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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Rabbi Yehudah son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai ruled: Her husband may enter the Temple and burn incense. But why should not a prohibition be imposed on the ground that the man came in contact with a niddah during the twenty-four hours of her retroactive tumah? — He holds the same view as Shammai who ruled: For all women it suffices to reckon their period of tumah from the time of their discovering the flow. But shouldn't a prohibition be imposed on the ground that the man has experienced an emission of semen? — This is a case where his intercourse was not consummated.

The Mishnah had stated: The sages, however, agree with Rabbi Akiva that one who observed a bloodstain. Rav explained: [She conveys tumah] retroactively and the ruling is that of Rabbi Meir. Shmuel, however, explained: [She conveys tumah] from now onwards and the ruling is that of the Rabbis. 'From now onwards'! Wouldn't this be obvious? — It might have been presumed that, since retroactive tumah for a period of twenty-four hours is only a Rabbinical measure and the tumah of bloodstains at all times is also only a Rabbinical measure, as during the twenty-four hours' period a woman does not convey tumah to the man who had intercourse with her so also in the case of a stain does she not convey tumah to the man who had intercourse with her, hence we were informed [that she does convey tumah to the man]. Might it not, however, be suggested that the law is so indeed (like what you thought)? — [No, since] in the former case there is no slaughtered ox in your presence<sup>1</sup> but here there is a slaughtered ox in your presence.<sup>2</sup>

Rish Lakish also explained in the same way [that tumah is conveyed] retroactively and that the ruling is that of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yochanan explained: [The tumah is conveyed] from now onwards and the ruling is that of the Rabbis.

MISHNAH: All women are in the condition of presumptive taharah for their husbands. For those who return from a journey their wives are in the condition of presumptive taharah.

GEMARA: What need was there to state: those that return from a journey? — It might have been presumed that this applies only to a husband who was in the town, since in such a case the woman thinks of her duties and duly examines herself, but not to a husband who was not in town since the question of [marital] duty does not occur to her, hence we were informed [that the law applies to the latter case also].

Rish Lakish in the name of Rabbi Yehudah Nesi'ah observed: But this applies only where the husband came and found her within her usually clean period. Rav Huna observed: This was taught only of a woman who had no settled period, but if she had a settled period intercourse with her is forbidden.

The Gemara asks: Towards where [does this lead]? On the contrary, the reverse stands to reason, since in the case of a woman who has no settled period it might well be assumed that she experienced a discharge, but where she has a settled period [she should be presumed to be clean] since her period was fixed? — Rather, if the statement was at all made it was made in the following terms: Rav Huna said, This was learned only in the case of a woman the time of whose settled period had not arrived but if that time had arrived she is forbidden, for he is of the opinion that [the laws of] settled periods are Biblical.

<sup>1</sup> Metaphor. Within the twenty-four hours prior to her having observed a discharge.

<sup>2</sup> The bloodstain had actually been discovered.

Rabbah bar Bar Chanah said: Even if the time of her settled period has arrived she is also permitted, for he is of the opinion that [the laws relating to] settled period are only Rabbinical.

Rav Ashi reported as follows: Rav Huna said: This was learned only of a woman who had no settled period that was determinable by days alone but one that was determinable by both days and leaps, so that since the period depends on some specific act it might well be presumed, that she did not leap and that, therefore, did not observe any discharge. Where, however, she has a settled period that was determinable by the days alone, she must have no intercourse, for he is of the opinion that the restrictions relating to settled periods are Biblical. Rabbah bar Bar Chanah ruled: Even if she has a settled period that was determined by the days alone, she is permitted intercourse, for he holds the opinion that [the restrictions relating to] settled periods are only Rabbinical.

Rav Shmuel citing Rabbi Yochanan ruled: If a woman has a settled period, her husband may calculate the days of that period and cohabit with her. Said Rav Shmuel bar Yeiva to Rabbi Abba: Did Rabbi Yochanan refer also to a young wife who is too shy to perform immersion? — The other replied: Did then Rabbi Yochanan speak of one who had actually observed a discharge? It may [in fact be held] that Rabbi Yochanan spoke only of a case where it is doubtful whether or not the woman did observe a discharge and where, [so that] even if some reason could be found for assuming that she did observe one, it may also be assumed that she had since performed immersions, but in a case where it is certain that she had observed a discharge, who could say that she had since performed immersion? And, seeing that it is a question of a doubt being opposed by a certainty [she must be deemed tamei] since a doubt cannot take one out of a certainty. But does it not? Was it not in fact taught: If a chaver died and left a store-room full of fruits, even if they were only then due to be tithed, they are presumed to have been properly prepared. Now here it is a case of certain tevel and there is only the doubt as to whether or not it was tithed, and the doubt nevertheless sets aside the certainty? — No, there it is a case of a certainty against a certainty, in agreement with a statement of Rav Chanina of Choza'ah, for Rav Chanina of Choza'ah said: It is

presumed with a chaver that he does not allow anything to pass out of his control unless it has been duly prepared.

And if you prefer I might say: It is a case of doubt against doubt, since [the man might have acted] in accordance with a suggestion of Rabbi Oshaya, for Rabbi Oshaya said: A man may resort to a device with his produce and store it together with its chaff so that his cattle may eat of it and it is exempt from the tithe.

The Gemara asks: But doesn't a doubt set aside a certainty? Surely it has been taught: It once happened that the female slave of a certain tax-collector in Rimmon threw the body of a premature child into a pit, and a Kohen came and gazed into it to ascertain whether it was male or female, and when the matter came before the Sages they pronounced him tahor because weasels and martens are commonly found there. Now here, surely, it is a certainty that the woman had thrown a premature child into the pit and a doubt whether they had dragged it away or not, and yet does not the doubt set aside the certainty? — Do not read, 'Threw the body of a premature child into a pit' but 'a kind of premature child'. But was it not stated, 'To ascertain whether it was male or female'? — It is this that was meant: And a Kohen came and gazed into it to ascertain whether she had aborted an inflated object or a premature child and, if some ground could be found for assuming that she aborted a premature child, to ascertain whether it was male or female. And if you prefer I might reply: Since weasels and martens are commonly found there they had certainly dragged it away. (15a – 16a)