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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

### ***Redeeming a pure Minchah***

The *Mishna* says that once a *minchah* offering or libation has been sanctified in a vessel, it cannot be redeemed, even if it is impure.

The *Gemora* asks why the *Mishna* teaches us something that is obvious, as once something is inherently sanctified, it cannot be redeemed.

The *Gemora* answers that since the verse calls a sanctified animal with a blemish “impure”, and says we may redeem it, we may have thought that anything impure may be similarly redeemed. The *Mishna* therefore teaches us that something that is impure, but has been sanctified with a vessel, cannot be redeemed, as the case of the animal, although sanctified, has not been sanctified with a vessel.

The *Gemora* cites the *braisa*, which explains the verse about the blemished animal. The verse says that if the sanctified item is any impure animal, which they will not offer it as a sacrifice to Hashem, it may be redeemed. The *braisa* says that this verse cannot be referring to a non-kosher animal, as an earlier verse already stated that if one sanctified an impure animal (i.e., non-kosher), one may redeem it. When the verse refers to this animal as one that they will not offer as a sacrifice, this implies that it will *never* be offered. This limits redemption to an animal with a permanent blemish, as one with a temporary one may be offered once its blemish passes.

Rav Huna bar Manoach challenges Shmuel’s statement, that even a pure *minchah* may be redeemed before it is sanctified in a vessel, from the *Mishna*. The *Mishna* continues by saying that bird offerings, wood for the altar, *levonah* spice, and vessels of the service which became impure may not be redeemed, as the verse only mentions redemption of animals. We understand that animals may not be redeemed, as they are inherently sanctified, and no verse allows for their redemption, but why may not one redeem the rest of the items?

Rav Huna bar Manoach suggests that these items, even when impure, are not considered truly impure:

Wood and *levonah* are not food or utensils, and can only become impure due to their special status of being *kodesh – sanctified*. This only takes effect when they are put to service: the wood when it is chopped, and the *levonah* when placed in a vessel. Until then, they are technically pure.

Vessels, even when impure, can be purified by dipping in a *mikvah*.

This implies that something that is not impure may not be redeemed.

Shmuel answers that since these items are so rare, the Sages did not allow one to redeem them, once they were sanctified. The *Gemora* explains that even wood is rare, since only clean wood, with no infestation, is valid for the altar.

Rav Pappa says that if Shmuel would have known the *braisa*, which states that if one donates an unblemished animal for the maintenance fund of the Bais Hamikdash, it automatically becomes a sacrifice, he would have recanted.



This *braisa* categorically states that something that is valid for the altar will always be a sacrifice, which would include a pure *minchah* offering.

The *Gemora* rejects this, saying that Shmuel did know this *braisa*, but maintained that this, like the *Mishna's* items, was due to the scarcity of unblemished animals, as even a slight blemish in the eye could render it unfit.

Rav Kahana differs with Shmuel, and says that only if the *minchah* is impure may it be redeemed. Some say Rabbi Oshaya agrees with Rav Kahana, and some say he agrees with Shmuel.

Rabbi Elozar says that the only thing redeemed while still pure is the *minchah* flour of a poor *chatas* offering, as the verse refers to the poor person who brings it al *chataso* – on his sin. This teaches that if he designated the flour, and then became rich, he adds on to his donation, and brings the appropriate scale *chatas*. This implies that he would redeem his original flour. (100b – 101a)

### **What is Edible?**

Rabbi Oshaya says that he heard that if one improperly planned to eat a *minchah* in the wrong place or time, Rabbi Shimon would say that the *minchah* cannot become impure. The *Mishna* says that the Sages and Rabbi Shimon dispute whether items that may not be eaten by anyone can become impure. The Sages say they can, while Rabbi Shimon says they cannot. The *Mishna* lists the following items, all of which are prohibited from any benefit:

1. *Orlah* – fruit of a new tree in its first three years
2. *Kil'ai hakerem* – hybrids in a vineyard
3. An ox who killed and must be stoned
4. A calf whose neck is broken to atone for an unsolved murder
5. The birds of a *metzora* who is healed
6. A first born donkey
7. Meat and milk

The *Mishna* says that Rabbi Shimon agrees that meat and milk can become impure, as they were once edible (before they were cooked together). [If one may not eat something, but may benefit from it, it is considered “food that is eaten”, as one can give it to a non-Jew.]

