

18 Mar-Cheshvan 5779
Oct. 28, 2018



Menachos Daf 79

Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler, Kollel Boker Beachwood

Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

Moshe Raphael ben Yehoshua (Morris Stadtmauer) o”h

Tzvi Gershon ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o”h

May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Sanctifying the Bread

The *Gemora* asks: In accordance with whose view is the ruling in our *Mishna*?

The *Gemora* answers: It is in accordance with the view of Rabbi Meir, for it was taught in a *braisa*: This is the general rule (*concerning a todah offering that became disqualified*): If the disqualification preceded the slaughtering, the bread is not sanctified; if it occurred after the slaughtering, the bread is sanctified. Therefore, if one slaughtered it with intention of eating from it beyond its proper time or outside of its proper place, the bread is sanctified; if he slaughtered it and it was found to be a *tereifah*, the bread is not sanctified. If he slaughtered it and it was discovered to be blemished, Rabbi Eliezer says: The bread is sanctified; but Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not sanctified; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua do not dispute the ruling that if it was found to be a *tereifah*, the bread is not sanctified; they also agree if it was slaughtered with intention of eating from it beyond its proper time, the bread is sanctified; they agree that if it was slaughtered and it was discovered to be blemished, the bread is not sanctified. They disagree only where it was slaughtered with an intention of eating it outside of its proper place; in this case Rabbi Eliezer says: The bread is sanctified, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not sanctified. Rabbi Eliezer argued as follows: Since the intention of eating it beyond its proper time invalidates it, and the intention of eating from it outside of its proper place also invalidates it: just as in the former case the bread is nevertheless sanctified, so too in the latter case, the bread is sanctified. Rabbi Yehoshua explained his view as follows: Since the intention of eating from it outside of its proper place invalidates it, and a blemish discovered in the animal also invalidates it: just as in the latter case the bread is

not sanctified, so too in the former case, the bread is not sanctified. Rabbi Eliezer replied: I compared it to the case where there was an intention to eat from it beyond its proper time, but you likened it to the case of a blemish discovered in the animal. Let us then see to which of the two it resembles more. If it is more similar to the case where there was an intention of eating it beyond its proper time, then we must derive it from there; and if it is more similar to the case where a blemish was discovered in the animal, then we must derive it from there. So Rabbi Eliezer began to argue as follows: It is reasonable to derive that which is invalidated through intention from that which is invalidated through intention, but we should not derive that which is invalidated through intention from that which is invalidated on account of a physical disqualification. Rabbi Yehoshua countered as follows: It is reasonable to derive an invalidation that does not involve the penalty of *kares* from an invalidation which also does not involve the penalty of *kares*, but we should not prove it from the invalidation where one had intention of eating it beyond its proper time, for that is an invalidation which involves the penalty of *kares*. Furthermore, we should derive it from the invalidation where one slaughters the offering not for its own sake, for this is an invalidation through intention and also does not involve the penalty of *kares*. Upon hearing this, Rabbi Eliezer was silent.

The *Gemora* asks: Why is it, according to Rabbi Meir’s opinion that where the *todah* offering was slaughtered and was found to be *tereifah*, the bread is not sanctified, for the invalidation is regarded as occurring before the slaughtering, and that where it was slaughtered and a blemish was discovered, the bread is, according to the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer, sanctified, for the invalidation is not regarded as occurring before the slaughtering?

The *Gemora* answers: It refers only to such blemishes like cataracts over the eye, and it is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva who said that offerings with such blemishes that were brought up on the altar, they must not be taken down (and should remain there to be burned; this is because they are not so recognizable; evidently, they are valid offerings – to a degree, and therefore, the slaughtering of such an animal will sanctify the bread).

The *Gemora* notes that Rabbi Yehoshua would reply by saying that Rabbi Akiva only holds like this with respect of the validity of the animal itself that if they were brought up they must not be taken down, but he does not say so to such an extent that it can sanctify the bread. (78b – 79a)

Mishna

If libations had already been sanctified in a service vessel when the animal offering (accompanying it) was found to be invalid, the law is as follows: if there is another animal offering (that requires libations), they may be offered with it; but if not, they are left to become invalid by remaining overnight. (79a)

Sanctifying the Libations

Zeiri said: The *nesachim* (libations) become sanctified only by the slaughtering of the sacrifice.

The *Gemora* cites our *Mishna* and asks on Zeiri, for presumably the sacrifice became invalid during the act of slaughtering (and yet the libations are sanctified)!

The *Gemora* answers that it became invalid during the act of sprinkling.

The *Gemora* asks: Would this then be in accordance with the opinion of Rebbe who maintains that where there are two services which render the offering permissible, one can elevate it even without the other? [There is a discussion regarding the two lambs that were offered as a sacrifice on the festival of Shavuos: The lambs sanctify the accompanying bread by

slaughtering the animals. If the lambs were slaughtered for their own sake and their blood was thrown for their own sake, the bread is sanctified. If the lambs were not slaughtered for their own sake and their blood was thrown not for their own sake, the bread is not sanctified. Rebbe maintains that if the animals were slaughtered for their own sake but the blood was not thrown for their own sake, the bread receives a status of *kedushas haguf*, physical sanctity with regard to becoming invalid if they are taken outside the Bais HaMikdash and that they can no longer be redeemed.]

The *Gemora* answers: You may even say that it is in accordance with Rabbi Elozar the son of Rabbi Shimon (who disagrees with Rebbe there), for we are dealing here with a case where the blood had been received in a bowl and spilled out (so there is no possibility to sprinkle the blood); and R Rabbi Elozar the son of Rabbi Shimon holds the same view as his father, who maintained that anything which stands ready for sprinkling is regarded as if it was sprinkled. [Accordingly, the moment that the blood had been received in a bowl, the libations become sanctified; the only time they wouldn't become sanctified is if the sprinkling was performed improperly.] (79a – 79b)

DAILY MASHAL

Libation in Our Era

Rabbi Meir Arik zt"l asked Rebbe Avraham Mordechai of Gur zt"l: Why did *Chazal* say that someone who wants to offer a libation on the altar should provide *talmidei chachamim* with wine (Yoma 71a) rather than reciting the verses concerning libation, as they said: "Anyone who learns about the *chatas* is as though he offered a *chatas*" (Menachos 110a). The Rebbe simply replied, "*Chazal* interpreted this from the verse "this is the Torah for the *'olah* and the *minchah*," etc. but libations are not mentioned there!

On another occasion he replied, "*Chazal* also wanted to leave something for those who don't know how to learn, that they can bring an offering in our era" (*Kemotzei Shalal Rav*, Vayikra, 79).