

Zevachim Daf 102



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Moshe as a Kohen

The Gemara asks on Rav (who maintains that Moshe was a Kohen) from the following Baraisa: Elisheva had five joys more than the other daughters of Israel (on the day of the Inauguration of the Mishkan): her brother-in-law, Moshe, was a king; her husband, Aaron, was a Kohen Gadol; her son, Elazar, was deputy Kohen Gadol; her grandson, Pinchas, was the Anointed Kohen for battle; and her brother, Nachshon, was the Nasi of his tribe; yet she was in mourning for her two sons (Nadav and Avihu). At any event, the Baraisa stated that Moshe was a king; implying that he was not a Kohan Gadol!?

The *Gemara* answers: It should be emended to read that he was also a king (*besides a Kohen Gadol*).

The Gemara notes that this is actually a matter of a Tannaic dispute, for it was taught in a Baraisa: (Moshe was asking of Hashem that he should not be the one to lead the Jewish people out of Egypt) And the anger of Hashem burned against Moshe. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karchah said: A mark (such as a blow or a curse) is recorded by every "burning anger" in the Torah, but no mark is recorded in this instance. Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai said: A mark is recorded in this instance too, for it is written: Is there not Aaron your brother the Levi? Now surely he was a Kohen!? Rather, this is what Hashem was saying: I had said that you would be a Kohen and he a Levi; now, however, he will be a Kohen and you will be a Levi. The Sages maintain: Moshe was invested with Kehunah only for the seven days of inauguration. Some say: Only Moshe's descendants were deprived of Kehunah (but he himself remained a Kohen his entire life), for it is said: But as for Moshe the man of God, his sons are named among the tribe

of Levi; and it says: Moshe and Aaron among His Kohanim, and Shmuel among them that call upon His Name. - Why [add] 'and it says'? — You might argue that [the first prooftext] is written for [future] generations, hence it says, however, 'Moshe and Aaron among His Kohanim'.

The *Gemara* asks: Now, is then a mark recorded of every "burning anger" in the Torah? Surely it is written: *And he went out from Pharaoh in burning anger*, and yet Moshe said nothing to him?

Rish Lakish answered: Moshe slapped him and went out.

The *Gemara* asks: But did Rish Lakish actually say this? Surely it is written: *And you shall stand opposite him (Pharaoh) by the river's bank*, and Rish Lakish said: Hashem said to Moshe: He is a king, and you must show him respect; while Rabbi Yochanan maintained: Hashem said to him: He is a wicked man, therefore you may act defiantly toward him!?

The *Gemara* answers: Reverse the opinions. (102a)1 – 102a2

Royalty

Rabbi Yannai said: Let the awe of royalty always be upon you, for it is written: And all these of your servants shall come down to me (and bow down), but he did not say it of Pharoah himself.

Rabbi Yochanan said: It may be inferred from the following: And the hand of Hashem was on Eliyahu; and he girded up his loins, and ran before Achav (as a sign of respect, for it is not dignified for a king to ride without an escort). (102a2)







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Ulla said: Moshe desired kingship, but Hashem did not grant it to him, for it is written: *Do not come closer* (*halom*); and "*halom*" can only mean kingship, as it is written: *Then David said, "Who am I, O Lord God … that You have brought me "halom"?*

Rava asked from a *Baraisa*: Rabbi Yishmael said: Elisheva's brother-in-law (*referring to Moshe*) was a king?

Rava answered: Moshe wanted kingship for himself and his descendants (and that was not given to him).

The *Gemara* asks: Does then "halom" wherever it is written refer to future generations? Surely it is written regarding Shaul: Has the man ever come here ("halom"), and yet only he was a king but not his offspring?

