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Menachos Daf 19

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Understanding Rabbi Shimon

The *Gemora* asks: What is Rabbi Shimon’s source (*who holds that a non-Kohen may not pour in the oil*)?

It is written: the sons of Aaron, the *Kohanim*. Scriptural verses add onto the previous topic (*of pouring*) and the one following it (the taking of the *komeitz*). [*Accordingly, the pouring must be done by a Kohen.*]

The *Gemora* asks: Does Rabbi Shimon indeed hold that a verse can add onto the previous topic and the one following it? But it was taught in a *braisa*: The verse says that the *Kohen* will “take from the *chatas* blood with his finger, and put it on the corners of the Altar.” The *braisa* says that the use of word “finger” adjacent to “take” (*i.e., receiving the blood*) and “put” (*i.e., applying the blood*) teaches that both must be done with the right hand. Rabbi Shimon says that the word “hand” is not used in describing the application, while the word “finger” only applies to the “put” phrase, so it is valid if the *Kohen* received the blood with his left hand. ‘*Rashi* explains that Rabbi Shimon means that the verse does not say, *And he will take with his finger etc. Being that it only says finger later, it only means that the placing of the blood must be done with one’s right hand, not the acceptance of the blood. This indicates Rabbi Shimon does not hold that we derive words in a verse as if they are all connected.*] Abaye indeed says that the argument in this *braisa* is regarding whether or not a verse can add onto the previous topic and the one following it!?

Rather, the *Gemora* answers: Rabbi Shimon’s position is based on the letter “*vav*” in the word *v’hevi’ah* (*and he will bring it*), which connects this act with the word *Kohen* mentioned previously (*indicating that it must be done by a Kohen*).

The *Gemora* asks: Does Rabbi Shimon indeed hold that a “*vav*” connects previous words to this word? The verse states: *And he will slaughter the cattle, and the sons of Aaron, the Kohanim, will bring the blood close, and they will sprinkle the blood.* This teaches us that from accepting the blood and onward, everything must be done by a *Kohen*. This means that slaughtering can be done by a non-*Kohen*. If Rabbi Shimon holds that a “*vav*” connects previous words to this word, one should say slaughtering should also be invalid if done by a non-*Kohen*!?

The *Gemora* answers: This case is different, as the verse states, *and he will lean...and he will slaughter.* This teaches us to compare leaning to slaughtering. Just as leaning can be done by a non-*Kohen*, so too slaughtering can be done by a non-*Kohen*.

The *Gemora* asks: If so, we should derive that just as leaning is done by the owner of the sacrifice, so too slaughtering should be done by the owner of the sacrifice!?

The *Gemora* answers: One cannot say this based on a *kal vachomer*. If the sprinkling of the blood, the primary atonement of the sacrifice, is not done by the owner, we certainly cannot require the owner to slaughter the animal! If you will say that we cannot derive what is possible



(slaughtering) from what is not possible (as a non-Kohen cannot sprinkle the blood), the Torah states regarding Yom Kippur, and he will slaughter the chatas bull which is his. This indicates that normally one does not slaughter his sacrifice. (18b – 19a)

Torah and Chukah and what is Essential for a Minchah?

Rav says: Whenever the Torah states the words, *torah* (law) and *chukah* (decree), it shows that the law being discussed is essential (or one does not fulfill that mitzvah).

The *Gemora* asks: One might think that both words must be mentioned, as in the verse, *this is the chukah of the torah*. However, regarding a *nazir*, the verse only states *torah*, and Rav states that waving must be done to the sacrifice of a *nazir*.

The *Gemora* answers: Regarding *nazir*, the verse also states, *so it should be done*, which is similar to it also saying *chukah*.

The *Gemora* asks: Regarding *todah* the verse only states *torah*, and the *Mishna* states that the four types of breads are absolutely necessary, or none of them are valid.

The *Gemora* answers: *Todah* is different, as it is compared to *nazir*. This is as the verse states: *On the sacrifice of the todah of his shelamim*. A master had stated: *His shelamim* includes the *shelamim* of a *nazir*.

The *Gemora* asks: Regarding a *metzora* the verse only states *torah*, and the *Mishna* states that the four items used in the sacrifice of a *metzora* are absolutely necessary, or none of them are valid.

The *Gemora* answers: Being that the verse says, *This should be the torah of a metzora*, it is as if it says *chukah* as well.

The *Gemora* asks: Regarding *Yom Kippur* the verse only states *chukah*, and the *Mishna* states that the two goats of *Yom Kippur* are absolutely necessary, or none of them are valid.

The *Gemora* concludes: Indeed, either *chukah* or *torah* indicate that all components of the law being discussed are absolutely necessary.

The *Gemora* asks: Regarding other sacrifices, the *Torah* states *torah*, and yet these laws are not absolutely necessary!?

The *Gemora* answers: *Torah* requires *chukah*, but *chukah* does not require *torah*.

The *Gemora* asks: Didn't Rav state both *chukah* and *torah* (indicating they are the same)?

The *Gemora* answers: Rav meant that even though it says *torah*, if *chukah* is stated, it means the law is absolutely necessary.

The *Gemora* asks: Doesn't the verse say *chukah* by a *minchah*, and yet Rav says that wherever the *Torah* stated a law a second time regarding *minchah*, this shows it is absolutely necessary. This indicates that *chukah* is not relevant!?

The *Gemora* answers: This is because *chukah* was only stated regarding the eating of the *minchah*, not the process of offering a *minchah* (regarding which laws must be stated twice to show they are absolutely necessary).