Rav Assi quotes Rabbi Yochanan who explains that Rabbi Shimon says that only food that can be eaten can become impure, since the verse says that “food, which is eaten,...will become impure”. Since a *minchah* which one planned to eat improperly is prohibited from any benefit, it is not eaten by anyone, and Rabbi Shimon would say it cannot become impure.

The *Gemora* asks why Rabbi Shimon says the reason meat and milk can become impure is because they were once edible, as the *braisa* says that Rabbi Shimon says that one may benefit from meat and milk.

The *Gemora* answers that Rabbi Shimon was offering another reason, which is valid even according to those who prohibit benefit from meat and milk.

The *Gemora* challenges Rabbi Oshaya from a *braisa*, in which Rabbi Shimon says that sacrifice meat that was left over after the blood was applied can become impure, but if it was left over without the blood applied, it cannot become impure. Rabbi Shimon continues, saying that a sacrifice that one planned to eat improperly cannot become impure, but a *minchah* that one planned to eat improperly can become impure.

The *Gemora* deflects this, saying the *braisa* is a case where the *minchah* was edible before the improper plan, while Rabbi Oshaya is discussing a case where it was never edible, i.e., when one sanctified the grain while it was still in the ground.

The *Gemora* says that this is a possible answer, if we assume that Rabbi Oshaya says that one may not redeem a *minchah*

that is pure, but if we assume that he says that one may redeem it regardless, it would have been edible, had he redeemed it before his improper plan. The *Gemora* says that since he didn't actually redeem it, this does not make it ever edible, and it cannot become impure.

The *Gemora* challenges this, as Rabbi Shimon says that something that could have happened is tantamount to having happened. The *Gemora* proves this from his statement that a *parah* – red heifer can become impure, since it had a time when it was edible.

Rish Lakish explains that Rabbi Shimon says that even after slaughtering the *parah*, one can redeem it, in favor of a nicer one, and that is enough to make it considered edible.

The *Gemora* deflects this, saying that only in the case of *parah*, where one is *commanded* to redeem the *parah*, if a nicer one is found, do we consider it tantamount to redeemed. However, in the case of the *minchah*, one has no mitzvah to redeem it, and therefore we do not consider it redeemed.

The *Gemora* challenges the statement that anything one is supposed to do is considered done, from the *braisa*, which says that if the sacrifice was left over before the blood was applied, it is inedible. Even though there is a *mitzvah* to apply the blood, we do not consider it done, and the sacrifice is not considered edible. The *Gemora* answers that the case of the *braisa* is when there was not time to apply the blood, and therefore we cannot consider the application done. When the *braisa* says that if it was left over after the blood was applied, it means that as long as there was time to apply the blood, it is *as if* it was applied.

The *Gemora* asks why the case of *piggul* isn't considered edible, as there is a *mitzvah* to apply the blood.

The *Gemora* answers that the case of the *braisa* is one who had the improper plan when slaughtering the animal –

before any application would be relevant - and there was therefore no time at which it was edible. The *braisa* could have said that if one had an improper plan when applying the blood, it is edible, but preferred to teach that *piggul* on a *minchah* is edible, even if done at the time of *kemitzah*. Although it is analogous to slaughtering an animal, since it was edible before sanctification, it can become impure. (101a – 102a)

## INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

### *Impure since it's kodesh – when?*

The *Gemora* says that wood and *levonah*, even when they become impure, are considered pure. The *Gemora* explains that they only become impure due to their special status of *kodesh*, and that impurity can only occur once they've been sanctified by a vessel – the wood by being chopped, and the *levonah* by being placed in a vessel.