The Gemara answers: If you wish I can answer that there was Ishboshes (his son, who also was king). Alternatively, I can answer that Shaul was different, for his kingship did not remain even with him (due to his sins). This agrees with that Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Chanina: When greatness is decreed for a man, it is decreed for him and for his descendants for all generations, as it is stated: He does not withdraw His eyes from a righteous person but he is with kings on the throne etc.; but if he becomes haughty, the Holy One, Blessed be He, lowers him, as it is stated: And if they are bound in chains, caught in cords of poverty. (102a2 – 102a3)

Blemished

The *Mishnah* had stated: Those who have a blemish, whether a permanent blemish or a temporary one, receive a share and eat, but do not offer.

The Gemara cites a Baraisa which teaches us the source for these rulings: Every male (by a minchah offering); this includes people with a blemish. With respect to what? If it is in respect of eating, surely it is written elsewhere: He may

eat the bread of his God, from the Holy of Holies! Therefore it must mean in respect of receiving a share.

It was taught in another *Baraisa*: *Every male* (*by a chatas*); this includes people with a blemish. With respect to what? If it is in respect of eating, surely it is written elsewhere! If it is in respect of receiving a share, surely that as well is already stated!? Therefore it must mean in respect of a man blemished from birth. For I might have thought that only an unblemished person who developed a blemish receives a share; how do I know it of a man blemished from birth? Therefore, it says: *Every male*.

It was taught in another *Baraisa*: *Every male* (*by an asham*); this includes people with a blemish. With respect to what? If it is in respect of eating, surely it is written elsewhere! If it is in respect of receiving a share, surely that as well is already stated!? If it is in respect of a man blemished from birth, surely it is already stated!? Therefore, it must mean in respect of a man with a temporary blemish. For I might have thought that only a man with a permanent blemish receives a share; how do I know it of a man with a temporary blemish? Therefore, it says: *Every male*.

The Gemara asks: Isn't that illogical?

Rav Sheishes said: It should be reversed.

Rav Ashi said: It is logical even without reversing it, for I might have thought that a *Kohen* with a temporary blemish should be like a *Kohen* who is *tamei* - who may not eat so long as he is not *tahor*; so may this person not eat so long as he is not healed; therefore, the Torah informs us otherwise. (102a3 – 102b1)

The *Mishnah* had stated: Whoever is not eligible etc.

The Gemara asks: Is he not? surely a [Kohen] with a blemish is not eligible, yet he receives a share? Moreover [it implies that every] one who is eligible for service receives a share;





but, a Kohen who is tamei is eligible for the service in public sacrifices, and yet does not receive a share? — He means: who is fit to eat. - But, a minor is fit to eat, yet does not receive a share? — He does not teach this. Now that you have arrived at this, [you can say] after all, it is as we first said: if [your difficulty is] on account of Kohen who is tamei, he does not teach this; and if [your difficulty is] on account of a [Kohen] with a blemish: a [Kohen] with a blemish was included by the Merciful One. (102b1)

The *Mishnah* had stated: Even one who was *tamei* at the time of sprinkling the blood and was *tahor* at the time of the burning of the fats, does not receive a share in the meat.

The *Gemara* infers from here that if he would have been *tahor* when the blood was sprinkled but *tamei* when the fats were burned, he receives a share.

The *Gemara* notes that our *Mishnah* does not agree with Abba Shaul, for it was taught in a *Baraisa*: Abba Shaul said: One does not receive a share unless he was *tahor* from the time of the sprinkling of the blood until the time of the burning of the fats.

Rav Ashi inquired: What if he became tamei in between? Do we require him to be tahor at the sprinkling and at the burning, and this condition has been fulfilled, or perhaps, he must be tahor from the time of the sprinkling until the time of the burning of the fats? The Gemara leaves this question unresolved. (102b1 – 102b2)

Rava said: I have learned the following halachah from Rabbi Elazar the son of Rabbi Shimon, which he stated in a lavatory. If a Kohen, who was a tevul yom, came and demanded of a Kohen who was tahor: Give me a share of a Yisroel's minchah offering, that I may eat from it (tonight after I become tahor), the tahor Kohen can answer him: If, by your chatas, where your power is strong (for you can offer it whenever you please, and the meat and hide belongs to you), I can push you away from a Yisroel's chatas (and not allow you to receive a

share, for you are not eligible to perform the service); so by a minchah offering, where your power is weak (for the minchah of a Kohen is completely burned and not eaten at all), certainly I can push you away from receiving a share of a Yisroel's minchah offering!

