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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Komeitz and Levonah

The sharp ones from Pumbedisa said that offering the *komeitz* of a *minchah*, with the intent to offer the *levonah* spice tomorrow, makes the *minchah* invalid as *piggul*. Even the Sages, who say that one cannot cause *piggul* by offering half of its *mattir* – item that makes it permitted, agree that this case is *piggul*, since the whole *mattir* – both *levonah* and *komeitz* – is involved, whether in being offered, or being part of the improper plan.

Rava suggested that the earlier *Mishnah* proves this statement. The *Mishnah* says that performing the service on a *minchah* with plans to eat or offer part of the *minchah* in the wrong place makes it invalid, while performing it with plans to eat or offer part of the *minchah* at the wrong time, makes it *piggul* (incurring kares for anyone who eats it). The *Mishnah* lists all four services: taking the *komeitz*, putting it in the vessel, bringing it to the altar, and offering it there. Rava says that the *Mishnah* implies that a plan to offer part of the *minchah* improperly while doing any of the services makes it *piggul*, including offering the *minchah*. This proves that offering the *komeitz*, while planning to offer the *levonah* tomorrow, makes the *minchah* invalid.

The *Gemara* deflects this proof, since the *Mishnah* may simply mean that planning to offer part of the *minchah* improperly causes *piggul* when done while performing the first three services, but the service of offering the *minchah*

only causes *piggul* when one planned to eat the *minchah* at the wrong time.

Rav Menashia bar Gada was sitting in front of Abaye, and quoted Rav Chisda saying that offering the *komeitz* while planning to offer the *levonah* tomorrow does not make the *minchah piggul*, even according to Rabbi Meir, who says that half a *mattir* offered improperly can make a sacrifice *piggul*. Even Rabbi Meir requires that the item being offered can make the sacrifice *piggul* if the plan related to the part of the sacrifice that is becomes permitted, but not when it relates to something that itself makes the sacrifice permitted. When Abaye asked whether Rav Chisda said this in the name of Rav, Rav Menashia said he did, and the *Gemara* supports this from an explicit statement of Rav Chisda in the name of Rav.

Rav Yaakov bar Iddi quoted Abaye saying that the *Mishnah* proves this statement. The *Mishnah* says that if one slaughtered one of the two lambs of *Shavuot*, planning to eat from it tomorrow, it is *piggul*, but the second one is valid. If one slaughtered one lamb, planning to eat from the other one tomorrow, they are both valid. The reason that both are valid is that each lamb does not permit the other one, and the *Mishnah* therefore proves that *piggul* only occurs when an action is done with a plan relating to the part of the sacrifice which becomes permitted.

The *Gemara* deflects this proof, since that may be true only in the case of the lambs, which are totally separate



entities, but not in the case of *komeitz* and *levonah*, which are initially placed in the same vessel, and therefore may be considered one entity.

Rav Hamnuna said that Rabbi Chanina taught him something which was as valuable to him as all of his other learning. Rabbi Chanina said that if one offered the *komeitz*, planning to either offer the *levonah* the next day, to eat the remainder the next day, the *minchah* is *piggul*.

The *Gemara* asks why he phrased his statement this way. If he says that offering the *komeitz* while planning the offer the *levonah* tomorrow makes *piggul*, he should have just mentioned the first part of the plan, and if he says that offering part of the *mattir* makes *piggul*, he should have just mentioned the second part of the plan. If he holds both cases would be *piggul*, he should have enumerated each plan separately, since each individually would make it *piggul*.

Rav Adda bar Ahavah explains that he does not consider either plan to be sufficient to make it *piggul*. Therefore, he only discussed the case of planning both, since then the whole *minchah* is involved, and only then is it *piggul*.

Someone taught a *Baraisa* in front of Rav Yitzchak bar Adda, saying that if one offered the *komeitz*, planning to eat the remainder tomorrow, all agree that it is *piggul*.

Rav Yitzchak challenged this, since this case is a matter of dispute, with the Sages saying it is not *piggul*, since only part of the *mattir* was offered.

Rather, Rav Yitzchak corrected him to say that all agree that it is *passul* – invalid.

The *Gemara* explains that Rav Yitzchak did not correct him to say that *according to Rabbi Meir*, it is *piggul*, since one

can confuse *piggul* with *pasul*, but one would not confuse *all agree* with *according to Rabbi Meir*. (16b6– 17a3)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, HAKOMEITZ ES HAMINCHAH


Eating or Offering

The *Mishnah* says that if one takes the *komeitz* planning to improperly eat something that is offered, or offer something that is eaten, the *minchah* is valid, while Rabbi Eliezer says it is invalid. Even planning to improperly eat something eaten or offer something that is offered only makes the sacrifice invalid if the plan was for the minimum size of a *k'zayis* – olive size. Planning to eat half a *zayis* of something eaten, and offer half a *zayis* of something offered does not combine to make it invalid. (17a4)

Rabbi Eliezer's Position

Rav Assi quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who explains the source for Rabbi Eliezer's position. The verse discussing *piggul* says *im hai'achol yai'achail* – if it will be eaten, repeating the phrase for eating. This teaches that there are two types of “eating” plans that make a sacrifice *piggul* – eating of a person, and eating of the altar, i.e., offering. Rabbi Eliezer says that since the verse uses the same verb for both, we learn that they are equivalent, and it becomes *piggul* even if one planned to eat what is offered, or to offer what is eaten. The Sages disagree, and say that all the verse is teaching by the use of the same verb is one of the following:

1. Even if one planned for the altar to “eat” the part to be offered, without using the term “offer”, it is *piggul*.
2. In order to make *piggul*, the size of the amount that one must plan to offer is a *k'zayis*, just like the size of eating.