Tosfos (101a af) notes that the *Gemora* says that until they've been sanctified, even when they become impure, they are *like* pure. This implies that they are actually impure, but because they haven't become sanctified, we treat them as still pure.

Tosfos explains that once they've been sanctified, they can become impure by the Torah's standards, but until then they can become impure, but only at a Rabbinic level of impurity. The *Gemora* is saying that since they are still pure at a Torah level, they are *like* pure, and may not be redeemed.

Tosfos explains that the *Gemora* (Zevachim 34a), which says that wood and *levonah* only can become impure once they've been sanctified by a vessel, is referring to the same process of sanctification and the same vessels as our *Gemora*, at which point it may become impure from a Torah level.

Tosfos cites Rashi in Zevachim, who says that the *Gemora* there is referring to the wood becoming sanctified when the *Kohen* takes its coals in the fire pan. Rashi would therefore say that our *Gemora*, which refers to the wood becoming sanctified when chopped, is referring to a Rabbinic level of impurity. Furthermore, when the *Gemora* says that before that point, it is *like* pure, it means that it is *actually* pure, since the only impurity, even Rabbinic, only can occur once the wood is chopped.

### **Eaten or not?**

The *Gemora* lists the items that Rabbi Shimon says cannot become impure, because they are not eaten by anyone. Tosfos (101a Pigel) notes that the list does not include an *olah* sacrifice, although it is not eaten by anyone. Tosfos explains that the consuming of the sacrifice by the altar is considered eating, rendering the meat “food that is eaten”, and therefore liable to become impure.

One of the items in the list is the first born donkey, which must be killed. Rashi asks why it is relevant to state that Rabbi Shimon says it cannot *become* impure, as once it is killed, it itself is impure, due to its status as *neveilah* – a carcass. Rashi offers two answers:

1. If it was slaughtered for a non-Jew to eat, then in the time before it has finished moving, it is not considered a *neveilah*, but would be considered food, if it was edible. Since it is prohibited from benefit, Rabbi Shimon does not consider it food.
2. Even once it is a *neveilah*, only a *kazayis* – olive size of the meat would carry the impurity of *neveilah*. If it is considered food, such a small piece can combine with another piece of food, to make a *kabetza* – egg size, the minimum size for food to become impure. Since Rabbi Shimon says it is not considered food, it cannot combine with other food.

### **Changing a mitzvah-object just before its observance**

In recent weeks we have learned *halachos* about the Chanukah lights from many different *sugyos*. This week we conclude the series of articles about Chanukah with a sharp disagreement between two great *poskim* about the *mitzvah* of lighting Chanukah lights while they argue whether the point can be proven from...the *halachos* of the red heifer.

A few weeks ago we addressed the question as to if a person who observed a *mitzvah*, such as the four species, and then found a nicer *esrog*, should observe the *mitzvah* again with the *esrog mehudar* or, since he has already observed the *mitzvah*, he cannot observe it again with embellishment (Vol. 237).

This week we shall discuss a similar but very different question. A person took up the four species but before pronouncing the *berachah*, his friend approached him with a much nicer *esrog*. Should he discard his *esrog* for the better one? Apparently, there’s no reason not to and he even has a *mitzvah* to do so, as a person is commanded to embellish a *mitzvah*. However, the author of *Shvus Ya’akov* and the author of *Chacham Tzvi* disagreed about the matter, also about a person who arranged wax candles in his Chanukah lamp and then obtained olive oil. Should he exchange the candles for the oil or better leave the candles to observe the *mitzvah*?