The *tevul yom* can reply: You can push me away from a *Yisroel's chatas*, for although my power is strong, so is yours; however, can you push me away from a *minchah* offering, where just as my power is weak, so is yours!?

The *tahor Kohen* can respond: It is written: To the *Kohen* who offers it shall it belong; come, offer the *minchah*, and then you may eat from it.

He continues: If a Kohen, who was a tevul yom, came and demanded of a Kohen who was tahor: Give me a share of a Yisroel's chatas, that I may eat from it (tonight after I become tahor), the tahor Kohen can answer him: If by a minchah offering, where my power is weak (for the minchah of a Kohen is completely burned and not eaten at all), I can push you away from receiving a share of a Yisroel's minchah offering; so by my chatas, where my power is strong (forl can offer it whenever I please, and the meat and hide belongs to me), surely I can push you away from receiving a share of a Yisroel's chatas!

The *tevul yom* can reply: You can push me away from a *Yisroel's minchah* offering, for just as your power is weak, so is mine; however, can you push me away from a *Yisroel's chatas*, where just as your power is strong, so is mine!?

The *tahor Kohen* can respond: It is written: The *Kohen* who throws its blood shall eat it; come, throw the blood of the *chatas*, and then you may eat from it.

He continues: If a Kohen, who was a tevul yom, came and demanded of a Kohen who was tahor: Give me a share of the breast and the thigh of a Yisroel's shelamim, that I may eat from it (tonight after I become tahor), the tahor Kohen can





answer him: If, by your chatas, where your power is strong (for you can offer it whenever you please, and the meat and hide belongs to you), I can push you away from a Yisroel's chatas (and not allow you to receive a share, for you are not eligible to perform the service); so by a shelamim offering, where your power is weak, for you only receive the breast and the thigh, certainly I can push you away from receiving a share of them!

The *tevul yom* can reply: You can push me away from a *Yisroel's chatas*, for my power is weak in respect of my wives and slaves (*that I cannot give them from the meat*); however, can you push me away from the breast and thigh, where my power is strong in respect of my wives and my slaves?

The *tahor Kohen* can respond: It is written: To the *Kohen* who throws its blood shall it belong; come, throw the blood of the *shelamim*, and then you may eat from it.

Thus the *tevul yom* departs, with his arguments on his head; with an *onein* on his right and one who lacks atonement on his left.

Rav Achai asked that the *Baraisa* could have mentioned the same discussion regarding a *bechor*: If a *Kohen*, who was a *tevul yom*, came and demanded of a *Kohen* who was *tahor*: Give me the Kohanic gift of a bechor, that I may eat from it (*tonight after I become tahor*), the *tahor Kohen* can answer him: If I can push you away from a *Yisroel's chatas*, though my own privileges in a chatas are weak in respect to my wives and slaves, surely I can push you away from a bechor, where I enjoy great privileges, as it is altogether mine.

The *tevul yom* can reply: You can push me away from a *Yisroel's chatas*, where just as your privileges are weak so are my privileges weak, will you push me away from a bechor, where just as your privileges are great, so are mine great?

The tahor Kohen can respond: It is written: You shall throw their blood against the altar, and shall cause their fat to go

up in smoke . . . and the flesh shall be yours; come, throw the blood of the *bechor*, and then you may eat from it.

The *Gemara* answers that Rabbi Elazar the son of Rabbi Shimon would argue that the *tevul yom* can respond: Is it then written: And their flesh shall be to the Kohen who throws the blood? Surely it is written: And their flesh shall be yours; which means even to another Kohen.

