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Mishna

If the *komeitz* became *tamei* and they offered it up (anyway), the *tzitz* provides acceptance. If, however, the *komeitz* left the Courtyard, and they offered it up (anyway), the *tzitz* does not provide acceptance, for the *tzitz* provides acceptance for *tumah*, but not for a disqualification due to leaving the Courtyard. (25a)

The Tzitz Provides Acceptance

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: Regarding the *tzitz* it is said: *it shall be on Aaron's forehead, so that Aaron shall bear a sin of the sacred offerings*. This teaches that if the service of an offering is done in a prohibited fashion, the *tzitz* will atone for the sin and the sacrifice is then acceptable. What sin are we referring to? It cannot be referring to the sin of *piggul* (*where the one performing the blood service of a sacrifice intended that the sacrifice be consumed outside its prescribed location; this means that he intended to either apply the blood or burn a part of a sacrifice outside the Courtyard, or to eat the gift portion outside the permitted area*), for regarding a sacrifice that has the deficiency of *piggul* it is said: *it shall not be accepted*, and this teaches that the sacrifice is invalid. The *tzitz* also does not atone for *nossar* (*a sacrifice where the Kohen intended while performing the blood service that it be consumed beyond the allotted time*), for regarding *nossar* it is said: *it shall not be considered*, which teaches us that this sacrifice is invalid. The sin referred to here is the sin of *tumah*, which has an exception that it is permitted if the community is *tamei*.

Rabbi Zeira asks: Perhaps we are referring to the sin of “leaving” (*when a sacrifice leaves the Courtyard*), for it has an exception by a *bamah* (*where there are no partitions at all*)?

Abaye answers: It is written: *to bring them favor before Hashem*. The *tzitz* provides acceptance for a sin which is before Hashem, but not for the sin of leaving (*which is not before Hashem*).

Rabbi Il’a asks: Perhaps we are referring to the sin of performing the service with the left hand, for it has an exception on *Yom Kippur* (*when the Kohen Gadol carries the bowl of incense in his left hand*)?

Abaye answers: *Sin* is written by it. The *tzitz* provides acceptance for a sin which was set aside; this excludes the case of *Yom Kippur*, for there the Torah prescribes it to be performed with the left hand.

Rav Ashi answers: We are referring to a sin of the sacred offerings, not a sin of those who perform the service for the sacred offerings.

Rav Sima the son of Rav Iddi said to Rav Ashi, and others said that Rav Sima the son of Rav Ashi said to Rav Ashi: Perhaps we are referring to the sin of blemishes, for they have an exception with regard to birds, for the master has stated: There is no requirement of flawlessness and masculinity regarding bird offerings!?



He replied to him: Regarding your case (*of blemishes*) it is written: *There will be no acceptance (so the tzitz cannot possible provide acceptance for it).*

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa* which states that if the blood of a sacrifice became *tamei* and was applied accidentally, the sacrifice is valid, but if it was intentional, the sacrifice is invalid. If the sacrifice was a communal one, it is valid in both cases. Finally, if the sacrifice was from an idolater, it is invalid whether accidentally or intentionally, whether through a mishap or willingly.

The *Gemora* asks that this contradicts the following *braisa*: On what does the *tzitz* provide acceptance? It is for blood, meat or fats that became *tamei*; whether accidentally or intentionally, whether through a mishap or willingly.

Rav Yosef answers: This is not a question, for the latter *braisa* is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, and the former follows the viewpoint of the Sages, for it was taught in a *Mishna*: One may not separate *terumah* from produce which is *tamei* for produce which is *tahor* (*since it is not edible, the Kohen will be losing out*). If he did so accidentally, the *terumah* is valid. If he did so intentionally, (*the Sages instituted*) it has no validity. Rabbi Yosi said: Whether he did so accidentally or intentionally, the *terumah* is valid.

The *Gemora* asks: We have only heard that Rabbi Yosi does not penalize someone who does something intentionally; have we heard that he holds that the *tzitz* can provide acceptance with regard to the parts of the sacrifice that are eaten? But it was taught not like that in the following *braisa*: Rabbi Eliezer said: The *tzitz* provides acceptance with regard to the parts of the sacrifice that are eaten. Rabbi Yosi said: The *tzitz* does not provide acceptance with regard to the parts of the sacrifice that are eaten.

The *Gemora* answers: Switch the opinions around: Rabbi Eliezer said: The *tzitz* does not provide acceptance with regard to the parts of the sacrifice that are eaten. Rabbi Yosi

said: The *tzitz* provides acceptance with regard to the parts of the sacrifice that are eaten.