Rabbi Eliezer says that if the verse were only teaching these items, it should have used the same form of the verb. Since the verse changed the form, it is also teaching that planning to eat or offer *any* part of the sacrifice makes it invalid.

Rabbi Zeira challenged Rav Assi's explanation. If Rabbi Eliezer's position is based on this verse, he should say that one who plans to eat something offered or offer something eaten should make the sacrifice *piggul*, but Rav Assi quoted Rabbi Yochanan saying that Rabbi Eliezer only considers such a sacrifice invalid, but not *piggul*.

Rav Assi answered that it is a dispute of *Tannaim* whether Rabbi Eliezer considers it *piggul* from the Torah, or only Rabbinically invalid.

To support this, Rav Assi cites a *Baraisa*, which says that if one slaughters a sacrifice planning to drink its blood tomorrow, offer its meat tomorrow, or eat its sacrificial fats tomorrow, the Sages say it is valid, and Rabbi Eliezer says it is invalid. If he planned to leave the blood until tomorrow, Rabbi Yehudah says it is invalid, but Rabbi Elazar says that even in this case, the Sages say it is valid, while Rabbi Eliezer says it is invalid. Rav Assi asks which opinion Rabbi Yehudah is following. The Sages, who say that it is valid even if one would plan to eat the blood tomorrow, even though the verse refers to "eating," would surely say it is valid if he just planned on leaving the blood. Rather, Rabbi Yehudah is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. If so, how is Rabbi Elazar's position different? Rav Assi therefore argues that they differ on the position of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehudah says that Rabbi Eliezer says that the sacrifice is invalid if he planned to only leave the blood overnight, implying that he would say it is *piggul* if he planned to eat the blood. However, Rabbi Elazar says that in all the cases of the *Baraisa*, Rabbi Eliezer considers the sacrifice only invalid, but not *piggul*.

The *Gemara* deflects this proof, saying that all agree that Rabbi Eliezer only considers it invalid. The *Baraisa* therefore is enumerating three positions:

1. The first opinion says that the dispute is only in the three cases listed, but Rabbi Eliezer agrees to the Sages that if one planned to only leave the blood overnight that it is valid.
2. Rabbi Yehudah says that the Sages agree to Rabbi Eliezer that if one planned to leave some blood overnight that the sacrifice is *invalid*. Since the sacrifice would be invalid if all the blood were left overnight, Rabbi Yehudah says that the Sages decreed that it is invalid even if he planned to leave some of the blood overnight.
3. Rabbi Elazar says that the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer dispute the case of planning to leave blood overnight, just as they dispute the other cases in the *Baraisa*. (17a4 – 18a1)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Eaten by Fire

The *Gemara* says that the verse which repeats the verb "eat" teaches that a sacrifice is invalid even if someone's plan is in the form of the altar "eating" the parts that are offered.

Tosfos (17b Lo shna) notes that the *Gemara* (Zevachim 31a) says that if one plans to burn eaten parts of the sacrifice tomorrow, the sacrifice is invalid, since the verse uses the verb "eat" in relation to fire. Once we learn that a fire consuming is considered eating, why would we need this verse to teach that phrasing the plan in terms of the altar "eating" makes it invalid?

Tosfos offers the following answers:



1. The source in Zevachim only applies if the person referred to “fire” in the plan. The *Gemara* here is including one who simply planned for the *altar* to eat the parts to be offered.
2. The source in Zevachim only applies to a plan to burn the parts of the sacrifice that are eaten, and is simply teaching that consuming by fire is a form of eating. From that source alone, we would have considered one who planned for the altar to eat the parts to be offered to be equivalent to one who planned to *eat* these parts, which would not make the sacrifice invalid (according to the Sages). The *Gemara* here is including even this case, and teaching that all agree that the sacrifice is invalid.

in *Sefer HaShoroshim* (entry for *zevach*). It is interesting that the Zohar asks this question (*Vayakhel*, 219) and answers that it is so called because of the smoke of the incense which rises and defeats (“slaughters”) the accusers.

Vernacular in the Torah

The *Gemara* says that Rabbi Eliezer learns two things from the repetitive use of the word “eat,” since the verse uses two different forms of the verb. Tosfos (17b ma’i) notes that the *Gemara*’s assumption is that Rabbi Eliezer learns something extra simply from repetition. This implies that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold that the Torah writes in vernacular, and we therefore must learn something from repetitions that would be normal human expression. Tosfos discusses at length the differing positions on this point, and cases where the positions seem to be inconsistent in different areas of discussion in the *Gemara*.

DAILY MASHAL

The Inner “Altar”?

Why is the inner altar called a *mizbeiach*, from the root *zevach*, a slaughtered offering? After all, nothing is sacrificed thereon. The author of *Toras Zeev* (p. 36) writes that this is because of the sprinkling of the blood of the inner *chataos* sprinkled on it. The Radak explains likewise