**Are objects shamed?** The author of *Shvus Ya’akov* adopted the opinion that one should not change a *mitzvah*-object already designated for its *mitzvah* because that would disdain the *mitzvah* whereas the *Chacham Tzvi* maintained that one should exchange the object for a nicer one. First we must examine the essence of their disagreement. Surely a relinquished *esrog* or candles do not feel disgraced or embarrassed! Rather, we should avoid showing disdain for a *mitzvah*. If a person designates an object for a *mitzvah* and even begins the *mitzvah* with it and suddenly rejects the object and doesn’t use it, he disgraces the *mitzvah* because if he would honor it, he wouldn’t have rejected the object that began to serve him for the *mitzvah*. We therefore have

a doubt whether one should use the object set aside for a *mitzvah* to avoid disgracing the *mitzvah* or, since discarding the designated object is only in order to embellish the *mitzvah*, one shouldn't regard such an act as disgracing a *mitzvah*.

The author of *Shvus Ya'akov* (Responsa, 37) ruled that one ought to light the candles prepared for the *mitzvah* in order to avoid disgracing them (see his proofs *ibid*). The *Chacham Tzvi* (Responsa, 45) was asked for his reaction to the ruling and offered a detailed reply in which he rejected the proofs of *Shvus Ya'akov* one by one and posed a serious question based on our *sugya*. Our Gemara explains that, according to Rabbi Shimon, if they slaughtered a red heifer and then found a nicer one, they redeem the one that was slaughtered and observe the *mitzvah* with the better heifer. We thus see that even after slaughtering the heifer, with which they began to perform the *mitzvah*, if they find a finer heifer, they exchange it.

**The difference between a red heifer and the Chanukah lights:** A person who acquired the *sefer Shvus Ya'akov* rushed this serious comment to the author and in his next volume (II, 30) the latter replied that this halachah was known to him. But according to the Gemara's conclusion (Shevuos 11b), the redemption of the red heifer becomes possible by a special condition at the time of its sanctification – “the heart of the *beis din* makes a condition therefore” – that if it will be decided to exchange it, it shall turn out that it was never sanctified. Therefore, there is no proof from the Gemara that it is allowed to disgrace an object designated for its *mitzvah* as the case of the red heifer differs from other instances in that a condition was made in advance that it would not be set aside for the *mitzvah* in certain conditions (see *Beis Meir* in the *Likutim* at the end as for his remarks).

This reply of *Shvus Ya'akov* and the disagreements between him and the *Chacham Tzvi* were cited in dozens of works, including Responsa *Shevet HaLevi* by Hagaon Rav S. Wosner (III, 79), who repudiates the *Chacham Tzvi*'s proof from our

*sugya* in another way. He asserts that we should distinguish between a red heifer, which is like a sacrifice, and the Chanukah lights. The *mitzvah* to embellish a sacrifice is a positive *mitzvah* from the Torah while the *mitzvah* to embellish other mitzvos, interpreted from the verse “This is my G-d and I shall embellish Him”, is a rabbinical decree according to many Rishonim. Therefore, embellishing sacrifices, imbedded in the *mitzvah* itself, obligates exchanging the present animal for a better one, as that is the obligation of the *mitzvah*. However, regarding other mitzvos, where the embellishment is a rabbinical decree, it could be that one shouldn't disgrace the *mitzvah* to embellish it.

## DAILY MASHAL

### *The Hechsher of Chibas HaKodesh*

We learn in our Gemara that there are things not considered food (concerning becoming impure) but because of the “endearment of the sanctified” (*chibas hakodesh*), they are considered food. This concept – “*chibas hakodesh* makes them fit” – is mentioned by Rabbi Baruch, the author of *HaTrumah*, in his poem *Baruch K-l Elyon*: “Anyone who observes Shabbos properly, the *hechsher* of *chibas hakodesh* is his lot”. The *magid* HaGaon Rabbi Shalom Shvadron zt”l of Yerushalayim explained that even someone who only observes Shabbos basically, will have a fine lot and will be helped to feel the exalted sanctity of Shabbos just as dry wood becomes “food” because of *chibas hakodesh* (*Telalei Oros*, Vayikra).