Rav Sheishes asked: Can the opinions be reversed? But it was taught in a *braisa*: I might have thought that if a *tamei* person ate from the meat of a sacrifice which had become *tamei* before the sprinkling of the blood would be liable to *kares* because of it; it is therefore written: *Every one that is tahor shall eat the meat*, and then it says: *but the person that eats from the meat of the shelamim offering that is Hashem's, having his tumah upon him, that person shall be cut off from his people*. This indicates that meat which is permitted to those that are *tahor*, one is liable for it on account of *tumah*, but meat that has not been rendered permitted to those that are *tahor*, one is not liable on account of *tumah*. The *braisa* questions this: But perhaps it is not so, and rather, it indicates that an offering which may be eaten by those that are *tahor*, one is liable for it on account of *tumah*, but an offering which may not be eaten by those that are *tahor*, one is not liable for it on account of *tumah*, and so I would exclude those parts of the offering which had been left overnight and those which had been taken out of the Courtyard, since they may not be eaten by those that are *tahor*. The verse therefore writes: That is Hashem's, an inclusive expression (*to include these cases, for although they presently are not permitted for consumption, they were rendered permitted by the sprinkling of the blood*). Perhaps I might then include meat from an offering that was rendered *piggul*, that it shall be like that which was left over; the verse therefore states: *from the meat of the shelamim offering*, an exclusive expression. And why do you prefer to include these (*when the meat was left overnight or it left the Courtyard*) and exclude the other (*piggul*)? Since the verse includes and excludes, I include those which were valid at one time, but I exclude those which were never valid. And if you will ask: Why will a *tamei* person be liable for *tumah* when he eats meat after the sprinkling of the blood that became *tamei* before the sprinkling of the blood? [*Why? It was never valid!?*] It is because the *tzitz* provides acceptance for it.

Now it emerges that meat which became *tamei* (before the blood was sprinkled – one who is *tamei* will be liable to *kares* for eating of it after the blood was sprinkled) – yes, but a *tamei* person will not be liable to *kares* for eating meat (after the blood was sprinkled) which was taken out (before the sprinkling of the blood). Now, whom have you heard to say that that the throwing of the blood accomplishes nothing for parts that are outside of the Courtyard? It is Rabbi Eliezer, and yet the *braisa* states that the *tzitz* provides acceptance for meat that is eaten!?

Rav Chisda answers the original contradiction: There is no difficulty at all, for one *braisa* represents the view of Rabbi Eliezer, and the other is in accordance with the view of the Sages.

The *Gemora* asks: But perhaps Rabbi Eliezer only said that the *tzitz* provides acceptance for meat that is eaten; have you heard that he says that does not penalize someone who does something intentionally?

The *Gemora* answers: Indeed we have, for just as we heard that Rabbi Yosi holds that opinion, so we heard that it is Rabbi Eliezer's as well, for it was taught in a *braisa*: Rabbi Eliezer said: Whether he did so accidentally or intentionally, the *terumah* is valid.

The *Gemora* asks: But perhaps Rabbi Eliezer said this only in the case of *terumah* which is lenient; have you heard that he says this in the case of *kodashim* which are more stringent?

The *Gemora* answers: Then to whom will you attribute that *braisa* (that the *tzitz* is effective even where it was done intentionally; it must be that Rabbi Eliezer does not make a distinction between *terumah* and *kodashim*).

Ravina answers the contradiction in the following way: Regarding *tumah*, the *tzitz* provides acceptance whether it happened accidentally or intentionally; however regarding the sprinkling of the blood, if it was performed accidentally,

the *tzitz* provides acceptance, but if it was done intentionally, it does not.

Rav Shila answers the contradiction in the following way: Regarding the sprinkling of the blood, the *tzitz* provides acceptance whether it happened accidentally or intentionally; however regarding *tumah*, the *tzitz* provides acceptance if it was performed accidentally, but not if it was done intentionally. (25a – 25b)

DAILY MASHAL

The Tzitz Atones

The *Gemora* states that the *tzitz* would atone for the sins regarding offerings in the Bais HaMikdash. What was the significance of the *tzitz* that it atoned for these sins?

The *tzitz* was placed on the forehead of the *Kohen Gadol*, and the head is the source of the intellect. We find that a *korban olah* was brought for the sin of arrogance, where one conjures up thoughts of grandeur and selfishness. One who offered a sacrifice demonstrated humility of spirit, and if there was a deficiency in the sacrifice, this was reflected in his lack of sincerity or in his desire to gain atonement. The *Kohen Gadol*, who represented the Jewish Nation, would don the Holy Vestments, and these vestments contained the power to compensate for the lack of desire and intent in the person offering the sacrifice. Thus, the *tzitz*, worn on the forehead of the *Kohen Gadol*, would compensate for the lack of sincerity and intent on the part of the one offering a sacrifice that was brought for arrogance or selfishness.