to the *Tanna Kamma*. (77b2 – 78a1)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

For the Sake of Firewood

The *Gemara* says that the prohibition of bringing leavening and honey on the altar only applies when it is being done as pleasing aroma; but, if it is being done for the sake of firewood, meaning - not as an offering, there is no prohibition.

The Rambam, as explained by Kesef Mishnahh (Issurei Mizbeach 5:3) holds that this only works if it is brought independently, but not when it is offered together with an actual sacrifice. [See Minchas Chinuch 117.]

However, there is a disagreement between the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer in the *Mishnah* if one can burn limbs of a *chatas* to be like firewood, or whether there is only permission to bring up *leavening* and honey on the altar. We rule like the Rabbis that the idea of bringing up for the sake of firewood only works for leavening and honey, but not for other sacrifices that do not belong on the altar.

Nevertheless, Tosfos suggests that even the Rabbis would admit that only on sacrifices such as a *chatas* offering, which should be eaten, cannot be brought on the altar for firewood, but this intent would work for unconsecrated items to be put on the altar. It is for this reason that we would allow the blood of a sacrifice that gets mixed with non-sacrifice blood to be sprinkled and wouldn't constitute a violation of bringing *chullin* on the altar. The rationale seems to be that when something is brought with a sacrifice or is actually a sacrifice, one's intention cannot remove that status. Therefore, it would be a violation of burning the meat of a *chatas* on the altar. Similary, when one burns the leavening and honey with a sacrifice, it assumes status of a sacrifice so that intent cannot consider it to be merely wood. But when one places *chullin* on the altar, since it doesn't belong there, the intent can consider it to be merely wood.

The Minchas Chinuch writes that the sacrificing of leavening and honey for the sake of firewood only works if it is explicit intent, but if it is done without any intent, it is a violation. It is not clear when one would burn *chullin* on the altar without any intent whether we would consider his intention to be for firewood, or whether we would require explicit intent for this. Tosfos seems to hold that this would also require specific intent.

DAILY MASHAL

Sefer HaChinuch suggests that the prohibition to bring leavening on the altar is to remind us of *zrizus* and doing things quickly. The prohibition against bringing honey on the altar is to teach us that a person shouldn't spend his life running after sweets; rather, a person should focus on foods that are healthy for his body and his needs to sustain himself.

L'zecher Nishmas HaRav Raphael Dov ben HaRav Yosef Yechezkel Marcus O"H