The *Gemora* asks: Doesn't the word *chukah* only appear regarding the eating of the *lechem hapanim* (showbreads), and yet the *Mishna* says that the two arrangements of bread and the two spoons of *levonah* (frankincense) are essential to each other. Evidently, whenever the *torah* says *chukah* regarding the eating of a sacrifice, it refers to all the laws of



that sacrifice. [This should apply by all the services of the minchah as well!?!]

The Gemora answers: A minchah is different, as the verse states, from its finely ground flour and from its oil, indicating that only these things are absolutely necessary. [That which a minchah needs a full measure of flour and oil is derived from the extra words “finely ground” and “its,” not from “chukah.”]

The Gemora discusses a previous statement: Rav says: Wherever the Torah stated a law a second time regarding minchah, this shows it is absolutely necessary. Shmuel states: The verse states, from its finely ground flour and from its oil, indicating that only these things are absolutely necessary.

The Gemora asks: According to Shmuel, whenever the Torah stated a law a second time, is it indeed not necessary?!

The Gemora answers: Certainly Shmuel holds that these laws are necessary. Rather, their argument is regarding the verses his full komeitz and his komeitz. The braisa states: His full komeitz and his komeitz teach that one should not make a measured vessel for the amount of the kemitzah (as one must do kemitzah with his hand, and not with a vessel). Rav says: This is said by the verse twice, as the verse also states: And he brought the minchah near and he filled his palm from it. Shmuel understands that this verse is not relevant to our discussion, as it was stated regarding the Tabernacle inauguration, which only happened during the time of Moshe. We therefore cannot derive laws that are for generations from a special (one time) incident.

The Gemora asks: Does Shmuel indeed hold that one does not derive laws from a temporary incident? But it was taught in a Mishna: The vessels designated for liquids sanctify liquids, and the measures designated for solids sanctify solids. Vessels for liquids do not sanctify solids, nor do the measures for solids sanctify liquids. Shmuel said: This (that vessels designated for liquids do not sanctify solids) was only

learned regarding measures, but basins (for liquids) can sanctify (even solids), as it is written: both of them (bowl and basin) filled with fine flour. [This indicates that Shmuel does derive from a temporary incident, as this verse was stated by the sacrifices of the Nesi'im that were only brought at the inauguration of the Temple.]

The Gemora answers: Shmuel derives from this verse because it is stated twelve times (indicating that it is also relevant for future generations).

Rav Kahana and Rav Assi asked Rav: The verse states twice that the minchah must be brought close to the altar, yet if this step is not done, the minchah is still valid?!

The Gemora answers: Which verse was said a second time regarding bringing it close? The verse states: This is the torah of the minchah, the sons of Aaron should bring it close before Hashem. This verse merely teaches where the minchah is supposed to be brought (and is not meant to say bringing must be done or the minchah is invalid).

This is as the braisa states: [The verse says, “And this is the law of the flour offering, the sons of Aharon should bring it before Hashem to the face of the altar.”] Before Hashem implies to the west, but the verse states “to the face of the altar.” One might therefore think that it should be to the south, but the verse states, “Before Hashem.” How can these verses be reconciled? He brings it to the southwestern corner – to the tip of the corner of the altar, and it is sufficient.

Rabbi Elozar states: One would think that it should be brought to the west or south of the corner of the altar. We therefore apply the rule that whenever there are two verses, one can be explained as fulfilling itself and a second verse, but the other can only be explained by negating the explanation of a second verse, we use the former way of explanation. If we would remain with the literal, “Before Hashem” in the west, this would negate the verse, “to the face of the altar” in the south. However, “to the face of the



altar” in the south does not necessarily negate, “*Before Hashem*” in the west. What does one do? He brings it to the southern corner of the altar.

The *Gemora* asks: How is this considered upholding the other verse?

Rav Ashi answers: Rabbi Elozar understands that the entire altar was in the northern part of the Courtyard (and therefore, even when the *Kohen* is by the south of the altar, he is still “before Hashem”). (19a – 19b)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Shechitah of a Kohen is Invalid!?

The Zohar in Parshas Naso writes that it is forbidden for a *Kohen* to perform a *shechitah* on a sacrifice.

This is truly perplexing, as our *Gemora* derives from Scriptural sources that a non-*Kohen* is ALSO valid to slaughter; but certainly, a *Kohen* is valid as well!?

The *sefer Yisa Brachah* explains as follows: Our *Gemora* asks that according to R’ Shimon, who holds that the “*vav*” in the beginning of a word adds to the previous topic, it should emerge that a non-*Kohen* will be disqualified from performing a *shechitah*. The *Gemora* answers that that there is a *hekeish* from *semichah* to *shechitah*; just as *semichah* can be performed by a non-*Kohen*, so too *shechitah*.

The question can be asked: Don’t write the “*vav*,” and don’t have the *hekeish*, and automatically, a non-*Kohen* would be valid for *shechitah*!? [The *Gemora* asks such a type of a question in *Pesachim 5a*.]

The answer must be that without these derivations, we would have thought that the *shechitah* must be performed by a non-*Kohen*, and not by a *Kohen*, for *Kehunah* is written

from the accepting of the blood and onward. Now that the “*vav*” added to the previous topic, we would think that it must be done by a *Kohen* only; the *hekeish* teaches us that even a non-*Kohen* is valid.

It emerges that a *Tanna*, who does not subscribe to the view that a “*vav*” adds to the previous topic might hold that a *Kohen* cannot perform the *shechitah* at all. Tosfos writes that R’ Eliezer, the son of R’ Shimon holds like that. Accordingly, we can answer that the particular Zohar in question was authored by R’ Eliezer, the son of R’ Shimon (as evident from the beginning of that passage), and R’ Eliezer therefore maintains that a *Kohen* cannot perform the *shechitah*.