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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

### **Types of Minchah**

Rav Pappa inquired: What is the *halachah* if one said, “I accept upon myself to bring types of *minchah*”? Shall I say that since he said “types,” he obviously meant two *minchah* offerings, and the term “*minchah*” (which is singular) that he used, is because all *minchah* offerings – collectively, are referred to as *minchah*, as it is written: *And this is the law of the minchah*? Or perhaps, since he said “*minchah*,” he meant only one *minchah*, and by the expression “types of *minchah*,” he merely meant the following: “Of all the different types of *minchah* offerings, I accept upon myself to bring one *minchah*”?

The *Gemora* attempts to resolve this from our *Mishna* which stated: If he said, “I accept upon myself to bring a *minchah*,” or, “a type of *minchah*,” he must bring one *minchah*. It follows, however, that if he said “types of *minchah*,” he would have to bring two!

The *Gemora* cites the next clause of the *Mishna* to prove otherwise; it stated: If he said, “*minchah* offerings,” or, “a type of *minchah* offerings,” he must bring two *minchah* offerings (of one type). It follows, however, that if he said “types of *minchah*,” he would bring only one!

The *Gemora* concludes that we cannot derive anything from this *Mishna*.

The *Gemora* attempts to resolve this from the following *braisa*: If one said, “I accept upon myself to bring a type of *menachos*,” he must bring two *minchah* offerings of the same type. It follows, however, that if he said “types of *minchah*,” he would bring only one!

The *Gemora* deflects this proof, for perhaps the inference is that if he said “types of *minchah*,” he must bring two *minchah* offerings of two types.

The *Gemora* asks: But it has been taught otherwise in the following *braisa*: If one said, “I accept upon myself to bring a type of *menachos*,” he must bring two *minchah* offerings of the same type. But if he said, “types of *menachos*,” he must bring two *minchah* offerings of two types. It follows from this that if he said “types of *minchah*,” he brings only one *minchah*!

The *Gemora* agrees with this, but asks that perhaps this *braisa* represents the viewpoint of Rabbi Shimon, who ruled that (when one said, “I take upon myself to bring an oven-baked *minchah* offering”), he may bring half in *challos* – loaves and half in *rekikin* – wafers; accordingly the expression “types of *minchah*,” refers

to that *minchah* offering which may be of two types. According to the Rabbis, however, who ruled that one may not bring half in *challos* and half in *rekikin*, he would then have to bring two *minchah* offerings of two types. (105a)

### **Half Challos; Half Rekikin**

The *Mishna* had stated: If he said, "I specified (a certain type), but I do not recall what type I specified," he must bring all five types.

Rabbi Yirmiyah says that this *Tanna* cannot be Rabbi Shimon, for according to Rabbi Shimon who ruled that he may bring it half in *challos* and half in *rekikin*, then even if Rabbi Yehudah's view were accepted that all *minchah* offerings consisted of ten loaves each, he would have to bring fourteen *minchah* offerings because of the doubt (and not just five). [For he would have to bring eleven possible variations of the oven-baked *minchah*, viz., ten *challos* and no *rekikin*, nine *challos* and one *rakik*, eight *challos* and two *rekikin*, etc., plus the three other kinds of *minchah* offering, a total of fourteen *minchah* offerings. According to Rabbi Meir, who maintains that all *minchah* offerings consisted of twelve loaves each, there are thirteen variations of the oven-baked *minchah*, beginning with twelve *challos* and no *rekikin*, and so the total would be sixteen.]

Abaye said: You may even say that it is Rabbi Shimon, for we have heard that Rabbi Shimon said that one may bring an offering and stipulate about it. [Therefore, in the case of our *Mishna*, he would only have to bring one oven-baked *minchah* of ten loaves

and one of ten wafers (besides the other three types of *minchah* offerings) and stipulate as follows: "If I had specified to bring it all in loaves, or all in wafers, then let the loaves or the wafers be offered in fulfillment of my vow and the others be a donated offering; and if I had specified to bring it partly in loaves and partly in wafers, then let that number of each type which I had specified be offered in fulfillment of my vow and the rest be offered as a donated offering). For it was taught in a *braisa*: Rabbi Shimon said [concerning one who is uncertain if he is obligated in the *metzora* sacrifices for he was a confirmed *metzora* who has now recovered, or was he merely confined and he is not required in any sacrifices]: On the next morning he brings his *asham* offering together with the *log* of oil and stipulates, "If this is a *metzora's* offering, this is his (my) *asham* and this is its *log*, but if not, then this *asham* should be a donated *shelamim*." That *asham* must be slaughtered in the north (like an *asham*), and requires sprinkling of its blood on the thumbs (like a *metzora's* *asham*), and *semichah*, libations and the waving of the breast and the thigh (like a *shelamim*); and it is eaten one day and one night (like an *asham*). And although the master in Tractate *Zevachim* has explained that Rabbi Shimon permitted a man to bring an offering and stipulate about it in the first instance only by a person's remedy (in order for him to become *tahor*), but in all the other cases he permitted it only after the fact, but not in the first instance; that distinction applies only to *shelamim* offerings, since the conditions caused a reduction in time allowed for the eating, and results in offerings being rendered invalid; but in the case of *minchah* offerings (where there is no reduction in the amount of time it may be eaten,



for whether it is an obligation, or whether it is a donation, it may be eaten for a day and a night), he would permit it even in the first instance. (105a - 105b)

## DAILY MASHAL

### ***“You Don’t Know” Is Also Torah***

In many places Rashi takes the trouble to write that he doesn’t know a certain detail (see a list in Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s *Gilyon HaShas*, Berachos 25b). The Chazon Ish zt”l said that this is no empty statement. This is also part of Torah. A learner should say to himself while he learns, “This I know and this I don’t know” (*Sha’arei Aharon, Shulchan ‘Aruch*, I).

### ***We Shall Do and We Shall Hear***

The *Gemora* previously recounted: “Rabbi Yishmael’s nephew, Ben Dama, asked Rabbi Yishmael, Such as myself, who learnt the entire Torah, may I learn the Greek wisdom? He applied to him this verse: This book of the Torah shall not leave your mouth and you shall study it day and night. Find an hour which is neither day nor night and then learn the Greek wisdom.” As learning Torah is meant to know practical *halachah*, and women are obligated to learn the *halachos* applicable to them, they therefore bless the *berachah* on the Torah (*Beis Yosef*, 47). Ben Dama asked Rabbi Yishmael if someone who knows the whole Torah is allowed to learn other sorts of wisdom. Rabbi Yishmael answered that aside from the obligation to learn in order to know, there is also an obligation to learn Torah in order to...learn Torah!

And you shall study it day and night. The *Beis HaLevi* thus explains (in his preface to his work) the high level of the Jews when they first said *na’aseh venishma’* – “We shall do” **before** “We shall hear”. “We shall hear and do” would mean that we will hear and study Torah only in order to practice. However, “we shall do and we shall hear” means that aside from performing, “we shall hear” – we shall learn and learn with no conditions or limits.