The *Gemara* asks: Now, how could Rabbi Elazar the son of Rabbi Shimon do this? Surely Rabbah bar bar Chanah say in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that a person is allowed to think about Torah matters anywhere besides for a bathhouse and a lavatory?

The Gemara answers: It is different when it is done involuntarily (for he was unable to interrupt his thoughts). (102b2-102b4)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Do Chinese People think in Chinese?

Our *Gemara* cites Rav, who quotes a long *halachic* discussion said by Rabbi Elazar the son of Rabbi Shimon and Rav mentions that he said it in the *beis hakisei* (lavatory). The lavatory is a place where it is forbidden to learn Torah. The *Gemara* wonders how he was allowed to learn in such a place and answers "He was forced to." Rashi comments (s.v. *Leonso*): "His learning was constantly fluent on his lips and he would think of it unwillingly."

There's no difference between thinking and speaking words of Torah: He who learns this *Gemara* tries to understand: Assuming that Rabbi Elazar the son of Rabbi Shimon was so involved in matters of Torah that he **thought** of them perforce, why did he have to **speak** words of Torah? He should





have only thought them. The Perishah (O.C. 85, cited by Pri Megadim, ibid) proves from our Gemara that there is no difference between the severity of the prohibition to think words of Torah in unclean places and the severity to speak

There's a difference between thinking words of Torah and **speaking them:** Still, this *chidush* is strongly rejected by the Chidah in his Birkei Yosef and by other Acharonim as it is a clear halachah that in the "middle room" - the room before the bathhouse – it is forbidden to speak words of Torah but allowed to think them! It is evident that the criteria of the two prohibitions are not identical (and so is it evident from other halachos, such as birkas haTorah, that we cannot compare thought to speech). Therefore, the question returns: How did Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon speak Torah in the restroom if he could have only thought?

them, and as he was thinking words of Torah perforce, he was

permitted to speak them.

The author of Tzon Kodoshim explains that Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon did not speak words of Torah in a place where It is forbidden but merely thought there and later spoke them in the beis midrash (Mishnahh Berurah, 85, S.K. 8, and see Sefas Emes on our sugya).

We have thus descended from the severe level of speech to the more lenient level of thought. Still, this "perforce", that the Gemara explains for Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon's behavior, demands understanding. How could he think? After all, it is also forbidden to think words of Torah in an unclean blace!

DAILY MASHAL

What is thought? Indeed, to understand the issue, HaGaon Rav Efrayim Burdianski zt"l examines the essential nature of thought. What is thought? In what language does a person think? It seems that a Russian thinks in Russian and someone from China would think in Chinese. Certainly one can think in such a way. However, when we think about our thoughts, we

discover that many of them are like a dream in which we imagine an event without wording it. Thus, when a person thinks about a house or another object, he contemplates all sides of it but doesn't necessarily "talk to himself" about it.

Two types of thought: in words and by contemplation: We thus have two types of thought: thought in words and thought by means of wordless contemplation. It could be that the prohibition to think in an unclean place only applies to thought that resembles speech - i.e., thought in words but there is no Torah prohibition to think matters of Torah without words and *Chazal* instituted this prohibition because of the honor of the Torah. Therefore, it could be that Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon did not think in words but in concepts, which is only forbidden midrabanan. This is what the Gemara means "by perforce is different": Chazal did not forbid a person so deeply involved that he cannot distract himself from Torah thoughts, their decree was not applied to such a holy person (Mishkenos Efrayim, §18, and see Mishnahh Berurah, ibid, and Chazon Ish, O.C. §14, S.K. 18; concerning if thought in unclean places is forbidden midoraysa, see Nishmas Adam, kelal 3, os 2, that the Rishonim disagreed and see Pri Megadim in the general preface, end of cheilek 5).

